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A Note on Abbreviations / Naming Conventions 
Within the footnotes a number of abbreviations are used for efficiency, these are 
explained below: 
 
• HC Deb – House of Commons debate 
• HL Deb – House of Lords debate 
• IWM – Imperial War Museum 
• RAF Hendon – The RAF Museum and Archives, Hendon 
• TNA – The National Archives, Kew 
 
In the early 1920s Mesopotamia became Iraq, for the avoidance of doubt the territory 
is referred to as Iraq throughout the text.  
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Introduction 
The evolution of airpower from its inception in the first decade of the twentieth 
century has been something that historians and theorists have written about 
extensively. The focus of much of this writing has been on the traditional role of 
airpower in conventional warfare. While this is understandable given the interest in 
large-scale conventional wars, such as the First and Second World Wars, it is not an 
accurate reflection of airpower's diverse utility and application since its inception on 
the eve of The First World War. This work will focus on the use of airpower by the 
RAF in unconventional operations. In particular it focuses on the relationsip between 
theory, doctrine and operations, and how each of these influence the other. 
 
The Royal Air Force (RAF) has a long history and tradition of operating in overseas 
territories, this has spanned both conventional and unconventional conflict. In its 
formative years the RAF was heavily engaged in performing overseas policing 
duties, in the interwar years this approach to colonial policing became known as air 
control. The recent conflicts in Libya, Syria and Iraq in the 2010s1, all demonstrate a 
preference by the British government to intervene at arm’s length, with an 
inclination not to put substantial combat forces on the ground. Although at times 
significant ground forces commitment has been necessary, for example in 
Afghanistan, the preference is still to use airpower to support special forces and local 
military forces. This is in contrast with prior experience that necessitated significant 
ground force commitment. In each of these contemporary engagements the RAF has 
                                               
1 The conflict in Libya against Gadafi’s regime was as part of a multinational force led by NATO. 
2 
played a leading role, while ground force participation has been restricted to 
specialist roles, including; training, special forces and engineers. This strategy is 
reminiscent of the overseas operations that the RAF undertook in the interwar years, 
known as air control, or air policing operations. The importance of this capability in 
the twenty-first century will be significant, as John Andreas Olsen argues: 
 
Placing increasing emphasis on the “second grammar,” [i.e. 
unconventional operations] as we should, the application of airpower 
must change in order to stay relevant, the fundamentals of airpower 
remain the same, but the use of airpower, and the concepts governing 
its utility, may be very different in the second century of manned flight 
than they were in its first.2 
 
Aim of this work 
Since the end of The First World War, airpower has been used extensively by some 
states in unconventional operations. Surprisingly, very little has been written about 
this role of airpower in comparison to conventional operations, both by historians 
and theorists, and even more surprisingly by air forces themselves. Historians have 
tended to focus on large scale airpower centric events, such as the Battle of Britain, 
the strategic bombing campaigns of the Second World War, cold war dog fighting in 
Korea etc, while theorists have in the main focused on the strategic level, in 
particular the nuclear dimension. Historians for their part have focused on large scale 
airpower centric events due to the large quantities of primary source material 
available, and also undoubtedly due to the apetite for output related to these well 
known events in history. Unsurprisingly air forces have tended to focus their 
attention on the ability of airpower to provide an edge over their traditional 
                                               
2 John Andreas Olsen, Global airpower (Washington, D.C. 2011), p. xvii 
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opponents (i.e. other air forces). This was also a feature of early naval theorists.3  
This focus by air forces can be explained due to the need for air foces of all sizes to 
justify the heavy investment required by states to maintain a modern, capable air 
component. These large budgets can be justified by planning for large scale 
conventional conflict against a peer, not so much for countering insurgents in second 
and third world countries. In contrast, this work will shine a light on the topic of 
airpower in small wars, in particular focusing on the relationship between the theory 
and the practice of deploying airpower in small wars and thus look to fill the gap in 
historiography, as highlighted above.  
 
It will achieve this by focusing on several research areas. Firstly, it will examine the 
development of air power theory and doctrine during this period, providing a high 
level overview of the entirety of airpower theory, and then focusing specifically on 
doctrine and theory relevant to the utilisation of airpower in small wars . Secondly, it 
will examine the practical application of air power in small wars during this period, 
and throughout it will use organizational learning as an analytical framework to 
determine whether or not during this period the RAF can be considered a learning 
organisation. By undertanding this a better determination can be made as to the 
effectiveness of the RAF in a small wars environment in the past, and its ability to be 
succesful in current and future operations. This determination will be based on an 
understanding of whether or not theory and doctrine impacted practical application, 
and whether lessons learned through practical application impacted subsequent 
                                               
3 For example see the work of Alfred Thayer Mahan, in particular The Influence of Sea Power Upon 
History, 1660–1783 (1890) 
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theory and doctrine. The outcome of this research will provide information of 
relevance to both the professional and academic fields within this area and will 
undoubtedly have policy relevance to air forces and governments around the world. 
Furthermore, the focus on organizational learning will have broader appeal as the 
outcome will have applicability in several fields and allow organizations of all types 
to become more efficient and effective at learning and adapting. The following 
section outlines the structure of this work and provides a chapter outline. 
 
Chapter Outline 
To provide a framework through which the different periods can be viewed the first 
chapter of this work will be a theoretical review and methodology. This chapter will 
provide a view on the evolution of airpower theory throughout the entire period, this 
is important to understand how the theory of airpower has developed and evolved 
over the last one hundred years. In addition, this chapter will highlight the sparsity of 
focus on the utility of airpower in small wars. This first chapter will also briefly 
provide context in relation to the development and evolution of counterinsurgency 
theory. Furthermore, this chapter will focus on the area of organisational learning 
and will provide an overview of approaches to this topic while also creating a 
framework through which the information highlighted in the subsequent chapters can 
be viewed. The result of which will be to provide an understanding of how air forces 
learn, why some lessons were learned, and if these learnings can be seen in 
5 
subsequent theory, doctrine and operational practice. Following this theoretical 
chapter, the subsequent chapters will focus on specific time periods.4 
 
The structure of the historical narrative chapters will be based on specific time 
periods throughout the last 100 years that logically dissect the period into sections 
that reflect the main thinking around airpower theory and the approaches of the RAF 
to operations. Each chapter will contain three key sections. The first section will 
discuss the prevalent theory and doctrine of the time. The second will discuss the 
practical application of airpower in the period. The third will act to connect the 
chapters by discussing the issue of organisational learning and whether the practical 
application during one period, influenced the theory and doctrine of the subsequent 
period.  
 
Chapter two covers the period from 1919 to 1939 and will discuss the development 
of airpower theory and doctrine during this time, as well as the practical application 
of airpower in small wars. This will include case studies covering the British 
experience of airpower in the Middle East, Africa and the North-Western Frontier. 
The third chapter will analyse the period 1945 to 1975, this period represents a low 
point in terms of airpower theory and doctrine development, mainly due to the now 
nuclear dimension, however there are particularly interesting case studies during this 
period. The case studies include the British experience in Malaya and Kenya. The 
fourth chapter will focus on the application of airpower in contemporary 
counterinsurgency environments, while also highlighting contemporary thinking on 
                                               
4 These time periods are; the interwar period (1919-1939), post-second World War (1945-1975), and 
Contemporary (2000-2010) 
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airpower doctrine and theory during this time. This chapter will also focus on current 
RAF thinking on asymmetric warfare, and finally it will discuss the portents for the 
use of airpower in these operational environments in the twenty first century. 
 
The concluding chapter will look to provide a summary of findings of this work by 
reference to the key research questions outlined earlier in this introduction.  
 
Before proceeding, it is important to examine the existing literature relevant to this 
area. Furthermore, this section will outline how this work will add to and enhance 
this body of literature. 
 
Literature Review 
Airpower in small wars 
Relatively speaking, the subject of airpower and its utility in small wars has had little 
academic or professional focus over the last one hundred years. This is not surprising 
considering the popularity of the study of conventional airpower in major conflicts; 
however, it has resulted in a history of airpower that is unrepresentative of its actual 
diverse utility. In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s three books appeared that had this 
topic as their central focus. In 1989 Philip Towle published a short monograph 
entitled Pilots and rebels: the use of aircraft in unconventional warfare, 1918-1988.5  
Also in 1989, RAND published a work by Bruce Hoffman titled, British air power in 
                                               
5 Philip Towle, Pilots and rebels: the use of aircraft in unconventional warfare, 1918-1988 (1st ed., 
London; Washington, 1989) 
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peripheral conflict, 1919-1976.6 This was followed quickly by David Omissi’s work, 
Airpower and colonial control: the Royal Air Force, 1919-1939.7 For the next 
decade or so these three works would represent the key monographs focusing on the 
area of airpower in small wars, however in 2003 James Corum and Wray Johnson 
published Airpower in small wars: fighting insurgents and terrorists.8 Later still in 
2009, the Royal Air Force Centre for Airpower Studies published a work titled Air 
power, insurgency and the “war on terror”, edited by Joel Hayward.9 In 2011 the 
Royal Air Force Centre for Airpower Studies published another work on this topic, 
The RAF, small wars and insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939, by Sebastian 
Ritchie.10 This latter work would be the first of a two part series, the second of which 
would focus on the post Second World War period. Also by Sebastian Ritchie, this 
work was titled The RAF, small wars and insurgencies: later colonial operations, 
1945-1975.11 In 2015 we saw the publication of Wings of empire: The forgotten wars 
of the Royal Air Force, 1919-193912, by Barry Renfrew. 
 
Philip Towle’s work, while short, is a significant contribution to this area of study. 
Towle’s background is in strategic studies and international relations and this is clear 
in his work as he successfully places the history in the wider political context. 
                                               
6 Bruce Hoffman, British air power in peripheral conflict, 1919-1976 (RAND Corporation, 1989) 
7 David E Omissi, Air power and colonial control: the Royal Air Force, 1919-1939 (Manchester 
England; New York, NY, 1990) 
8 James S Corum and Wray R Johnson, Airpower in small wars: fighting insurgents and terrorists 
(Lawrence, Kan., 2003) 
9 Joel Hayward (ed.), Air power, insurgency and the “war on terror” (Royal Air Force Centre for 
Airpower Studies, Cranwell, 2009) 
10 Sebastian Ritchie, The RAF, small wars and insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939 (Cranwell, 
United Kingdom, 2011) 
11 Sebastian Ritchie, The RAF, small wars and insurgencies: later colonial operations, 1945-1975 
(Cranwell, United Kingdom, 2011) 
12 Barry, Renfrew, Wings of empire: the forgotten wars of the Royal Air Force, 1919-1939 (Stroud, 
UK, 2015) 
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Within the book he charts the ways in which airpower has been used to attack and 
also to support insurgents, from the RAF policing of colonial territory in the 1920s 
through to the Mujahadeen fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. 
Towle’s research is impressive and yet he himself admits that studying this particular 
area is difficult due to the lack of primary sources from the rebel’s perspective.13 The 
one area in which Towle’s analysis is lacking is the fact that he does not relate his 
history to the wider development of airpower theory and doctrine; this context would 
have proved very beneficial. Nevertheless, Towle’s work is concise, illuminating, 
and based on good primary research. 
 
British air power in peripheral conflict by Bruce Hoffman, is a short work, however 
it provides a concise overview of the different small wars that the RAF were 
involved in during the period, from British Somaliland in 1919, through to Dhofar in 
the early 1970s. The work was published by the RAND Corporation, and sponsored 
by the United States Air Force; because of this its conclusions are focused around 
what the RAF experience in these conflicts could potentially mean to the United 
States Air Force. In conclusion, it addresses some of the issues that were relevant to 
the United States Air Force at the time of its publication, these include themes on air 
defence, the role of technology, the role of helicopters, as well as the role of air 
forces in cooperation and coordination with other military services.14 This 
publication however must be viewed in the light of the period in which it was 
published. What is interesting about this period of reflection within the United States 
Air Force is the fact that the contextual background to this work was still heavily 
                                               
13 Philip Towle, Pilots and rebels: the use of aircraft in unconventional warfare, 1918-1988 (1st ed., 
London ; Washington, 1989), p. 8 
14 Bruce Hoffman, British air power in peripheral conflict, 1919-1976 (RAND Corporation, 1989) 
9 
influenced by the experiences of the Vietnam conflict. It could be argued that the 
focus on the lessons of the British use of airpower in peripheral conflict was a nod to 
the seeming inability of the US to succesfully prosecute airpower in Vietnam, 
particularly in the earlier stages of the war prior to its evolution into a more 
conventional conflict. 
 
Airpower and colonial control is an in-depth academic study of the British policy of 
air control used during the interwar period to police some of Britain’s colonial 
territories. Omissi’s work covers the origins of air policing, its initial use in Iraq and 
its subsequent wider use, he also examines in detail the elements that attributed to its 
adoption for this role, for example geographical considerations, technology, and 
indigenous peoples’ responses to air control. Finally, Omissi compares British 
experience to that of other colonial powers and finds that air control was not a purely 
British phenomenon. Omissi’s work is important for two reasons; firstly, it offers an 
in-depth study of why air control emerged as an approach to colonial policing in the 
interwar years, secondly it considers how airpower was deployed in this operational 
environment and what the results were. Omissi’s work offers a good template for the 
case studies that will be included within this work. Where this work will differ from 
Omissi is in relation to its focus on the relationsip between theory, doctrine and 
operations, and how each of these influenced the other. In essence, how did 
operations impact theory and doctrine, and consequently, did changes in theory and 
doctrine impact how operations were conducted? This impact and influence will be 
analysed with reference to organisational learning.15 
                                               
15 David E Omissi, Air power and colonial control: the Royal Air Force, 1919-1939 (Manchester 
England; New York, NY, 1990) 
10 
 
Airpower in small wars by Corum and Johnson is another significant contribution to 
this area of study. Contained within one work is a history of airpower’s utility within 
this operational environment from the early use of airpower by the US in Central 
America and the Caribbean in the 1910s and 1920s, right through to the use of 
airpower in Middle Eastern small wars up to the year 2000. Throughout this work, 
the authors also provide some varied case studies including; the Greek Civil War, 
counterinsurgency operations in South Africa, as well as the use of airpower by 
South American governments in counter guerilla operations. While both authors 
currently work in academia it is apparent from their approach that they are very 
much writing from a professional military perspective. Both authors have taught at 
American military institutes, and both have served in the armed forces (Johnson is a 
retired USAF Colonel, while Corum is a retired Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army 
reserves). While this approach does not detract from the usefulness of this work, it 
does mean that the result is more of a straightforward history, as opposed to an 
academic analysis (this can be evidenced in the fact that the bibliography is 
comprised of two pages of text, mentioning only a small number of relevant works). 
However, this is the purpose of the work, and in this regard, it succeeds.16  
 
Air power, insurgency and the “war on terror” is a collection of essays edited by 
Joel Hayward and the book is based on a series of presentations given at a 
conference of the same name held in 2007. In this work, the essays seek to analyse 
historical instances of the use of airpower in small wars and counterinsurgency 
                                               
16 James S Corum and Wray R Johnson, Airpower in small wars: fighting insurgents and terrorists 
(Lawrence, Kan., 2003) 
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operations and from this to discern if a pattern exists, if lessons were or could be 
learned, and if a historical analysis can provide information to allow air forces to be 
more efficient and effective in supporting counterinsurgency operations today and 
into the future. This book is extremely relevant to what this work is trying to 
accomplish. Whereas this collection focuses on historical case studies and 
supplements this with two chapters on the future direction of air power in 
counterinsurgency operations, this work will expand on this and look to connect it 
with two key factors that will illuminate the issue further. Firstly, the connection 
between practical experience on the one hand and doctrine and theory on the other, 
and secondly the influence of organisational learning on the past and future ability of 
air forces to learn appropriate lessons from historical experience.17 This work will 
argue that the effectiveness of air forces in prosecuting airpower in small wars is 
directly related to the extent that the air force can be considered a learning 
organisation.  
 
In Barry Renfrew’s Wings of Empire, the author focuses on the period 1919 to 1939. 
This narrow focus allows Renfrew to provide a significant amount of detail in 
relation to the policy of air substitution and air control pursued by the British 
authorities in the interwar years. One disappointing aspect of Renfrew’s work is that 
he concludes that with the outbreak of the Second World War, that the application 
and experience of air control would be lost to the RAF forever. It is hoped that this 
work will show that air control was not lost to the RAF, but rather in the post war 
period their thinking had evolved and that the approach to using airpower in colonial 
                                               
17 Joel Hayward (ed.), Air power, insurgency and the “war on terror” (Royal Air Force Centre for 
Airpower Studies, Cranwell, 2009) 
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conflicts had developed. This evolution and development had been possible because 
of air control, and it owed quite a lot of its DNA to the experiences of the air control 
period.18 As Lietenant Colonel Riched Newton (Retd.) has stated, what is unique 
about Renfrew’s work is his extensive use of oral histories, diaries and papers of 
those involved, this first-person perspective certainly gives the work a lot of 
credence.19 The use of these sources are certainly of interest to this work, however, 
as Newton also noted, what lets this work down is its lack of scholarly precision, 
however the source material has proved beneficial. 
 
While the works above have had airpower in small wars as their central topic, their 
approach in the main has been to tell the history of airpower in small wars. While 
some have placed this history in the context of the wider development of airpower, 
surprisingly little attention has been given to the relationship between the conduct of 
operations and the theory and doctrine relevant to that environment. This is the key 
theme running throughout this work, and is a new approach to this topic that will 
provide valuable analysis of the relationship between the theory, doctrine and the 
practical utilisation of airpower in small wars. While monographs have not in the 
main focused on this relationship, significant scholarly articles have looked at this 
issue, works by Priya Satia and Jafna Cox,20 amongst many others, have been used 
extensively in this work. 
                                               
18 Barry, Renfrew, Wings of empire: the forgotten wars of the Royal Air Force, 1919-1939 (Stroud, 
UK, 2015) 
19 Lieutenant Colonel Richard Newton (retd.), review of Barry Renfrew, ‘Wings of Empire’, in Air 
Power Review, vol. 19, no. 1 (Spring, 2016), pp 144-6, p. 114 
20 Priya Satia, ‘The defense of inhumanity: air control and the British idea of Arabia’, in The 
American Historical Review, vol. 111, no. 1 (February, 2006), pp. 16-51; Jafna L. Cox, ‘A splendid 
training ground: The importance to the Royal air force of its role in Iraq, 1919–32’, The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. 13, no. 2 (1985) pp 157-184, p. 163 
13 
 
The other works identified that contained a significant amount of information on this 
area was Victor Flintham’s 1990 work, Air wars and aircraft: a detailed record of 
air combat, 1945 to the present.21 Flintham’s book is an excellent reference work for 
all air combat from 1945 to the 1980s. The work is heavy on detail and yet light on 
opinion, thus making it ideal reference material; of particular utility are the 
numerous orders of battle and over 200 pictures contained within the book. 
 
As can be seen from the above section there are several published monographs on 
this particular area of study, furthermore, in the past decade there has been a 
proliferation of journal articles published that do address the use of airpower in small 
wars. This undoubtedly has been precipitated by the situation in which western 
coalitions have found themselves in, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Throughout this study journal articles will be used extensively as secondary sources. 
The sources of these articles vary from professional military journals to academic 
journals. Of particular relevance to this study are the articles that have appeared in 
professional military journals. These articles, written in the main by military officers, 
provide an insight into a practitioner’s view of the use of air power in small wars. 
These opinions will be contrasted against the published doctrine and theory, to see 
what if any divergence appears between doctrine and theory on the one hand and 
practical experience on the other. The key professional military journals reviewed 
include; Airpower Journal, Airpower Magazine, Air and Space Power Journal, 
Royal United Services Institute Journal and Military affairs. The key academic 
                                               
21 Victor Flintham, Air wars and aircraft: a detailed record of air combat, 1945 to the present (New 
York, 1990) 
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journals reviewed were; Journal of Military History, Journal of Contemporary 
History and the Journal of Strategic Studies.  
 
This work will add to the literature outlined above and it is hoped enhance it in two 
particular areas. Firstly, in the context of small wars, it will for the first time trace the 
association of theory and doctrine on the one hand, to practical application on the 
other, and secondly, it will use an interdisciplinary approach to look at this 
association through the lense of organisation learning, thus determining whether the 
RAF can be considered a learning organisation. A learning organisation is one that: 
 
[…] typically adds to, transforms, or reduces organizational 
knowledge. Theories of organizational learning attempt to understand 
the processes which lead to (or prevent) changes in organizational 
knowledge, as well as the effects of learning and knowledge on 
behaviours and organizational outcomes.22 
 
Organisational learning will inform this work by trying to show how air forces, 
specifically the RAF, add to, transform or reduce organisational knowledge, while 
also trying to understand the cause and effect of the processes that do this. 
 
To provide further context to this work, it is also important to look at the published 
literature of two related areas, that of general airpower and the other of 
counterinsurgency. Both of which have been researched extensively to provide 
perspective for this work.  
                                               
22 Martin Schulz, ‘Organizational learning’ in The blackwell companion to organizations (2002), 
available at http://www.unc.edu/~healdric/Classes/Soci245/Schulz.pdf (accessed 17 April 2014), p. 1 
15 
Airpower  
There is a large historiography on airpower, none more so than in recent years. The 
key secondary texts used to provide context for this work include; A history of air 
warfare, by John Andreas Olsen, Airpower history: turning points from Kitty Hawk 
to Kosovo, by Sebastian Cox and Peter Gray, The age of airpower, by Martin Van 
Creveld, Airpower: the men, machines and ideas that revolutionized war, from Kitty 
Hawk to Gulf War II, by Stephen Budiansky, Air warfare: history, theory and 
practice, by Peter Gray and Air Power, by Jeremy Black.23 
 
All of these works offer similar analysis of the history of airpower; each charts the 
development of airpower and its utility, while also highlighting key points in its 
history that influenced its application. In the main these works focus on the use of 
airpower in a conventional context. Surprisingly, what they do not include is any 
significant analysis of the use of airpower in unconventional warfare. While Jeremy 
Black does atempt to do this, his work is very broad and as a result lacks any 
significant depth. This gap is surprising when one considers that the bulk of air 
actions in the interwar period were indeed in unconventional operations.  
 
While the above works are general airpower history works, and tend to focus on the 
history of airpower from its inception onwards, there has been a large volume of 
work that focuses on the use of airpower in specific conflicts. Specific works on all 
                                               
23 John Andreas Olsen, A history of air warfare (2010); Sebastian Cox and Peter Gray, Air power 
history: turning points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo (London; Portland, OR, 2002); Martin Van 
Creveld, The age of airpower (1st ed., New York, 2011); Stephen Budiansky, Air power: the men, 
machines, and ideas that revolutionized war, from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II (New York, N.Y., 
2004); Gray, Peter, Air warfare: history, theory and practice (London, 2016); Jeremy Black, Air 
power (Lanham, MD, 2016) 
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the major unconventional conflicts have been used, while specific works on airpower 
technology have also proved very useful, a key example of this is David Wragg’s, 
Helicopters at war.24 Further to these there have been several works that have 
focused solely on the history of airpower theory, and these have been of major 
importance to this work. Foremost amongst these have been two works by Philip 
Meilinger, Paths to Heaven, and Airwar: theory and practice.26  
 
All the aforementioned works, and many more, have provided important context to 
the topic of this work. When analysing a specific subsection of a topic, it is always 
important to understand the broader concepts at play, thus this perspective has 
proven very beneficial. As has been shown in relation to the airpower theory works 
cited above, these have focussed primarily on the use of airpower in conventional 
conflict. This work will use these works as a starting point, but will then divert from 
these to look at airpower theory relevant to unconventional warfare.  
Counterinsurgency 
Of equal importance from a contextual perspective has been an analysis of texts 
related to the field of counterinsurgency history and theory. There has been a 
proliferation of works in the last decade that have sought to understand and analyse 
the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and some have researched historical 
counterinsurgency campaigns to try to uncover approaches that may be applicable to 
these twenty first century insurgencies. In the main the modern literature on this 
                                               
24 David Wragg, Helicopters at war, a pictorial history (London, 1983) 
26 Colonel Philip S. Meilinger, The paths of heaven, the evolution of airpower theory (Maxwell AFB, 
Alabama, 2001); Colonel Philip S. Meilinger, Airwar: theory and practice (London; Portland, OR, 
2003) 
17 
topic is too focused on the most recent conflicts and so lacks context and 
perspective. However, those that have sought to place the current insurgencies within 
a wider historical context have proven to be very valuable.  The ability to analyse 
current conflicts in the context of historical operations is useful for several reasons. 
Firstly, the ability to trace the evolution in theory and practice related to how 
counterinsurgency operations are conducted provides an insight into themes of 
interest to this study, such as organizational learning. Secondly, comparative analysis 
of different counterinsurgency operations is very illuminating in providing specific 
insight into how differing approaches can lead to differing outcomes. 
 
Counterinsurgency in modern warfare, edited by Daniel Marston and Carter 
Malkasian, is one such work. This work is comprised of a series of essays, written by 
leading counterinsurgency experts that address the full historical perspective of 
twentieth century counterinsurgency campaigns, from the Philippines to the modern 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of interest in this work is the focus on patterns and 
lessons learned, which will be a key consideration of this work.27   
 
Other works of a similar vein include; War in the shadows by Robert Asprey, this 
work focuses in the main on the history of US counterinsurgency operations.28 
Learning to eat soup with a knife: counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam, by John Nagl, is a particularly interesting work. As the title suggests, Nagl 
focuses on the approaches to the operations in Malaya (by the British) and Vietnam 
(by the United States) and analyses these to discern if and how British and US forces 
                                               
27 Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds.), Counterinsurgency in modern warfare (Oxford; New 
York, 2010) 
28 Robert B Asprey, War in the shadows (Lincoln, NE, 2002) 
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altered their approach to each operation based on the lessons they were learning at 
the time. Nagl’s approach is very applicable to the idea in this work of trying to 
understand whether operational experience influenced subsequent theoretical and 
doctrinal approaches (i.e. were lessons learned?).29Contextually important to this 
work was also literature critical of counterinsurgeny approaches, among the authors 
reviewed were Douglas Porch and Colonel Gian Gentile.30 
 
Works that brought together different perspectives on counterinsurgency also proved 
very valuable. The works consulted included The Routledge handbook of insurgency 
and countersurgency, edited by Paul Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, and 
Understanding counterinsurgency, edited by Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney.31 
 
The emphasis on counterinsurgency writing in the last fifteen years has been 
warranted. As western powers have become embroiled in lengthy campaigns against 
insurgents and terrorists, there is a natural inclination within the professional and 
academic world to try and better understand the challenges that these engagements 
pose. The conclusions of many of these writers are quite similar. They espouse an 
integrated political-military approach to these types of engagements where the armed 
forces are subordinated to the political authority and where emphasis is placed on 
political, social and cultural aspects of the conflict. The concept of ‘hearts and 
                                               
29 John A Nagl, Learning to eat soup with a knife: counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam (Chicago, 2005) 
30 Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency, exposing the myths of the new way of war (Cambridge, 2013); 
Colonel Gian Gentile, Wrong turn: America’s deadly embrace of counterinsurgency (New York, 
2013) 
31 Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (eds.), The Routledge handbook of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency (Oxon, UK, 2014); Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (eds.), Understanding 
counterinsurgency, doctrine, operations, and challenges (Oxon, UK, 2010) 
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minds’ is a key example of this. There are certainly those that do address the military 
aspects of such conflicts, and in the main the conclusions here focus on the 
advantages of supporting indigenous security forces to carry out operations. 
However there appears to be a glaring deficit in all of this, and that is the 
understanding of the potential role that airpower, in all its guises, can play in these 
types of conflicts. Air strike operations are just one-component of an ever-widening 
role that airpower can play, and it is the intention of this work to demonstrate not 
only where this utility has proved beneficial in the past, but also to ascertain the role 
of airpower in small wars today, and in the future. 
Organisational Learning 
Finally, to provide some context for the organisational learning theme of this work it 
is important to provide some insight into the works that have influenced this 
analysis. Organisational learning is a very complex concept within organisational 
theory. For the purposes of this work some of the key theorists within this area have 
been reviewed and some of the key concepts about organisation learning will be used 
to frame an analysis of the learning process within air forces. At its core, 
organisational learning is concerned with ‘attempt[ing] to understand the processes 
which lead to (or prevent) changes in organizational knowledge, as well as the 
effects of learning and knowledge on behaviours and organizational outcomes’.32 
 
Chris Argyris was one of the first theorists to propose two different kinds of learning 
within organisations; what he termed single-loop and double-loop learning. In his 
                                               
32 M. Schulz, ‘Organizational learning’ in The blackwell companion to organizations (2002), 
available at www.unc.edu/~healdric/Classes/Soci245/Schulz.pdf  (accessed 04 January 2015) 
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1978 work with David Schön, Organizational learning: a theory of action 
perspective, they detail this theory and the work provides some relevant approaches 
that can be used within this work when analysing the air force learning process.33  
 
In 1990 Peter Senge published The fifth discipline: the art and practice of the 
learning organization, in this work Senge seeks to outline the elements that make up 
the ideal learning organisation.34 Senge outlines key elements that must be present 
within an organisation and discusses how these can be implemented, if not already 
present. This work offers key insights into what is required to be a learning 
organisation and thus provides an interesting approach that can be used to analyse 
the RAF and to discern whether they have the elements required to be a learning 
organisation. 
Systems Theory 
Following on from the area of organisation learning is the related discipline of 
systems theory. Systems theory allows the researcher to study a system in-depth and 
consequently understand principles that have applicability in broader contexts. A key 
text that has influenced this area of the research is Robert Flood’s 1999 work, 
Rethinking the fifth discipline: learning within the unknowable.35 What is 
particularly relevant about this work is Flood’s approach to connecting 
organisational learning and systems theory. Whereas Peter Senge tells us the 
characteristics required to be a learning organisation, David Flood tells us the steps 
                                               
33 Chris Argyris and Donald A Schön, Organizational learning (Reading, Mass., 1978) 
34 Peter M. Senge, The fifth discipline: the art and practice of the learning organization (1st ed., New 
York, 1990) 
35 Robert L. Flood, Rethinking the fifth discipline: learning within the unknowable (London; New 
York, 1999) 
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required to improve the organisation to the degree required to become the learning 
organisation so espoused by Senge. Flood’s approach is very relevant in this work as 
it provides key strategies for change that can be suggested, if required, to turn air 
forces into the ultimate learning organisations. 
 
As can be seen from the literature review above there is certainly a gap in research in 
this area and this work will focus on bridging this gap in three specific areas. Firstly, 
there appears to be a lack of academic research related to airpower’s utility in small 
wars. To address this, this work will provide an analysis of the RAF use of airpower 
in small wars in the period 1910-2010.36 This analysis will be based on archival 
research focused not only on the operations conducted by the RAF in small wars, but 
also the policy that governed these operations, as well as the opinion of officers and 
the rank and file in the success, or otherwise, of these operations. Furthermore, this 
analysis will also place these operations in the relevant political and social context. 
 
Secondly, there is a lack of research on the connection between airpower’s utility in 
this operational environment, and the theory and doctrine that precipitates its 
practical application. For the most part research to date has tended to focus 
separately on operations, theory or doctrine. This work will argue, and demonstrate, 
that practical application on the one hand, and doctrine and theory on the other, are 
inextricably linked, and that any thorough analysis must take each into consideration.  
 
                                               
36 While the analysis in this work nominally concludes in 2010, in conclusion, it will also look at 
more recent RAF publications and doctrine that influence the conclusions that have been drawn. 
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Finally, there appears to be a gap in our understanding of how interrelated the 
concepts of learning are with the development, dissemination and practical 
application of doctrine. This work will, through an analysis of past experience, 
proffer an opinion on how historical experience can prove beneficial to 
understanding how modern armed forces can become better learning organisations. 
 
The following section outlines the research methodology used that will address these 
gaps. 
 
Research Methodology 
This work will trace the evolution of the theory and practice of the deployment of 
airpower in small wars from 1910 to 2010. This work will focus on the British 
experience, and thus on the RAF. It will achieve this by examining several research 
areas. Firstly, it will analyse the development of airpower theory and doctrine during 
this period. Secondly, it will examine the practical application of this theory and 
doctrine through a historical analysis of the utility of airpower in small wars. 
Thirdly, this work will assess the issue of organisational learning and through this 
come to a determination as to whether or not the RAF can be considered a learning 
organisation.  
 
While in the main this work will focus on the use of airpower by British forces, it 
will also look at how other air forces have applied airpower within this operational 
environment, particularly from a contemporary perspective. The focus on British 
forces is for two main reasons. Firstly, from the earliest days of military airpower, 
the Royal Naval Air Service, the Royal Flying Corps (RFC), and its successor the 
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Royal Air Force (RAF), were at the forefront of airpower theory and practice.37 
Secondly, the British have used airpower in unconventional ways, from its inception, 
right through to current operations and so is an obvious choice for a study that 
focuses on airpower in small wars. The outcome of this research will provide 
information of relevance to both the professional and academic fields within this 
area. Furthermore, the focus on organisational learning will have broader appeal. 
 
This work sets out to redress the imbalance in coverage outlined earlier and will do 
so by focusing on some key research questions. Namely, was there an evolution in 
airpower doctrine, relative to small wars, in the period 1910-2010? Was airpower 
theory during this period reflected in airpower doctrine?38 Did practical experiences 
of airpower in small wars during this period filter through into subsequent airpower 
doctrine and theory? Does the application of airpower in small wars throughout the 
period provide lessons for its utility in the 21st century? Does the development of 
doctrine during this period tell us something about the ability, or inability, of the 
RAF to implement practical changes based on the evidence of operational 
experience? A key to understanding these different questions is the ability to 
understand the process that governs the development of theory and doctrine, its 
dissemination and education, and its practical application. This process is 
summarised in the following graphic. 
                                               
37 The Royal Flying Corps became the Royal Air Force in 1918 after the publication of The Smuts 
Report in 1917. 
38 Airpower theory in the main are theoretical works published outside of the official military 
structure, whereas doctrine represents the official theory of military forces. 
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Figure 1 - Organisational Learning Process 
 
Source: Created by the author. 
 
It is worth noting that doctrine was not always present in the period that is under 
analysis, however in the main the learning process is valid, in earlier periods the 
capturing of operational lessons and dissemination of this would have been on an 
informal basis. This is evidenced in the publication of articles by service men 
returning from duty and also the curricula of staff college courses. 
 
The above graphic demonstrates a standard learning process that has been adapted to 
address the learning process within military organisations. While it would be naïve 
to believe that all military organisations learn in the same way, it is beneficial to 
utilize a generic model to be able to analyse learning throughout the historical period 
of this study. It is felt that the disadvantages of using this generic framework will be 
outweighed by the insight that such an analysis will provide. Firstly, information is 
gathered from two sources; experience and theory, this is then typically formulated 
into doctrine where the lessons learned are deemed to be of wider application, is 
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disseminated, and provides the basis for education of personnel, and finally this 
doctrine is applied within operational environments. This application then feeds back 
into the initial step (experience and theory) and the process begins once again. This 
work will trace this cyclical process; furthermore, it will seek to understand if and 
why the process has been successful or failed throughout this period. For example, 
were lessons learned from operational experience, if not, why not? Was doctrine 
applied correctly, did doctrine even exist? It will also discuss political and cultural 
context, as the political and cultural environment undoubtedly plays a part in 
influencing armed services, and as a consequence their doctrinal teachings. 
 
These questions will provide very useful information on several key areas. Firstly, it 
will show the evolution of theory and doctrine during the period, while also 
highlighting the successes and failures that have occurred in its practical application. 
It will also help to understand this organisational learning process and through this 
provide some insight into how the process can be improved. 
 
The methodological approach for this work will differ for each of the key research 
themes; airpower doctrine and theory, historical application of airpower in small 
wars, and organisational learning. Firstly, to understand the theoretical and doctrinal 
approach to airpower during the period, an analysis of published doctrine and theory 
on airpower will be conducted. The focus of this analysis will be primarily on 
doctrine published by the Royal Air Force. This analysis will focus on the sections of 
air force and army doctrine relevant to airpower and small wars and will span the 
period from 1910 until 2010. In parallel, this section will examine the theory 
espoused by airpower theorists and understand how and if this was reflected in 
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doctrine. The methodology for this research area will utilise two main archives; the 
UK National Archives in Kew, London and the RAF archives in Hendon.  
 
The second research methodology that this work relies on is an historical analysis of 
the deployment of airpower in small wars. This area of the research relies heavily on 
primary sources and involved archival research in Great Britain, as well as the 
utilisation of primary resources available online. Also of importance was key 
secondary texts, details of which are in the literature review included above. The 
focus of this research is on several case studies that offer a wide range of examples 
of the use of airpower in small wars. Specific case studies examined include RAF 
operations in Iraq in the interwar period, operations in Malaya in the post war period, 
along with RAF operations in Afghanistan and Iraq after 2000. Furthermore, this 
work provides a snapshot view of other appropriate case studies that analyse the use 
of airpower in small wars, for example RAF operations in British Somaliland, Aden, 
Palestine, the Northwest Frontier, and Kenya. 
 
The final research area will involve an analysis of how theory and doctrine were 
translated into practical application; this will be done with an organisational analysis 
framework. Organisational analysis will focus on the area of organisational learning 
and systems theory. Approaches to this will rely heavily on models as proposed by 
Argyris and Schon (1976), Senge (1990) and Flood (1999). It will seek to confirm 
the applicability of the organisation learning process outlined earlier in this work 
(see figure 1) and look to deconstruct this and understand the connections and flow 
of this process.  
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Definition of key terms 
Before proceeding it is useful at this juncture to define some of the terms that will be 
used extensively within this work. Firstly, the theory referred to in the title of this 
work, refers to not only airpower theory, but also doctrinal theory. Airpower theory 
in the main are theoretical works published outside of the official military structure, 
whereas doctrine represents the official theory of military forces. Doctrine can be 
defined as: 
 
Military doctrine is the fundamental set of principles that guides 
military forces as they pursue national security objectives.39  
 
Theory has been around since the emergence of manned flight; however, it must be 
highlighted that doctrine was not always present, and certainly the early aviators 
went to war without an official doctrinal approach. As Group Captain Andrew 
Vallance has said, ‘doctrine is not theory per se, but an inter-active matrix of theory 
and practice’.40 Doctrine in the context of this work encompasses formal as well as 
informal doctrine. Jim Storr summarised the difference eloquently; Storr believed 
that doctrine could be both explicit (i.e. official, published) and implicit (i.e. received 
wisdom).41 Building on this theme, Neville Parton in his analysis of early RAF 
doctrine talks about the body of information that needs to be analysed as including 
official doctrinal publications, interim guidance and notes, as well as staff lectures 
and presentations to institutions like the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).42 
                                               
39 RAND, available at https://www.rand.org/topics/military-doctrine.html (accessed 17 July 2017) 
40 Group Captin Andrew Vallance, Air power, collected essays on doctrine (London, 1990), p. xix 
41 as quoted in Dr. Paul Latawski, The inherent tensions in military doctrine, Sandhurst Occasional 
Papers No. 5 (Surrey, 2011), p. 8 
42 Neville Parton, ‘The development of early RAF doctrine’, in The Journal of Military History, vol. 
72, no. 4 (October 2008), pp 1155-1178. 
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The practice of airpower simply refers to the operational activity of airpower, 
including army, navy and air force assets. Finally, the use of the term small wars is 
significant. In recent times, many terms have come to be used to describe the use of 
military force in unconventional operations (i.e. military activity where the opponent 
is a non-state actor). These terms include; unconventional warfare, low-intensity 
conflict, and military operations other than war (MOOTW), however the term small 
wars, while popular in the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, 
seems to have become unfashionable. So why use it? The term is flexible and thus 
can be used to describe many different types of operations and military conflicts, as 
the Small Wars Journal puts it:   
 
‘Small Wars’ is an imperfect term used to describe a broad spectrum 
of spirited continuation of politics by other means, falling somewhere 
in the middle bit of the continuum between feisty diplomatic words and 
global thermonuclear war.43  
 
For this work its definition is simple, it refers to conflict other than state on state 
conventional warfare. This definition differs little from that posited by Major C.E. 
Callwell in his seminal work Small Wars, their principles & practice, published in 
1896, ‘practically it [small wars] may be said to include all campaigns other than 
those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops’.44 Thus it 
encompasses many of the previously mentioned terms (i.e. unconventional warfare, 
MOOTW etc.). It is believed that the use of this all-encompassing term will allow 
                                               
 
43 http://smallwarsjournal.com/content/about (accessed 30 December 2013) 
44 Callwell, C E, Small wars. Their principles and practice (3rd ed., London, 1906), p. 1 
29 
for a greater view of airpowers wide utility in these types of conflicts, without 
getting bogged down in trying to categorise each type of conflict. 
 
This work will show that the history of the RAF is inextricably linked to small wars 
and counterinsurgencies, it will argue that in the interwar period the RAF developed 
and evolved a system for the successful employment of airpower in small wars, a 
system that would come to be known as air control. Thus, in the interwar years the 
RAF showed all the outwards signs of being a learning organisation. It captured 
knowledge from its experiences, codified this knowledge in ever-evolving doctrine, 
and applied this doctrine to successfully prosecute small wars. However, with the 
end of the Second World War the RAF had lost this connection with small wars, it 
seemed to forget many of the lessons that had been learned in Iraq and elsewhere in 
the interwar period, and when conflicts arose in Malaya and Kenya it needed to 
relearn these lessons. The learning organisation was no more, the connection with 
past experiences had been broken, the knowledge seemingly lost. In contemporary 
operations, the RAF once again needed to relearn earlier lessons, only with the 
publication of AP3000 (4th edition), do we see the emergence once again of the 
RAFs understanding of what it takes to successfully prosecute small wars. 45 This 
was a case not so much of the institutional knowledge being lost, but rather of the 
doctrine not reflecting this knowledge.  
                                               
45 RAF, AP3000 (4th  edition, 2009) 
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Chapter 1 – Theoretical Review and Methodology 
To provide contextual background to this work, this chapter will seek to trace the 
development of theory in the areas of airpower and counterinsurgency (COIN), and 
discuss briefly the confluence of these two areas. Furthermore, this chapter will 
provide an outline of organisational learning theory and dicuss its applicability as an 
analytical tool to assess an organisations ability to learn. This chapter will not 
discuss airpower doctrine, as this will be covered in detail in the subsequent 
chapters. This chapter will also not discuss the theory behind airpower in small wars 
and this is important for a number of reasons; firstly it is important to understand the 
prevalent (i.e. conventional) airpower theory and how it developed over time, thus 
making it easier to place airpower theory relevant to small wars in the wider 
theoretical context and debate; secondly tracing the development of airpower theory 
throughout this period will provide a context in which the subsequent chapters can 
be viewed. For example, in the interwar period the focus of airpower theorists was 
on strategic bombing, however as will be shown later, what the air forces were doing 
during this period was anything but strategic bombing. 
  
Airpower Theory 
The development of airpower theory, unlike its naval and land warfare counterparts, 
has been condensed into what is a very short period of time. It is now only a little 
over a century since the first use of powered aircraft in military operations, however 
within that time a huge amount has been written about its correct employment. 
Airpower theorists have enunciated the advantages of airpower in military operations 
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throughout the last century, however their approaches to, and theories on, the correct 
employment of airpower are varied.  
 
What is important to remember when analysing airpower theory is that theory is 
written for varying reasons and for varying audiences. As Peter Gray has said: 
 
The immediate challenge for the student of air warfare, at any level, is 
to ascertain what is being said by the theorist and, arguably more 
importantly, to analyse why it was written and who was actually 
influenced by the work.46 
 
This is echoed by David Jordan when he talks about the ebb and flow of airpower 
theory, and the fact that its central message seemed to change depending on the 
current viewpoint and the perception of what was deemed to be right at the time.47 
Through the analysis in this chapter, these points will be illuminated. 
 
During the First World War, most of the modern roles of air forces were established; 
close air support (CAS), interdiction, strategic bombing, reconnaissance and 
supply.48 After the First World War however, the emphasis from air theorists was 
centered on the use of airpower in strategic bombardment. The Italian theorist Giulio 
Douhet, the American Billy Mitchell and the Briton Hugh Trenchard, expressed this 
view most notably.  However, when one analyses the use of airpower in the First 
World War the primacy of strategic bombardment is certainly not apparent, indeed it 
                                               
46 Peter Gray, Air warfare, history, theory and practice (London, 2016), p. 37 
47 David Jordan, ‘Air and space power in the contemporary era: 1990-2030’, in David Jordan, James 
D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, Ian Speller, Christopher Tuck, C. Dale Walton, Understanding modern 
warfare (Cambridge, 2016) 
48 Beatrice Heuser, The evolution of strategy, thinking war from antiquity to the present (New York, 
2010), kindle edition, p. 298, location 5979. 
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is obvious that air superiority, close air support and interdiction played a more 
significant part than strategic bombing; reconnaissance certainly did. Also, if one 
looks at the actual employment of airpower in the interwar years, the role of strategic 
bombardment was minimal. The belief of these airpower theorists was that strategic 
bombardment offered a panacea to the inherent stagnation of land warfare as 
experienced in the First World War, this certainly was true of the Italian theorist 
Giulio Douhet.  
 
Giulio Douhet 
In his 1921 publication The Command of the Air, Douhet argued that airpower 
during the First World War was developed within an environment that caused it to 
grow rapidly without enough thought as to its most useful employment. He argued 
that the lessons of the First World War showed that what was required was an 
independent air force, one that would be ‘accorded equal importance with the army 
and navy’.49 Douhet went so far as to espouse the invulnerability of airpower when 
he stated that ‘nothing man can do on the surface of the earth can interfere with a 
plane in flight’.50 While the above statements represented bold views at the time, 
what drew the most ire from commentators was Douhet’s assertion that aerial 
bombardment transformed the civilian populations of belligerent countries into 
combatants.51 Douhet thought long and hard about this idea and formulated a 
strategy for strategic bombardment, utilising bacteriological weapons that would 
                                               
49 Giulio Douhet, The command of the air (1921), in David Jablonsky, Roots of strategy: book 4: 
military classics (Mechanicsburg, PA, 1999), p. 278. 
50 Ibid., p. 283. 
51 Ibid., p. 283. 
33 
seem inhumane today. Douhet argued that in order to create the biggest impact a 
strategic bombing force should utilise three types of bombs, firstly high explosive 
weapons should be used to destroy buildings, secondly incendiary weapons should 
be used to set fire to the destroyed buildings, and finally bacteriological weapons 
should be used to keep emergency services away from affected areas to reduce the 
likelihood of them being able to contain the conflagration.52  In reaction to the 
criticism directed at his 1921 publication of The command of the air, Douhet 
published a second edition of the work in 1927. This second edition built on the 
theories of the first, however his viewpoints were even more radicalized, this was 
probably in response to his perception that the criticism he had received to date had 
been unfair. 53 While the theories espoused by Douhet were not new (the French 
writer Clement Ader and the British writer Sir Frederick Lanchester, were among 
many who wrote about airpower prior to and during the First World War), his 
writing did bring together various theoretical strands into a format that received 
wider attention. As John Buckley so succinctly argues, ‘[…] Douhet had little new to 
say, but as a propagandist and prophet Douhet proved important, even if 
retrospectively so’. 54    
 
The influence of Douhet’s writing was important, his ideas can be seen in the 
airpower theory of countries such as France, Germany, the Soviet Union and the US, 
in the inter-war period.55 However, in the main Douhet’s theories remained insular 
                                               
52 Giulio Douhet, The command of the air (1921), in David Jablonsky, Roots of strategy: book 4: 
military classics (Mechanicsburg, PA, 1999), p. 294. 
53 Azar Gat, A history of military thought : from the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford; New 
York, 2001), p.580. 
54 John Buckley, Airpower in the age of total war (Bloomington, Ind., 1999), p. 73 
55 Azar Gat, A history of military thought: from the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford ; New 
York, 2001), p. 588 
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and received widest attention in his native country of Italy. Certainly, other services 
were aware of Douhet’s work during this time, however the strategic bombing 
theories developed in Britain and the U.S. developed independently of Douhet, but 
undoubtedly there was an awareness of his work. For example, although Douhet’s 
The Command of the air was not translated into English until 1942, excerpts had 
been translated and were circulating in the US Air Service by 1923.56 One theorist 
who met Douhet after the war and was directly influenced by his ideas was General 
William ‘Billy’ Mitchell. 
 
General Billy Mitchell 
General Billy Mitchell was a US Army officer, originally from the Signal Corps, 
who would eventually go on to lead all US air forces in Europe by the end of the 
First World War. Throughout his career Mitchell was driven, driven by his belief in 
himself and in his ideas. This manifested itself particularly once Mitchell had 
decided that airpower represented the single most important military factor in the 
world after the First World War. He believed that 'airpower […] has caused a 
complete rearrangement of the existing systems of national defense'.57 In 1925 
Mitchell published his best-known work, Winged defense, this work represented a 
collage of articles and opinion pieces that Mitchell had previously written and he 
openly admits that the work was 'thrown together'.58 While not as well-crafted or 
structured as Douhet’s work, Winged defense successfully communicates Mitchell’s 
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key theories. Winged defense was not widely read at the time, however Philip 
Meilinger argues that 'Mitchell remains America’s foremost airpower prophet'.59 The 
debate as to Mitchell’s impact on interwar airpower theory is ongoing and beyond 
the scope of this introduction, however Mitchell most certainly had an impact on US 
airpower thinking with his establishment of the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS). 
The degree to which his theories influenced the output of ACTS is open to debate, 
however its establishment alone is very significant. ACTS would provide the 
incubator for American ideas about strategic bombardment in the interwar period, 
specifically it developed the concept of high altitude precision daylight bombing 
(HAPDB). Mitchell did not make many friends during the post war period as his 
drive to espouse the benefits of airpower took little consideration for his peers. 
Mitchell’s relationship with the navy, but also his own army leadership, was openly 
hostile, antagonistic and at times bordered on vitriolic. Speaking in 1934 Army 
Brigadier General Charles E. Kilbourne commented, ‘for many years the general 
staff of the army has suffered a feeling of disgust amounting at times to nausea over 
statements publicly made by General William Mitchell and those who followed his 
lead’.60 It was this inability to tread softly that would lead to Mitchell’s court martial 
in 1925 and his resignation from the Army in February 1926.61 To a certain extent 
his resignation from the Army led to him embarking on a 10-year crusade to promote 
his ideas on air power and its importance in any future conflict. In the ten years 
before his death in 1936, Mitchell published extensively and toured the US 
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promoting his ideas. While Billy Mitchell lamented the lack of focus on US Army 
air power, the United States Marine Corp was heavily utilising air power in Central 
and South America, the fact that Mitchell seemingly ignored this is somewhat 
surprising. 
 
Mitchell’s key theories as outlined in Winged defense were similar to those of 
Douhet, but contained some key divergences. Ultimately Mitchell believed in the 
supremacy of airpower over the other services, and argued that 'neither armies or 
navies can exist unless the air is controlled over them'.62 Due to this importance 
Mitchell argued unceasingly for an independent air force, one that held equal power 
with the army and navy and was controlled by a unified Department of Defence.63 
Mitchell argued that the US forces at the time were inadequate and that ultimately 
'the influence of airpower on the ability of one nation to impress its will on another 
in an armed conflict will be decisive'.64 Where Mitchell’s ideas diverged from 
Douhet was that Mitchell believed that both air defence and pursuit aviation had a 
part to play in national airpower strategy, whereas Douhet did not.65 Also a 
significant divergence is apparent in relation to the targeting philosophy that 
underlined each man’s theories, whereas Douhet identified civilians as legitimate 
targets in the era of total war, Mitchell focused more specifically on targeting key 
enemy infrastructure, however later in his life he 'vacillated about the propriety of 
bombing civilians'.66 Mitchell’s belief in the importance of ‘pursuit’ avaiation would 
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wane within air force circles before the Second World War, although some like 
Chenault espoused its importance, the key focus would be on bombing. 67 
 
As mentioned previously John Buckley’s opinion of Douhet was that he was a 
propagandist and prophet, more than he was a theorist, similarly Buckley argues that 
Mitchell was more of an airpower 'advocate [and] vociferous publicist', than he was 
a theorist. 68  Mitchell focused too much of his effort on putting airpower on a 
pedestal, above the more traditional services, and in doing so he minimised the 
impact his writing could have. While Mitchell certainly was well known within the 
military establishment in the U.S., his wider influence during this period is minimal. 
Hap Arnold lamented that despite the work of Billy Mitchell, ‘we could not have had 
any real air power much sooner than we got it’.69 However, one of the lasting 
legacies of Mitchell was his establishment of the Air Corps Tactical Schools 
(ACTS). ACTS would be at the forefront of developing interwar airpower theory in 
the US. 
 
ACTS 
In the US, as elsewhere in the world, in the wake of the First World War there was a 
divergence of opinion as to the role that airpower had played, and the role it would 
play in future conflicts. This divergence of opinion in the US is aptly demonstrated 
through two quotes, the first from General Pershing (Commanding Officer of the 
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American Expeditionary Force [AEF] in Europe); '…an Air Force acting 
independently can of its own account neither win a war at present, nor, so far as we 
can tell at any time in the future', in opposition we have Captain Robert Webster, 
who stated during an Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) introductory lecture in 
1935, 'airpower is not a new weapon-it constitutes a new force, as separate from land 
power and sea power as each is separate from the other. It has created a trimorph or 
trinity of national defense which now consists of land power, sea power and 
airpower'.70 If the Army Air Service were to survive and thrive in the post war 
environment it would need to differentiate itself from the older services. The 
establishment of the Air Force Field Officers School in 1920, later to be renamed the 
Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) in 1926, began the process that would lead to the 
enunciation and codification of American airpower doctrine and theory that would 
be central to the early strategic bombing campaigns of the Second World War.  
 
As Peter Faber has argued the development of this theory can be understood as a 
three-phase process carried out at ACTS. Firstly, in the period 1920-6 the primacy of 
the bomber was established and the principles of its core employment identified. In 
the period 1927-34 the concept that would govern American airpower doctrine was 
expanded and communicated. This concept would be known as high altitude 
precision daylight bombing, or HAPDB for short. HAPDB was a concept developed 
by a group within ACTS known as the ‘bomber mafia’, this concept would be central 
to the approach known as 'industrial web theory' which involved the precision 
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bombing of an enemy’s industrial and economic infrastructure.71 The third phase 
outlined by Faber would run from 1935-40 and would involve the formalisation of 
this theory into doctrine and the development of target lists that would support its 
employment.72  
 
When in July 1941 President Roosevelt sought submissions to a war plan, Lt. Col. 
Harold Lee George gathered some former ACTS colleagues together and in nine 
days they created the air portion of the requested plan; AWPD-1, while nominally a 
list of material needed to win the war, was in effect 'a blueprint for strategic air 
warfare in Europe'.73 When the US went to war, it was AWPD-1 that they relied 
upon. While the theory formulated and refined over twenty years at ACTS was 
flawed, it did provide a starting point for the development of a war winning strategy, 
and it would subsequently be the 'basis for the development of modern airpower 
theory'.74 Where HAPDB failed was in its belief that strategic bombing could be 
performed during daylight and that strategic bombers would have suitable armament 
to enable them to be self-defensive. This view would be disproven in the early 
sorties flown by the U.S. Eighth Air Force over occupied Europe. The inability of 
the Norden Bombsight to bomb through cloud, and the lack, at that time, of fighter 
escorts, led to some early lessons that needed to be learned. However, it is certainly 
true that this approach would have a significant influence on modern air power 
theory as espoused most notably by John Warden in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
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however by this stage technology had developed to the point whereby the vision of 
ACTS could become operational reality. While ACTS and the U.S. Army Air Force 
was undoubtedly influenced by the theories of General Billy Mitchell, on the other 
side of the Atlantic, the theories that lay at the core of the Royal Air Force, were 
undoubtedly those of Hugh Trenchard. 
 
Hugh Trenchard 
Trenchard represented a polar opposite to General Billy Mitchell in some regards, 
the latter being confident, brash and populist, the former being particularly 
inarticulate, however Trenchard’s strength was his immense knowledge and sheer 
determination.75 As Tami Davis Biddle has noted, 'Trenchard’s bureaucratic talents, 
intransigence, and force of will were to make him a crucial asset to the survival of 
the still-fragile RAF'.76 It was sheer determination that would be required to ensure 
the survival of the RAF in the post war period and then to develop that fledgling 
service into something that could stand alongside the more established services of 
the army and navy. 
 
Whereas both Douhet and Mitchell put pen to paper and published their views in 
monograph form, Trenchard did not, however his theories on airpower can be seen in 
the doctrine publications of the RAF in the 1920s, in his sparse journal publications 
and the publication in Flight of speeches he gave, and also in the way in which he 
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deployed airpower during this period.77 The RAF had come into existence on the 01 
April 1918 following the publication of The Smuts Report into the best organization 
for British airpower. 78  However, in the immediate post-war period the RAF fought 
to maintain its independence in the face of drastic budget cuts and rivalry from the 
older services. Trenchard’s determination to ensure this survival is one of his 
greatest legacies, however from a reading of RAF doctrine publications during and 
after his reign as Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) one can also discern an airpower 
theory that resonates still. His ability to promote the RAF was aided by Sir Samuel 
Hoare in the Air Ministry, between them these men promoted not only the concept of 
air power but also the idea that the RAF was the best organisation to deliver this new 
military force. As Sophy Gardner has argued, the appointment of Sir Samuel Hoare 
was ‘arguably one of the most important miniterial appointments in the RAF’s 
history’.79 
 
Trenchard’s theory of airpower occupies a middle ground between that of Douhet 
and Mitchell, already discussed. As Philip Meilinger argues, 'they [the RAF] chose 
the Douhetian objective of morale, but the Tactical School [Air Corps Tactical 
School] industrial targeting scheme'.80 Trenchard believed that the key use of 
airpower was to influence the will of the enemy population, he believed the way to 
accomplish this was not through terror bombing of population centres, as Douhet 
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did, but through targeting the industrial infrastructure of an enemy in order to 
influence the will of the people, specifically the workers, and by extension the whole 
of the population. While Trenchard was undoubtedly a proponent of strategic 
bombing, he also had a keen understanding of the tactical role that the RAF could 
play in supporting ground forces, and indeed this is the area in which he 
concentrated his resources in the First World War, prior to the establishment of the 
Independent Air Force. During his time in the First World War, Trenchard learned 
three key lessons, firstly that air superiority was crucial, secondly that airpower was 
an inherently offensive weapon, and thirdly that the moral effects of air 
bombardment were greater than the material affects it could cause.81 His thoughts on 
airpower would coalesce with the publication, in 1922, of CD-22 (Operations), the 
first RAF doctrine publication. 82 While this document represented the first major 
doctrinal publication of the RAF, it was not without its issues during the drafting 
stage. Trenchard reviewed proposed changes from the Navy and Army, and 
immediately after its publication the Staff College began revising it as part of its first 
course.83 
 
CD-22 very much drew on the lessons of World War I, furthermore it expounded a 
vision for what the RAF wanted to become. It emphasized three key areas, firstly 
that the air force must cooperate with land forces, secondly it stressed the importance 
of the morale effect of air operations and thirdly, it acknowledged the importance of 
air superiority.84 CD-22 was superseded by AP1300 published in 1928, AP1300 
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reiterated the key points of its predecessor, however it differed in that it proclaimed 
the primacy of strategic bombing above air superiority. 85  What is interesting is that 
CD-22 only devoted a single chapter to air policing, something that since 1919 had 
become the central focus of RAF operations, indeed air policing would be the role 
that Trenchard would focus on in order to ensure the survival of the fledgling RAF. 
 
Air policing, also known as Air Control, was pivotal in presenting the RAF with a 
role to play in the post war world. Due to the ever-increasing focus on budgetary 
restraint, the ability of the RAF to provide a policing function for British overseas 
colonies at a price point that was significantly less than the army was immense. To 
cite one example, the ability of the RAF, in conjunction with ground forces, to put 
down the rebellion in Somaliland at a total cost of £77,000, and in only six weeks, 
represented a saving of millions to Whitehall, who had considered army proposals 
that involved two divisions and millions of pounds.86 While this operation was very 
much a joint operation, the introduction of airpower into this theatre had a decisive 
impact on the ability of British forces to rout and ultimately defeat the rebel forces. 
Based on this success it was unsurprising that the RAF would be looked upon to 
provide similar services in Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan, other British colonial 
territories that required extensive policing.  
 
Although these operations were not always successful, they gave the RAF a role, and 
protected them from the aspirations of the army and navy to get rid of the third 
service altogether. Although these operations kept the RAF busy, ‘the RAF’s only 
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operational experience [in the interwar period] was gained through dropping bombs, 
usually without opposition, on the hillside villages of rebellious peasants', this was 
not something that would prepare them well for the forthcoming war. 87 Indeed, it is 
worth noting that the RAF learned different lessons than their peers during the 
interwar period, as Richard Overy argues, while other air forces focused on the 
lessons to be derived from the Spanish Civil War, notably the importance of close air 
support and air superiority, the RAF believed that strategic bombardment should be 
the focus of independent air forces. The lessons from Air Control seemed to point to 
the effect that bombing had on the morale of the targeted population.88 While 
Trenchard and his protégés espoused strategic bombardment as the key priority of 
the RAF, others within the service also discussed the use of tactical airpower, this 
was the topic of John Slessor’s 1936 book Airpower and armies.89 
John Slessor 
John Slessor was an RAF officer, he was a flight commander in World War I, a 
squadron commander between the wars and he finished The Second World War as 
deputy commander of Allied air forces in the Mediterranean. Slessor’s seminal work, 
published in 1936, was Airpower and armies, and represents a compendium of 
lectures that he delivered at Camberley in the early 1930s.90 Slessor made the 
transition from planning to teaching in the late 1920s. In 1928, he was on the staff of 
the Directorate of Operations and Intelligence, however by 1930 he was on the staff 
of the School of Army Co-operation, and would subsequently teach at Camberley. 
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What is interesting about this book is that an officer who was fundamentally a 
Trenchardian strategic bombing advocate wrote it, and yet it detailed how armies and 
air forces should and could work together in a potential future continental conflict. 
This was undoubtedly due to his work at the School of Army Co-operation in 1930. 
What is also significant about this work is that an RAF officer delivered the lectures 
upon which it was based at Camberley, an army officer staff college. While 
exchange staff postings were not unusual, it is interesting at a time when the army 
and air force were still very much in opposition. Philip Meilinger has called this 
book 'the best treatise on airpower theory written in English before World War II' 
and certainly the book represents a significant evolution in British airpower theory.91 
This evolution can be seen in the move away from a purely strategic focus for 
airpower to one in which airpower supported ground forces. It discussed openly the 
concept of joint operations and support of the Army, something which senior RAF 
officers had been loath to do in the preceding twenty years. Furthermore Slessor 
discussed airpower in the operational sense (i.e. at a theatre level), something that 
had not been done to a great extent by that time and in this way he advocated that 
one of the best uses of the air force to support the army would be in the role of 
interdiction.92 This interdiction role was solidified in RAF doctrine with the  
publication of RAF manual AP1176, employment of Army co-operation squadrons.93 
It was this role that he felt should occupy air forces, with the result that 'the Air 
[force] may stop men and their supplies arriving at the battle-field at all'.94 The 
emphasis by Slessor on army cooperation was not a singular opinion. Sir Trafford 
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Leigh-Mallory wrote on this topic during this period and his writings can be found in 
the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute.95 Leigh-Mallory was a significant 
figure in the RAF and by 1930 had become an expert on Army co-operation, he 
commanded the School of Army Co-operation from 1927, before taking up a post at 
the Army Staff College at Camberely in 1930. 
 
In spite of the tone and topic of Airpower and armies, Slessor was very much a 
Trenchardian at heart, his belief was still very much focused on the ability of a 
strategic bomber force to dislocate and destroy the war making ability and morale of 
an enemy. It was very much this view that would be at the forefront of RAF theory 
and doctrine on the eve of the Second World War. As the Second World War 
proceeded and Allied armies were initially defeated and their air forces proven to be 
a non-factor, an airpower advocate from the US would write a book that would have 
a significant impact on airpower theory.  
 
Alexander de Seversky 
Alexander de Seversky was a 'fighter ace, war hero, aircraft designer, entrepreneur, 
stunt pilot, writer, and theorist'.96 By 1942 the apparent lessons of the Second World 
War were becoming clear, at least in some minds. De Seversky believed that the 
engagements in Norway, during the Battle of Britain, and over Crete, proved 
emphatically that airpower was the 'first and decisive arena of modern conflict’.97 De 
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Seversky was well positioned to spread the message of airpower. He was a veteran 
of the Great War, had worked for the US Government in aircraft design, had founded 
his own aircraft corporation (later to become Republic) and was known and 
respected within America. Interestingly he perceived his message as directed not at 
the military establishment, but rather at the wider US population, he believed that 
only through taking this route would the weight of public opinion force the 
establishment to wake up to the potential of airpower. Where de Seversky differed 
from Billy Mitchell and other airpower advocates was that he was unencumbered by 
service obligations, this is an important point in understanding de Seversky’s impact. 
Peter Gray has argued that because de Seversky was a civilian ‘he expressed 
controversial theories more openly than his military counterparts’.98 At the time of 
writing his 1942 book, Victory through airpower, deSeversky had no ties to the U.S. 
Army Air Force, as such his point of view can be said to be of someone who was not 
influenced by the political manoeuvring associated with inter-service rivalry that was 
rife during this period. 99  This neutrality meant that he could deliver his message 
without having to consider the political nuances of inter-service relations, something 
that his peers like Mitchell, Trenchard and Slessor were certainly influenced by. 
Furthermore, de Seversky had a technical background and thus his opinions and 
predictions on airpower technology held more weight. 
 
De Seversky’s 1942 book, Victory through airpower, would become a Book of the 
Month selection and was read by an estimated 5 million people, furthermore his 
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book was adapted for the screen and released by Disney in 1943. 100  De Seversky’s 
underlying thesis was not wholly different from that which had gone before. Like 
Mitchell and Douhet his theories were not very original, however his ability to 
present a coherent treatise on airpower was what he excelled at. As Philip Meilinger 
has stated 'he was a synthesizer and popularizer - a purveyor of second hand ideas', 
however the fact that he reached 5 million readers and translated his ideas onto film 
bears testimony to the influence he exerted.101 De Seversky advocated the use of 
long-range bombers to strike at the heart of the enemy, which is depicted well in this 
graphic from the aforementioned work: 
 
Figure 2 - Air Force control 
 
Source: De Seversky, Alexander P., Victory through airpower (New York 1942), p. 309. 
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De Seversky argued that if the US did not develop this capability, and develop it 
quickly, that the enemy would appear over American skies and deliver untold 
punishment on the American people. The central premise of Victory through 
airpower was that the lessons of the then three-year-old war needed to be digested 
and acted upon. De Seversky highlighted eleven key lessons:102 
 
1. No land or sea operations are possible without first assuming 
control of the air above 
 
2. Navies have lost their function of strategic offensive 
 
3. The blockade of an enemy nation has become a function of 
airpower 
 
4. Only airpower can defeat airpower 
 
5. Land based aviation is always superior to ship-borne aviation 
 
6. The striking radius of airpower must be equal to the maximum 
dimensions of the theatre of operations 
 
7. In aerial warfare the factor of quality is relatively more decisive 
than the factor of quantity 
 
8. Aircraft types must be specialized to fit not only the general 
strategy but the tactical problems of a specific campaign 
 
9. Destruction of enemy morale from the air can be accomplished 
only by precision bombing 
 
10. The principle of unity of command, long recognized on land 
and on sea, applies with no less force to the air 
 
11. Airpower must have its own transport 
 
De Seversky’s points may have seemed valid at the time, a mere three years into the 
war, however like his forbears he fell down in a number of particular areas. Firstly, 
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de Seversky’s work is based significantly on future capability and as such is more 
prophecy than theory.103 The second is that along with his pronouncements on 
airpower went a scathing attack of the capability and future relevance of the Navy, 
finally, his message was muddied in later years by ill-advised and surprising 
pronouncements, in de Seversky’s case the latter point took the form of a belittling 
of the impact that atomic and later nuclear weapons had on military strategy.104 
Undoubtedly the advent of the nuclear age was to have a profound effect on military 
strategy, and on theory. 
 
Nuclear Theory 
In the first twenty years after the end of the Second World War, nuclear strategy or 
theory, developed several key concepts that define it to this day. Concepts such as 
deterrence, mutually assured destruction and credibility of threat laid the foundation 
for nuclear theory. The irony is that very quickly theorists came to the realization 
that the only credible approach was one that did not involve conflict between two 
nuclear powers. Hence, we see the development of ideas like deterrence and 
mutually assured destruction. This belief was succinctly communicated in National 
Security Decision Memorandum 242, from 1974, it stated that the  
 
fundamental mission of U.S. nuclear forces is to deter nuclear war […] 
in the event that escalation cannot be controlled, the objective for 
employment of nuclear forces is to obtain the best possible outcome for 
the United States and its allies.105 
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It is not surprising that several nuclear strategists came from a background of game 
theory, none more prominent than Thomas Schelling. Game theory allowed 
strategists to run numerous scenarios to see what the outcome of a nuclear conflict 
would be, as mentioned earlier, unsurprisingly, theorists quickly realized that no 
winner would emerge and so a delicate balance of power was required. Bernard 
Brodie was another significant voice amongst nuclear theorists. Brodie’s central 
premise was that deterence was now the key role of nuclear weapons.106 However, in 
1979 Colin Gray argued that in the period since the Second World War nuclear 
strategy and theory had been too concerned with the concept of deterrence and the 
balance of power, and had not actually addressed the fundamental principles of 
strategy that would need to be used should a nuclear conflict break out. In his paper, 
Nuclear strategy, the case for a theory of victory, Gray argues that no matter how 
well deterrence has or will work, fundamentally there is always the possibility for 
nuclear conflict if nuclear weapons exist, thus there had to be strategy dictating how 
nuclear weapons should be employed.107   
 
Thankfully so far, this conflict has not occurred, however Gray’s argument is sound 
and relates in many ways to the perceived deficit in modern airpower theory. Prior to 
the Second World War there were several notable airpower theorists, as outlined 
earlier, after the war nuclear strategists came to the fore. This pivot towards nuclear 
theory is encapsulated in the writing of one of the eminent interwar airpower 
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theorists, John Slessor, as Chief of the Air Staff in the 1950s Slessor’s writing 
became more and more focused on the nuclear paradigm.108 
 
With the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam there would be a requirement for airpower 
theory to once again address some fundamental problems that were experienced 
during these two conflicts. In Korea, the air force set about relearning lessons that 
had been forgotten from the Second World War, Korea, like the Second World War, 
would be one in which tactical airpower would play a key role. Subsequently, when 
US involvement in Vietnam began, tactical airpower was initially demoted; civilian 
and military leaders sought once again to assert the primacy of strategic airpower as 
a decisive war winning strategy. Much to the disagreement of military leaders, the 
civilian decision-makers would decide that airpower should be used in a graduated 
manner, thus the concept of gradualism was adopted, and it would be this theoretical 
concept that would define the approach to the strategic air war in Vietnam. 
 
Gradual Escalation 
At the outset of the war in Vietnam the United States faced several significant 
challenges to its efficient use of airpower. As Philip Meilinger has argued ‘they had 
the wrong doctrine, the wrong aircraft, the wrong ordnance, and the wrong C 2 
system’.110 Meilinger’s conclusions were based on the type of war that the US faced, 
which initially was an unconventional war. However, the US believed that they 
could circumvent these problems by moulding the war to suit their capabilities, to 
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this end they believed that a strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam 
would be able to coerce the North Vietnamese into stopping their aggression against 
the South. The theoretical framework for this approach was to become known as 
gradual escalation. Gradual escalation was a theory put forward by Thomas 
Schelling in his 1966 book Arms and Influence.111 Schelling argued that the use of 
strategic airpower should be done in a graduated manner to communicate to your 
adversary that if they did not comply with your demands that the intensity of the 
bombing would gradually increase. Pauses in activity should be used to allow the 
enemy to consider their options and conclude that continuing their current course of 
action would be futile. There were several issues with gradual escalation and its use 
in Vietnam. Firstly, in the period during which the initial strategic air campaign was 
waged (1965-8) the conflict in Vietnam was very much an unconventional war. 
Guerrilla forces operating in the South relied very little on supply from the North 
and lived mainly from local resources, furthermore the North had little by way of 
strategic targets for the campaign to destroy, thus the amount of coercion that could 
be gained during this phase of the war was minimal. As Meilinger surmises ‘we tried 
Schelling’s theory in Vietnam but found it wanting’.112 This points to a lack of 
understanding by the US of their enemy. 
 
Many have argued that the use of strategic bombing later in the war was much more 
successful and essentially forced the North Vietnamese to negotiate a settlement.113 
However this success needs to be put in context, by this time the nature of the 
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conflict in Vietnam had changed. It now resembled a conventional conflict, in which 
the North Vietnamese could not cope with the casualties in men and materials that 
the US was able to inflict. There have been arguments posited to say that the theory 
of gradualism has its place in airpower theory, and that it was successful during the 
conflict in Kosovo in 1999, however this is a hotly contested issue and one in which 
much more research and analysis is required.114 After the end of the Vietnam War 
we see a re-appraisal of the American armed forces, including the Air Force, 
airpower theorists would also make a departure from the more traditional approaches 
of their forbears. As Philip Meilinger has argued:  
 
the various air theorists tended to become distinguished from one 
another based on their belief as to what was the main centre of gravity 
that should be the focus of a strategic bombing campaign. They did, 
however, tend to assume that air warfare was an inherently economic 
weapon - similar to the blockades and disruption of sea lanes 
characteristic of sea power. Modern air theorists have begun to move 
away from this economic/industrial focus and turned instead towards a 
more leadership or culturally-centered model.’115 
 
 
John Boyd 
One of these modern airpower theorists was Colonel John Boyd. Boyd was a United 
States Air Force fighter pilot who fought in Korea and Vietnam. The air combat 
lessons of these two conflicts were clear to Boyd. If you could think and act faster 
than your opponent you would win. Boyd promoted this idea through a cyclical 
construct he called the OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act).  
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Figure 3 - John Boyd: The OODA Loop 
 
Source: recreated from, John Boyd, Patterns of conflict116 
 
Boyd argued that in air-to-air combat the pilot who could progress through this 
decision cycle faster than his opponent would have a decided advantage, also the 
result of this speed would be to slow down the OODA loop of your adversary, thus 
ensuring victory. It is important to note that the OODA loop is cyclical, and not a 
single event, thus it is important to continue the cycle.117 Boyd stated that the most 
important stage of the loop was the orient phase, within this phase was a process of 
creation and destruction, in which you can breakdown and reconstruct elements and 
use them to your advantage, ‘put differently, the aim of Boyd's maneuver warfare is 
to render the enemy powerless by denying him the time to mentally cope with 
the rapidly unfolding, and naturally uncertain, circumstances of war’.118 Although 
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Boyd never published a monograph of his ideas, the core of his beliefs are to be 
found in a presentation that he worked on for a number of years entitled Patterns of 
conflict.119 Later Boyd would argue that his theories had applicability in a wider 
military historical context, and helped in understanding victory in conflict. While 
this assertion is questionable, what Boyd did in expanding the applicability of his 
theory was to highlight the fact that if you can disrupt the enemy’s thought processes 
at the highest level, then this can lead to significant advantages.120  
 
Boyd was important within an RAF context. Obviously, his experiences in Korea 
were relevant to the RAF, in fact his flight leader in Korea was an RAF exchange 
officer called Jock Maitland. Furthermore, his work on fighter development would 
have an influence on British thinking in this area, in particular in the wake of the 
Falklands War. Boyd’s work on developing the next generation of US fighter 
aircraft, which would become the ubiquitous F-16, certainly influenced the British as 
they too embarked on the development of a new fighter for the RAF. In 1983, a mere 
year after the Falklands conflict, the British would embark on the Future European 
Fighter Aircraft programme.  
 
Another theorist who influenced the RAF on contemporary airpower theory was 
Colonel John Warden.121 
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John Warden 
In 1988 John A. Warden III published a monograph entitled The air campaign: 
planning for combat, this work was the result of research conducted during study at 
the National War College.122 The air campaign focused on the operational level of 
air warfare and discussed how an operational commander should approach a given 
situation. Warden extensively used historical examples to demonstrate his points. 
After this Warden argued that at the strategic level the main target for any air 
campaign should be an enemy’s leadership. Warden demonstrated this through his 
five-ring model: 
 
Figure 4 – John Warden: Five-Ring Model 
 
Source: created by the author. 
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Warden’s theory was that the priority in targeting should be the inner ring of the 
five-ring model and that target priorities should then emanate out from this. As 
Warden states ‘the leaders, are at the strategic center, and in strategic warfare must 
be the figurative, and sometimes the literal, target of our every action’.123 It is argued 
that the precision available in modern airpower allows for this exactitude in 
targeting, as Charles Dunlap argued: 
 
Where once airpower pioneers sought to use bombing to crush the 
morale of entire populations, the technological prowess of today’s 
airpower creates opportunities for airmen to impose extreme stress on 
specific individuals and groups.124 
 
This thinking was not the norm in the late 1980’s. US military doctrine then 
emphasized the concept of AirLand Battle, that essentially focused on the use of 
airpower in support of ground forces. Warden believed that in essence the fielded 
forces of the enemy were the least significant target set, ‘fighting is not the essence 
of war, nor even a desirable part of it. The real essence is doing what is necessary to 
make the enemy accept our objectives as his objectives’.125 What Warden’s theory 
did was to hark back more to the interwar airpower theorists, who at the time 
advocated the strategic benefit of airpower, over its tactical and operational utility. 
Warden argued that if you could attack and disrupt the leadership of the enemy then 
the potentiality existed for a ‘house of cards’ scenario. Warden’s theories would be 
put to the test when he was involved in planning the air campaign against Saddam 
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Hussein’s Iraq in the First Gulf War. The efficacy of the strategic air campaign in the 
First Gulf War is still very much debated,126 however the First Gulf War provides an 
example of how airpower theorists still focus on the strategic effect that they believe 
airpower can offer.  
 
From an RAF perspective, the influence of Warden would appear to be 
understandable. As the main coalition partner in the First Gulf War, the RAF and 
USAF worked closely to execute the air campaign that was architected by Warden 
and ultimately executed by David Deptula.  
 
While Warden’s theory very much focused on targeting leadership, another theorist 
emphasized the power of coercive airpower, however this coercion would be 
achieved through targeting an enemy’s military capability. 
 
Robert Pape 
Robert Pape in his 1996 book Bombing to win: airpower and coercion in war argues 
that as the ability of the American public to tolerate military casualties has waned, 
the use of airpower in overseas conflict has risen, he argues that this has led civilian 
leaders to view the use of coercion as a potential shortcut to military success. In this 
book Pape looked to 'determine the conditions under which coercion has succeeded 
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and failed in the past in order to predict when it is likely to succeed and fail in the 
future', he argued that 'coercion, at least in conventional wars, succeeds when force 
is used to exploit the opponent’s military vulnerabilities'. Pape’s theory essentially 
argues that to achieve coercive success in conventional conflict, the approach should 
be one based on denial, rather than on punishment. Denial essentially is the targeting 
of an enemies’ military capability, to coerce the enemy into believing that his 
military strategy will not work.127  
 
The concepts of coercion and denial are complex ones, however in a conventional 
military context they can be very useful, particularly in a situation where your 
opponent is weaker than yourself. In the realm of unconventional warfare, the idea of 
coercion is very valuable, however in the main it would be the norm for strategies of 
coercion in this operational environment to be promulgated by political forces, such 
as the police, as opposed to military forces. However, as will be demonstrated later 
in this work, at times airpower was used very much to pursue strategies of coercion 
and denial, most notably in the Air Control policies of the RAF in the interwar years. 
 
Airpower Theory Conclusion 
The preceding sections have outlined the evolution of airpower theory from the end 
of the First World War until the 1990’s. There are several conclusions that can be 
drawn from this evolution. The first is that in the main airpower theorists have 
argued for the strategic employment of airpower in conflict, they believe that 
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airpower is an inherently strategic weapon. This focus on strategic effect has meant 
that the use of airpower in small wars has been nearly totally neglected from a 
theoretical perspective until more recently. The second point is that the evolution of 
airpower theory can be said to centre on the theory of targeting. There is a clear 
evolution in thought about the most important target set for airpower, this evolution 
has moved from a focus on people/morale, through industrial/economic targeting, to 
one focused on leadership (see graphic below).  
 
Figure 5 - The Evolution of Airpower Theory 
 
Source – Created by the author. 
 
While this evolution is interesting, it must be remembered that it was not a linear 
progression, however it is a useful lens through which to think about the evolution of 
airpower theory. In the context of the use of airpower in small wars, all of these 
target sets should play a role in the use of airpower in this environment. What is also 
interesting when analysing the evolution of airpower theory is the golden periods. 
Undoubtedly the first golden age was during the interwar period, this is where the 
fundamental theories of airpower were worked out. We then see a significant pivot 
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in the post war period to a discussion dominated by the nuclear dimension. This 
pivot is epitomised in John Slessor. A man in the 1930s writing about army air force 
cooperation, by the 1950s he was talking about nuclear deterrence.128 Finally we see 
a second golden age of airpower theory that encompasses the work of John Boyd and 
John Warden, amongst others. 
 
To provide further context for this work, it is important at this stage to provide a 
brief overview of counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, and how it has developed over 
the last one hundred years. 
 
Counterinsurgency Theory 
The concept of insurgency and counterinsurgency is not new. However, one of the 
reasons it is so hard to comprehend is the ever-changing semantics that accompanies 
it. In essence, an insurgency in its most basic form is an armed opposition to the 
legitimate state power, thus counterinsurgency is the strategy or tactics used to defeat 
an insurgency. James Kiras’ definition of irregular warfare is apt in this regard as in 
the main the tactics used by insurgents are irregular or unconventional,  
 
irregular warfare is defined as the use of violence by sub-state actors 
or groups within states for political purposes of achieving power, 
control and legitimacy, using unorthodox or unconventional 
approaches to warfare owing to a fundamental weakness in resources 
or capabilities.129  
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As mentioned counterinsurgency is not new and has been around ever since armed 
conflict began, however in the context of this work we will focus attention on 
counterinsurgency theory of the late 20th and 21st century. Prior to the Second World 
War there were two key works that attempted to formalize the theory of deploying 
military power in small wars, these were Small wars, their principles and practice, 
by Major C. E. Callwell, and the Small wars manual, published by the US Marine 
Corps. 130   
 
Major Callwell 
Major Callwell published his work based on his experience of serving overseas with 
the British Empire; in particular, he was deployed in the Afghan War of 1880, and 
also the Second Boer War that broke out in 1899.131 First published in 1896, with 
revised editions appearing in 1899 and 1906, Callwell produced the work to provide 
‘a sketch of the principles and practice of small wars’; something that he felt was not 
covered sufficiently in more traditional texts. 132 Callwell’s central premise was that 
irregular warfare must be carried out using a different approach than traditional 
conventional warfare; furthermore, the approach utilized ‘must be modified to suit 
the circumstances in each particular case’.133 Callwell’s work was very much of its 
time and represented the type of operations one would expect of a colonial power, 
however some of his key concepts had enduring value. Callwell argued that 
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conventional forces must use their strengths against the insurgent’s weaknesses, and 
to achieve success commanders must be flexible in their approach.134 Many of 
Callwell’s theories would be revisited after the Second World War when small wars 
would define a generation of warfare. The other seminal work to be published in the 
first half of the twentieth century would be the United States Marine Corps Small 
Wars Manual. 
 
USMC Small Wars Manual 
The Small Wars Manual was first published in 1940 and in essence was an extensive 
‘lessons learned’ document, drawing upon the experiences of the Marine Corps in 
the interwar period, it represented twenty years of lessons learned while fighting 
small wars in the Caribbean and Central America.135 During this period so called 
small wars represented the ‘normal and frequent operations of the Marine Corps’, 
indeed in the preceding 134 years the Marine Corps ‘landed troops 180 times in 37 
countries’.136 It was this vast experience that led the Marine Corps to realise that 
engagement in small wars was very different than conventional operations, small 
wars by their nature tended to be highly politicised whilst also relying heavily on 
diplomatic efforts.137 In particular the Marine Corps identified key areas that 
resonate particularly strongly in contemporary operations, these included the 
importance of stable executive agencies, carrying out routine police functions, and 
                                               
134 James D. Kiras, ‘Irregular warfare’, in Jordan, David (et al), Understanding modern warfare 
(Cambridge, 2008), p. 249. 
135 Major John P. Sullivan, The Marine Corps’ small wars manual and Colonel C.E. Callwell’s small 
wars - relevant to the twenty-first century or irrelevant anachronisms? (Marine Corps University, 
Quantico, Virginia, 2006), p. 1. 
136 United States Marine Corps, Small wars manual (Washington, 1940), p. 2. 
137 Ibid., p. 11. 
65 
also the ultimate goal of withdrawing from the theatre of operations.138 Interestingly 
for this period the Small Wars Manual also discussed the use of aviation in this 
operational environment. After the Second World War, there was little emphasis on 
small wars or counterinsurgency from a theoretical perspective, however this would 
change with the increase in colonial wars in Africa, the Middle East and South-East 
Asia. Another significant work to be published at the time was Counterinsurgency 
warfare, theory and practice, by David Galula. 139 Although Galula’s work was well 
known in France during the 1960s, his impact on British, and in particular US, 
thoughts on counterinsurgency would not be felt until the 2000’s. 
 
David Galula 
Having graduated from St. Cyr military academy in 1939, David Galula would go on 
to serve in the French army in North Africa, Italy, and France during the Second 
World War and would later serve in China, Greece, Indochina and Algeria. In 1964 
Galula published Counterinsurgency warfare while on a fellowship at Harvard, he 
would die three years later. ‘What we propose to do [with this work] is to define the 
laws of counterrevolutionary war, to deduce from them its principles, and to outline 
the corresponding strategy and tactics’, this purpose for Galula was driven by the 
fact that although many had talked about counterinsurgency, few had condensed its 
laws and principles into a single tract that could be used to systematically approach 
the problem of counterinsurgency at the strategic, operational and tactical level.140  
Galula was writing in a period when communist revolutionary war was endemic, this 
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was coupled with the post-war colonial collapse, and while these points show clearly 
throughout Galula’s work, they do not detract from its impact. Galula understood 
that unlike conventional war where military action was the principle instrument, ‘in 
the revolutionary war […] political action remains foremost throughout the war’.141 
Galula also argued that rather than the destruction of the insurgent force being the 
primary aim of the counterinsurgent; rather it should be the protection of the 
population. Only once this has been achieved will the counterinsurgent have the 
upper hand. Galula’s work would once again come to prominence with the 
experiences of the modern-day conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. From a British 
perspective, one of the most influential theorists on counterinsurgency was Robert 
Thompson. 
 
Robert Thompson 
Robert Thompson is widely acknoledged as one of the most significant theorists on 
British COIN. His experiences in the Malyan Emergency between 1948 and 1960 
provided the basis upon which he would build his principles of COIN. These ideas 
coalesced into five core principles: 
 
1. The government must have a clear political aim, to establish and maintain 
a free and independent state which is politically and economically viable  
2. The government must function in accordance with the law  
3. The government must have an overall plan. This plan must strike an 
essential civil-military balance  
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4. The government must give priority to defeating political subversion  
5. A government must secure its base areas first142 
 
The enduring focus of Thompson’s work is the primacy of political over military 
means. This is as applicable today as it was when Thompson was writing. Theorists 
like Thompson and Galula are known as the classical theorists of COIN, the neo-
classicists are all contemporary commentators on modern counterinsurgency theory. 
 
Modern Counterinsurgency Theory 
With the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq unfolding following conventional 
operations in both of those countries, the theory and analysis of counterinsurgency 
has once again come to prominence.  As Thomas Keaney and Thomas Rid state in 
their introduction to Understanding counterinsurgency: 
 
In the years after 2004, a conceptual reorientation of gigantic 
proportions took place inside the US armed forces. […] The debate’s 
range of ideas and the number of its publications, as a result, has 
assumed almost encyclopedic proportions.144 
 
At the forefront of these new discussions has been several authors including; 
Lorenzo Zambernardi, David Kilcullen, John Nagl and Rupert Smith. All of whom 
have emphasised several points that are enduring. The importance of winning the 
support of the population (so called ‘hearts and minds’), the primacy of the political 
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over the military, the tactics of ‘clear, hold and build’, and also a new-found 
appreciation of the importance of the cultural and religious dimension of 
counterinsurgency operations.  
 
Zambernardi argues that the lessons learned from counterinsurgency operations over 
the last 100 years are enduring and that in that sense: 
 
Counterinsurgency doctrine […] has experienced no radical change 
since its original development. It was originally, though not 
systematically, formulated in the twentieth century by none other than 
the British officer, T.E. Lawrence, and later extended, on the basis of 
the writings of Mao, by a variety of counterrevolutionary strategists 
such as the French theorists of la guerre revolutionnaire. Even the new 
counterinsurgency doctrine devised by General David Petraeus in Iraq 
and Afghanistan does not represent a fundamental shift away from its 
traditional understanding, which sees this type of conflict as a contest 
for the support and control of population and, in turn, places the 
security of the populace at the hub of military operations.146  
 
Zabernardi suggests that the succesfull counterinsurgenct faces a trilemma, there are 
three key goals of the counterinsurgent, however only two at any time can be 
successfully prosecuted. Zabernardi illustrates this trilemma with the following 
graphic: 
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Figure 6 – Zabernardi’s Impossible Trilemma of Counterinsurgency 
 
Source – Lorenzo Zambernardi, ‘Counterinsurgency's impossible trilemma’, in The Washington 
Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 3 (2010), pp 21–34, p. 21 
 
Zabernardi concludes by stating that the key to the succesful outcome of 
counterinsurgency operations is the capacity of political leaders to understand and 
accept human costs. 
  
David Kilcullen honed his theoretical perspectives on counterinsurgency from his 
first hand experience of the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The 
abiding principle of Kilcullen’s view of counterinsurgency is that: 
 
There are no fixed, standard operational techniques in COIN. It is a 
form of “counter-warfare” that morphs in response to changes in the 
character of an insurrection.147 
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From this viewpoint Kilcullen created what he describes as the three pillars of 
counterinsurgency, these are represented in the graphic below: 
Figure 7 - David Kilcullen, Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency 
 
 
Source – David Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: theory and practice, 2007’, (2007) available at 
http://usacac.army.mil (accessed 17 April 2014) 
 
David Kilcullen has held influential posts within the US, including, senior counter-
insurgency advisor to General David Petraeus in 2007-08, and also special advisor 
for counter-insurgency to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. 
 
 
John Nagl’s work on counterinsurgency has focussed in the main on the aspect of 
organisational learning and as such will be dealt with in the next section.  
 
In The utility of force, Rupert Smith argues that so called ‘war amongst the people’, 
is now the predominant form of military conflict and it is within this context that this 
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work attempts to understand the historical and contemporary role, if any, for 
airpower in small wars.148 
 
While the above sections have outlined the theoretical evolution of both airpower 
and counterinsurgency thought, before proceeding further it is important to provide a 
quick survey of where there has been a theoretical confluence between these two 
areas. The description of this section as a short survey is apt, as from a theoretical 
perspective there has been little emphasis on airpower within counterinsurgency. A 
telling example of this is that when the US Army published FM 3-24, its new 
counterinsurgency manual in 2006, it dedicated only four pages to the role of 
airpower in this operational environment.149 This doctrinal neglect has followed the 
theoretical neglect. The clear majority of airpower theorists (from Douhet all the way 
through to Warden), as outlined earlier in this chapter, have had little if anything to 
say about this topic. This is not surprising, especially considering the ‘hearts and 
minds’ approach to modern counterinsurgency operations. The role of airpower 
within this environment is an uncertain one. In the post- Second World War era, the 
perception was that the key roles for airpower in small wars revolved around air-
mobility, air-lift and reconnaissance, and that there was not a significant offensive 
role for airpower in counterinsurgency. This perception is and was wrong, as will be 
shown in subsequent chapters, offensive airpower played a significant role in this 
operational environment, from the 1920s right through to the present day. For 
example in modern counterinsurgency operations one strategy that has come to the 
fore is that of ‘decaptitation’, where counterinsurgents target insurgent leaders with 
                                               
148 Rupert Smith, The utility of force: the art of war in the modern world (London ; New York, 2005) 
149 ‘Army Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency’, (December 2006), available at 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=468442 
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the expectation that this will have a negative impact on the insurgent organisation, 
airpower is playing a significant role in enabling this strategy.150 Furthermore, in 
recent times with the unfolding of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq there has been 
an increasing call from within air forces to define what a potentially more important 
role within counterinsurgency operations may be. Writers like Philip Meilinger and 
Dennis Drew have argued that airpower has a role to play, however as yet a 
convincing holistic thesis has yet to be put forward.151  
 
Through an analysis of the evolution of doctrine and theory in this area, and a survey 
of the historical use of airpower in small wars, it is the hope of this work to attempt 
to answer the question; to what extent can airpower play a role in counterinsurgency 
operations in the twenty-first century? 
 
Organisation Learning 
During this period, Royal Air Force officers began to amass a 
substantial body of knowledge on what worked and what did not when 
using air power to police the empire. By the mid-1930s, that knowledge 
had been codified and was being taught at the RAF Staff College and 
the Imperial Defence College.152 
 
This work, as outlined in the introduction, seeks to understand the relationship 
between theory and doctrine, and the practical application of airpower in small wars 
from 1910 to 2010. To better understand the process of creating, disseminating and 
                                               
150 The benefits of the ‘decapitation’ strategy are much debated, for discussion see Geraint Hughes, 
‘Intelligence and special operations’, in Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (eds.), The Routledge 
handbook of insurgency and counterinsurgency (Oxon, UK, 2014), pp 114-5 
151 P. S. Meilinger, ‘Counterinsurgency from above’ in Air Force Magazine (July, 2008), pp 36-9; 
Dennis M. Drew, ‘U.S. airpower theory and the insurgent challenge: a short journey to confusion’, in 
The Journal of Military History, vol. 64, no. 4 (1998), pp 809–832 
152 David J. Dean, ‘Airpower in small wars’, in Air University Review (1983) 
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applying approaches to the use of airpower in this context, the area of organisational 
learning will be analysed to understand how, if at all, the concepts of organisational 
learning were applied by the military. Although organisational learning as a concept 
did not exist for much of the period under study, this approach will help to show how 
in fact the organisations under consideration did in fact learn and evolve. To 
contextualise this approach this section will provide an analysis of organisational 
learning theory, and through this identify the key points that will inform the analysis 
in the subsequent chapters.  
 
Organisation learning is of relevance to the military for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
the accelerated use of technology within the military means that new systems are 
introduced constantly, thus requiring the training of personnel and the evaluation of 
how best to use these new systems within a combat environment. Secondly, the 
varied nature of military deployments and force structure means that modern military 
forces need to be equipped to meet a wide range of combat scenarios; conventional, 
unconventional and peace support operations. Thirdly, modern military forces are 
vast, thus there is a requirement for a consistent approach to the use of force, this 
consistent approach is built on a foundation of doctrine, thus organisational learning 
is the ideal approach to analysing and understanding the process by which doctrine is 
created, disseminated and applied by military forces. While doctrine has existed 
throughout this period, this work will also examine how doctrine has changed, and 
whether doctrine, as we would consider it today, was used as extensively and in the 
same manner throughout the period. 
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This section will begin by describing why this approach is of benefit to the wider 
research aim, following this it will look at two distinct areas of organisation learning. 
Firstly, it will provide an overview of the main theoretical underpinnings of 
organisation learning theory and the related area of systems theory, secondly it will 
look at how organisational learning theory and systems theory has been applied in a 
military history context. This chapter will conclude by providing a summary of the 
key areas of organisational learning that have been identified as relevant to this 
work, and it will sketch out how these key points will inform the subsequent 
research. 
 
Why is it relevant to this study?  
The development of military doctrine, theory and practice has never been a linear 
process. The shift that occurred in military technology during the First World War 
(e.g. the introduction of tanks, airpower etc.) meant that from that point on doctrine 
(i.e. how you used military force) would be an important element of any military 
capability. This was even more evident in the air forces; as the rate of technological 
progress accelerated, pilots were being pushed to their physical and intellectual 
limits, the only thing that could alleviate this was a comprehensive and consistent 
approach to the use of air power in military combat. This approach was built upon 
two parallel elements; training and doctrine. Even as early as the First World War, 
air force commanders witnessed the folly of sending under-trained men to the front 
lines, however it was a necessary evil alleviated by the fact that the supply of men 
and machines was plentiful. However, as technology progressed and training became 
more of an investment, the unit cost of an aircraft and its trained crew became 
significant. No longer were men and machines so easily replaced. During the First 
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World War some British pilots reached the frontline with only fifteen hours of solo 
flying experience, today a British fast jet pilot’s initial training will last for twenty 
one months.153 Similarly, due to the emergence of airpower in the First World War, 
doctrine was non-existent in an official sense, although there was an RFC training 
manual, the lack of official doctrine meant that during the war strategy and tactics 
evolved based on the changing operational environment and technology available. 
However, after the war air forces could analyse the conflict and thus began to codify 
doctrine based on the apparent lessons of that conflict. 
 
The key elements that influence how military power is constructed and applied 
include experience, theory and technology, all of which represent inputs into the 
doctrinal development process. The development of doctrine is a critical factor in 
how air forces approach utilising their resources. Only through the development of 
doctrine can you understand the application of air power and how your pilots will 
need to be trained to align with these goals. Thus, the development of doctrine 
becomes a crucial factor in how air forces approach combat scenarios; small wars 
being a case in point. As mentioned earlier, doctrine is created through a process of 
inputs, these typically are experience, technology and theory. The key question of 
this work is whether these inputs led to an evolution in the theory and practice of 
deploying airpower in small wars during the period under consideration. 
Organisational learning will act as the framework through which the learning, or lack 
of learning, within air force organisations can be identified and analysed.  
                                               
153‘Extracts from a Digest of Services of the Central Flying School, Upavon’, TNA, Air 1/1/2310/17; 
for details on initial RAF fast jet pilot training see, https://www.raf.mod.uk/recruitment/roles/roles-
finder/aircrew/pilot/ (accessed 23 September 2017) 
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Organisation learning is a valid analytical framework for this topic for several 
reasons. To determine whether air forces evolved their approach to utilising airpower 
in small wars it is important to determine whether they learned from their 
experiences and whether this learning was translated into doctrinal evolution, and 
ultimately an evolution in the way in which airpower was utilised in a small wars 
context. One way in which to do this is to understand whether air forces can be 
considered as learning organisations, the extent to which they are should be apparent 
in doctrinal change—both formal and informal—and the subsequent practical 
application of airpower. Research in this work will focus on determining whether air 
forces, specifically the RAF, did indeed learn from their experiences in operating in 
a small wars environment, and whether this learning is discernible from an analysis 
of airpower theory, doctrine and practical application throughout the period in 
question. Also, this will allow for an analysis of whether their approach to learning 
had an impact on the things that they did, and did not, learn. This analysis will be 
informed by the concept of organisational learning. Before outlining the 
organizational learning theory that influenced this work, in the first instance it is 
important to outline the concept of doctrine and explain how it is relevant to 
understanding a military organisations ability to learn and evolve. 
Military Doctrine 
There are many definitions of military doctrine. Since the establishment of NATO, 
the definitions have coalesced for those countries operating within that organisation. 
For the purposes of this paper the definition used by the UK will be applied, this 
definition is from the United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms 
and Definitions, it defines doctrine as:   
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Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions 
in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in 
application.154 
 
 
As hinted at in the above definition, doctrine acts as a framework, or a platform, 
upon which military action is built. It provides the guidance to commanders as to the 
best way to apply military force in each situation.  
 
Denis Drew and Don Snow argue that doctrine is made up of three types of doctrine; 
fundamental, environmental and organizational.155  Fundamental doctrine represents 
the core building blocks, it is typically ‘broad and its concepts are abstract’. 
Fundamental doctrine rarely changes as it relates to immutable concepts. 
Environmental doctrine is more specific and is focused on the operational 
environment (i.e. land, sea, air or space), it provides guidance on the employment of 
military forces within a specific operational environment. Finally, organizational 
doctrine, as the name suggests, focuses on how a military organization operates, 
‘typically it discusses roles and missions of an organization, current objectives, 
administrative organization, force employment principles’ and so on. These different 
types of doctrine are interrelated and taken together are the doctrinal beliefs of a 
military organisation. 
 
Doctrine comes from several sources, however the primary input into the doctrinal 
process is experience. Essentially doctrine should be based on the past successful 
                                               
154 Dr. Paul Latawski, The inherent tensions in military doctrine, Sandhurst Occasional Papers No. 5 
(Surrey, 2011) 
155 Dennis Drew and Don Snow, Making strategy: an introduction to national security processes and 
problems, chapter 11, August 1988, pp. 163–174, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/drew1.htm (accessed 24 January 2016) 
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employment of military force. Furthermore, other factors can have some bearing on 
the doctrinal creation and evolution process, these include technology and theory. 
One of the greatest challenges in creating doctrine is that organisations do not rely 
too heavily on the experiences of the past. A key example of this is the inability of 
the French army in the Second World War to deal with the mobility of the German 
army, the French doctrine of the time was based on their experiences of the First 
World War, and it did not take into consideration the advances in firepower and 
mobility that occurred in the intervening decades. Thus, as Drew and Snow argue, 
‘doctrine can become irrelevant if the assumptions that support it are not frequently 
reexamined for their continuing validity’.156 
 
There are those who argue that doctrine is not the cornerstone of military beliefs, but 
rather one of several factors. Austin Long argues that in fact organizational culture 
has ‘a much greater influence on the conduct of operations than written doctrine’, 
furthermore he states that ‘the culture of military organizations does more to shape 
doctrine than doctrine does to shape military operations’.157 What is insightful about 
Long’s view is that he highlighted the differences between doctrine as written and 
operations as carried out. For Long this was glaringly true in Vietnam. Although in 
Vietnam, particularly after Kennedy became president, there was a strong focus on 
counterinsurgency doctrine, in fact operations in the main were aligned to the 
doctrine of high intensity conflict. He argues that this was because of ‘long years of 
                                               
156 Dennis Drew and Don Snow, Making strategy: an introduction to national security processes and 
problems, chapter 11, August 1988, pp. 163–174, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/readings/drew1.htm (accessed 24 January 2016) 
157 Austin Long, Doctrine of eternal recurrence, Rand Counterinsurgency Study (California, 2008), p. 
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training and education [where] officers are inculcated with patterns of thinking that 
reflect [their military] culture’.158 
 
The arguments put forward by Long are somewhat echoed in the writings of Jim 
Storr. Storr believed that doctrine could be both explicit (i.e. official, published) and 
implicit (i.e. received wisdom).159 This view of doctrine dovetails well with a key 
element of this work, that argues that both formal and informal doctrine existed 
within the RAF, and this will be a topic examined in more detail in subsequent 
chapters. 
 
Organisation Learning Theory & Systems Theory  
Organisational learning is a relatively new discipline having been developed in the 
1970’s. Organisational learning and the concept of the learning organisation has in 
the main focused on the business world, and as such is primarily concerned with how 
businesses learn and grow. However, this approach can and has been applied to any 
organisational setting. Similarly, systems thinking, a related discipline, is also a 
comparatively new concept and one that has been used to complement and accelerate 
the theories espoused in the field of organisational learning. 
 
Key theorists in the field of organisational learning and systems thinking include; 
Chris Argyis, Donald Schon and Peter Senge. In the 1970’s Chris Argyis and Donald 
                                               
158 Austin Long, Doctrine of eternal recurrence, Rand Counterinsurgency Study (California, 2008), p. 
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159 Dr. Paul Latawski, The inherent tensions in military doctrine, Sandhurst Occasional Papers No. 5 
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Schon proposed that organisations learned in two distinct ways; single-loop and 
double-loop learning.160 Single-loop learning refers to the process whereby 
organisations learn based on the difference between expected and obtained 
outcomes. In contrast, double-loop learning, occurs when organisations learn based 
on understanding and questioning the underlying values, assumptions and policies 
that led to the action in the first place. Double-loop learning is as a result a higher 
level of learning than that experienced in single-loop learning. An example of this 
from a military context would be whereby an army tries to learn from the failure of 
an operation (single-loop learning) as opposed to understanding why the operation 
was approached in the way it was in the first place (double-loop learning). One of 
the key concepts underpinning organisational learning is knowledge: 
 
Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual 
information, and expert insights that provide a framework for 
evaluating and incorporating new experiences and information. It 
originates and is applied in the minds of knowers. In organizations, it 
often becomes embedded not only in documents or repositories but also 
in organizational routines, processes, practices, and norms.161 
 
The ability of an organisation to utilize knowledge is very important. The ability to 
identify, process and utilize information is paramount, as Nonaka and Takeuchi 
argue: 
 
Organizational knowledge creation should be understood as the 
process that "organizationally" amplifies the knowledge creation by 
individuals and crystallizes it at the group level through dialogue, 
discussion, experience sharing, or observation.162 
                                               
160 Chris Argyris and Donald A Schön, Organizational learning (Reading, Mass., 1978) 
161 Thomas H. Davenport, and Laurence Prusak, Working knowledge, how organizations manage what 
they know (Boston, 1998), p. 5. 
162 Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi, The knowledge-creating company (New York, 1995), p. 
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This is very evident in military organisations, particularly in the concept of After 
Action Reports (AAR). 
 
Following on from the work of Argyis and Schon, and many others, Peter Senge 
published his seminal work on organisational learning and its connectedness with 
systems thinking. This work, published in 1990, was The fifth discipline, the art and 
practice of the learning organization.163 While Senge focuses on the commercial 
world, his theories have applicability in any organisational structure, none more so 
than the military. Ultimately Senge’s work is concerned with transforming 
organisations into learning organisations. Senge proposes that there are five 
disciplines that organisations must implement in order to achieve this.  
 
Figure 8 - Peter Senge's Five Disciplines 
 
Source – Created by the author from, Peter M. Senge, The fifth discipline: the art and practice of the 
learning organization (revised edition, London, 2006) 
                                               
163 Peter M. Senge, The fifth discipline: the art and practice of the learning organization (Revised 
edition, London, 2006) 
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Senge’s theories have significantly influenced this work and as such it is important at 
a high level to sketch out the main elements of his thinking. Senge argued that for an 
organisation to become a learning organisation it needed to understand the 
disciplines that would ultimately achieve the desired transformation from a 
traditional authoritarian structure to one in which learning is at the core of all an 
organisation does. The five disciplines are; personal mastery, mental models, 
building shared vision, team learning and systems thinking. Personal mastery ‘is the 
discipline of continually clarifying and deepening our personal vision […] and of 
seeing reality objectively’. Mental models ‘are deeply ingrained assumptions, 
generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the 
world and how we take action’. Building shared vision is ‘the capacity to hold a 
shared picture of the future we seek to create’. Team learning is essential, ‘unless 
teams can learn, the organization cannot learn’. Finally, systems thinking is the 
discipline that enables all of the others, ‘systems thinking is a conceptual framework 
[…] to make the full patterns clearer, and to help us see how to change them 
effectively’. 168 In order to assess whether or not the RAF can be considered a 
learning organisation, Senge’s five disciplines can be used as a kind of checkbox to 
see what, if any, of these elements are present, or evolved over the last one hundred 
years. While it would be futile to attempt to shoe-horn air force learning into these 
exacting modern day disciplines, they will act to inform the research and as such 
give a view of whether air forces developed any of these traits during their evolution, 
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and indeed whether this type of approach has been or could be of benefit to air forces 
in the challenges that they face today.  
 
Modern Interpretations 
Organisational learning is a very popular discourse. Many of the modern theorists 
working in this area draw from, and build upon, the core elements first espoused by 
the likes of Argyris, Shon and Senge, mentioned earlier. Although a vast literature 
exists, and is growing rapidly, for the purposes of this work it suffices to highlight 
some particular theorists and their views which have informed the approach to 
organisational learning taken in this work.  
 
Popper and Lipshitz, in their work, Organisational learning; mechanisms, culture, 
and feasibility, discuss some key theoretical questions on organisational learning. 
Namely, ‘(1) what are the similarities and differences between organizational 
learning and individual learning? (2) what conditions promote organizational 
learning? (3) what conditions promote productive organizational learning? and (4) 
how is organizational learning related to learning organizations?’. 170 In answering 
these questions Popper and Lipshitz argue that fundamentally a learning organisation 
is one in which learning is institutionalised within a culture of learning, furthermore 
they state that it is straightforward to ascertain whether a particular organisation (eg. 
an air force) is a learning organisation, this can be achieved by: 
 
mapping its organizational learning mechanisms, the culture in which 
                                               
170 M. Popper and R. Lipshitz, ‘Organizational learning’, in Essential readings in management 
learning; mechanisms, multure, and feasibility (London, 2004), p. 37 
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they are embedded, and the contribution of both to improved 
performance and members’ ability to change the organization’s 
mission and values (i.e. single-loop and double-loop learning, 
respectively).171 
 
This approach is very useful, simply it allows a determination to be made, of 
whether an organisation is a learning organisation, by analysing several key 
elements. These are, how does the organisation facilitate learning (both individual 
and group), does the organisation promote a culture of learning, and do these two 
elements, if present, combine to produce an improvement in organisational 
performance.  
 
Linda Argote in her work Organisational learning, creating, retaining and 
transferring knowledge, proposes an analytical framework to use when trying to 
understand organisational learning.172 This framework highlights several internal and 
external inputs and processes that effect an organisations learning ability, this is 
demonstrated in the graphic overleaf. In essence:  
 
The figure portrays an ongoing cycle through which task performance 
experience is converted into knowledge through organizational 
learning processes. Task performance experience interacts with the 
context to create knowledge. The knowledge flows out of the 
organization into the environment and changes the organization’s 
context, which affects future learning.173 
 
One of the key components of Argote’s theory is the idea of the organisational 
context and its impact on organisational learning. By organisational context, Argote 
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means all of the elements of an organisation that help to shape and define it, these 
would include elements like structure, history, goals, incentives and vision.174 Within 
a military organisation, these type of contextual elements are extremely important 
and thus Argote’s approach is very relevant within a military context. Argote argues 
that this context interacts with the experience of an organisation and the resulting 
output is knowledge. Experience can be acquired in several ways, firstly through 
learning by doing, secondly by after action reviews.175 Once again these ways of 
acquiring experience resonate well within a military context.  
 
Figure 9 - Argote's theoretical framework for organisational learning 
 
Source: Linda Argote, Organizational learning (Pittsburgh, 2012), p. 33 
                                               
174  Linda Argote, Organizational learning (Pittsburgh, 2012), pp 33-4 
175 Ibid., p. 38 
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In summary, Argote argues that her framework can show how there are three key 
elements of organisational learning; experience, context and knowledge. Argote 
posits that experience interacts with an organisation’s context and that this leads to 
knowledge creation and that ultimately organisational learning is concerned with 
creating, retaining and transferring knowledge, the more efficient this process, the 
greater the capacity of the organisation to learn. 
 
Another relevant area is in relation to the danger of knowledge, and learning, 
becoming too institutionalized and thus difficult to change. As Crossan, Lane and 
White argue, ‘because learning that has become institutionalized at the organization 
level is often difficult to change, it runs the risk of becoming irrelevant’.176 Within a 
military context this is an inherent danger of doctrine, doctrine thus should be seen 
as a:  
 
living intellectual body of thought that draws on the past, lives in the 
present, evolves, develops and, if necessary, gives way to a new 
thinking relevant to the present or anticipated future operational 
conditions and changing weapons technology.177 
 
Having provided an overview of the key theorists and development of organisation 
learning theory, the next section addresses specifically the use of organisational 
learning theories within a military context. 
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Organisational learning studies within a military context 
The armed services have been an interesting area of analysis for writers, 
organisational learning theorists and historians alike, and many have used the 
concept of organisational learning to try and better understand the performance of 
armed forces in several conflicts. Its large bureaucratic nature and requirement for 
continual training and education has led many theorists to analyse how military 
organisations learn, and how the propensity to learn, or lack thereof, within these 
organisations has manifested itself through operational performance. This analysis of 
military learning has accelerated in recent decades with the seismic shift in the type 
of operations that major western forces have been asked to do. In the main this 
analysis has focused on the U.S. military and the training and education of the 
military in the post-Vietnam era, and has tried to discern whether the shift in 
emphasis from conventional to unconventional warfare at the operational level, has 
filtered through to a shift in the focus for doctrine, education and training.  
 
Within the U.S. in the post-Vietnam era there was an aversion to any doctrine or 
training that was reflective of the experiences of Vietnam, thus the U.S. military, and 
the army moved to the other end of the spectrum. Instead of creating doctrine and 
training based on the counterinsurgency lessons of Vietnam, they focused on 
conventional land warfare.178 The result was the publication of AirLand Battle 
doctrine, a doctrine based not on the experience of Vietnam, but on a theoretical take 
on modern conventional warfare, one which had been influenced by contemporary 
experience in the likes of the Arab-Israeli wars of the 1970s and 80s. It would be this 
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theme that would percolate through to military training and education programmes, 
thus the opportunity to benefit from the experiential knowledge accumulated in 
Vietnam was lost. This lost opportunity can be explained by the fact that the U.S. 
military believed that the next conflict that they would be involved in would be a 
conventional war against Soviet forces on the plains of Central Europe, thus the shift 
away from the unconventional operations of Vietnam, to a more conventional 
approach enshrined in AirLand Battle. This inability to capture the knowledge from 
the experiences of Vietnam in doctrine did arguably influence the effectiveness of 
early operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, once those conflicts changed from 
conventional to unconventional operations. As AirLand Battle became the doctrinal 
bible for U.S. Military forces, thus it also influenced America’s other allies within 
NATO, such as the British.179 
 
As stated, in recent years many writers have attempted to decipher the conundrum 
that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have presented, this has in part been 
attempted through an analysis of previous relevant conflicts, such as Vietnam. This 
section outlines some of these contemporary studies, and looks at some of the works 
that have been published relating to learning within a military context. It concludes 
by providing some information on how these studies are relevant to this work, and 
how their findings have informed the research and analysis presented later in this 
work. 
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One of the key works when looking at military learning is John Nagl’s seminal work, 
Learning to eat soup with a knife.180 Nagl looks to contrast the experiences of the 
British Army in Malaya, with the U.S. Army in Vietnam, and through this 
understand how and why the British Army appeared to be able to successfully 
conduct counterinsurgency operations in Malaya, but the U.S. Army could not do so 
in Vietnam. In describing the goal of his work, Nagl acknowledges the important 
part played by the concept of organisational learning to understand and analyse the 
performance of a military organisation. Nagl uses Richard Downie’s definition of 
learning as: 
 
a process by which an organization uses new knowledge or 
understanding gained from experience or study to adjust institutional 
norms, doctrine and procedures in ways designed to minimize gaps in 
performance and maximize future success’.181  
 
Thus Nagl posits that one way in which the organisational learning process can be 
studied is through an examination of doctrine, and also an examination of the 
curricula of military schools and training institutes, the latter providing a window 
into institutional norms. 
 
One of the key questions that Nagl sets out to answer is whether in each scenario—
Malaya and Vietnam—the Army in question can be considered a learning 
organisation. This mirrors one of the central research questions of this work. Nagl 
seeks to answer this question by asking several research questions, namely; does the 
army promote suggestions from the field, are subordinates encouraged to question 
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superiors and policies, does the organization regularly question its basic 
assumptions, are high ranking officers routinely in close contact with those on the 
ground and open to their suggestions, and finally, are standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) generated locally and informally or imposed from the center? While not 
wholly applicable to organisational learning within air forces, this approach has 
certainly informed this work. 
 
In conclusion Nagl argues that the success of the British Army, and the failure of the 
U.S. Army, was because of institutional culture, ultimately organisational culture is a 
‘decisive determinant’in a military organisations effectiveness.182 Furthermore, Nagl 
argues that the difference between conventional and unconventional warfare is so 
vast, that if a military organisation is established and trained to succeed in one, that it 
is impossible to also be successful in the other.  
 
David Fitzgerald, like John Nagl, focuses on the importance of doctrine in his work 
Learning to forget: US Army counterinsurgency doctrine and practice from Vietnam 
to Iraq.183 Emphasising the importance of doctrine in understanding a military 
organisation, Fitzgerald argues that, ‘it [doctrine] offers a very useful repository of 
the institution’s memory and of historical lessons. Not only that, but doctrine is often 
one of the key terrains over which battles over identity and memory are fought’.184 
Interestingly Fitzgerald also highlights the importance of informal doctrine, this he 
argues can be discerned from several sources including; course curricula at military 
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learning institutions and the opinions of junior officers as communicated through 
professional journals and student papers. There is a third element that Fitzgerald 
highlights alongside formal and informal doctrine, that of lessons learned material, 
from institutions like the Combined Arms Center (CAC), the Combat Studies 
Institute, and also the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL).185 Fitzgerald 
argues that analysed in combination these three sources offer ‘a unique way of 
looking at both how historical narratives can shape the Army’s culture and identify 
how that very culture can affect the way in which narratives are constructed’.186 The 
idea of the creation and recreation of narratives around past experiences is a central 
pillar of Fitzgerald’s thesis. He argues that lessons and experience are evolutionary, 
and that the lessons of any experience (eg. Vietnam), can be presented in numerous 
different ways and the narrative constructed to fit in with contemporary thought. 
This he argues explains the differing interpretations of the lessons from Vietnam that 
were presented in the decades after that conflict. 
 
Fitzgerald concludes that the ability of military organisations to change can be 
driven by internal innovation, as opposed to external influence, however in the main 
these innovations are because of traumatic events, he highlights Vietnam, and the 
Iraqi insurgency, as two examples of traumatic events that drove innovation within 
the U.S. Army.187  
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Janine Davidson in her work, Lifting the fog of peace, how Americans learned to 
fight modern war, argues that to understand whether organisational learning is 
present in an organisation, we must first understand what it is.188 Organisational 
learning, she posits is distinguished from individual learning within an organisation 
due to the fact that the results of organisational learning will remain within an 
organisation even if the individuals involved no longer remain.189 Thus in order to 
determine if organisational learning is present, we must seek evidence of learning 
that remains in an organisation after the event. Within a military context this can be 
evidenced by ‘tactics, techniques, and procedures learned in action at one point in 
time are applied at the start of action at a later date’.190 In this one quote Davidson 
has summed up the central theme of this work, by tracing the evolution of theory, 
doctrine and practice of deploying airpower in small wars over a long period, it 
should be possible to trace if air forces learned the lessons of their experience—
through organisational learning—and thus modified their doctrine and practical 
application of airpower in subsequent operations. 
 
Davidson describes a basic learning cycle that should be present in organisations that 
exhibit organisation learning. This cycle contains three key elements:  
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Figure 10 - Davidson's organisational learning cycle 
 
Source - Janine Davidson, Lifting the fog of peace, how Americans learned to fight modern war (Ann 
Arbor, MI, 2011), pp 22-3 
 
Scan refers to the ability of organisations to capture the lessons of their experience, 
interpret is to ‘make sense of the information, to track themes and trends over time, 
to identify cause and effect and to synthsize and codify the information in a format 
that can be disseminated [eg. doctrinal publications and course curricula]’. Finally, 
to act is to complete the dissemination of the new information and to apply the new 
learning in a practical sense.191  
 
Pierre Barbaroux and Cécile Godé-Sanchez, in their paper, Acquiring core 
capabilities through organizational learning, set out to understand: 
 
the development of core capabilities through organizational learning. 
It insists on the variety of learning types which must be articulated in 
order to provide organizations with effective core capabilities […] 
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discriminating between various learning and training mechanisms 
according to their (i) type, (ii) level and (iii) context, we develop a 
conceptual framework to study organizational learning as a dynamic 
capability which enables the organization to develop core 
capabilities.192 
 
Barbaroux and Godé-Sanchez are interested in understanding how organisations 
adjust their core capabilities to meet ever-changing challenges. They seek to gain 
this understanding using organisational learning theory. They see organisational 
learning as the enabler for evolving core capability using education and training. 
Organisational learning, they argue, must be viewed in terms of the different types 
(i.e. individual or collective) and levels (i.e. first, second and third order of learning). 
First order learning complexity corresponds to the articulation of (simple) types of 
learning (e.g., learning by doing) which can be either individual or collective. 
Second order learning complexity is based on the combination of distinctive learning 
types which relate to different levels (e.g., single versus double loop) and knowledge 
processes (e.g., tacit versus explicit knowledge). Third order learning complexity 
relates to the articulation of different learning types, levels and contexts (e.g., 
learning in teams versus learning in communities). 
 
Ultimately Barbaroux and Godé-Sanchez apply their theoretical framework 
(comprised of learning types, learning levels and organisational context) to three 
U.S. Army training programmes, they conclude that organisational learning is indeed 
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a dynamic capability that 'enables the organization to manage various degrees of 
organizational learning complexity'.193  
 
Anthony DiBella, in his article, Can the Army become a learning organisation?, a 
question reexamined, attempts to lay out an approach for building learning capability 
within organisations.194 At the core of Di Bella’s article are three key research 
questions; ‘How does the Army learn and why? What does it learn? And how is that 
learning aligned with its mission and strategy?195 These three areas combined lead to 
the attainment of the goal; organisational learning. The third question is key, as Di 
Bella argues, ‘for organisations to learn strategically, learning resources and 
processes need to be directed toward attainment of the organization’s mission and 
strategy’.196 Thus an organisation needs to align its learning to the overall goals of 
the organisation, within a military context that means that theory, doctrine and 
education need to be aligned, any misalignment in these factors will point towards an 
organisation that is not truly a learning organisation. This alignment between theory, 
doctrine and practice is something that this work will examine in detail. 
 
Philip Rotmann, David Tohn and Jaron Wharton in their paper Learning under fire: 
the US military, dissent, and organizational learning post 9/11, argue that the ability 
of the U.S. Armed forces in Iraq to adapt to fighting a counterinsurgency war in the 
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years after the 2003 invasion represented ‘a remarkable institutional 
accomplishment’.197 The authors argue that this accomplishment was achieved by 
junior and senior officers who were innovative despite institutional constraints. 
These constraints were because of the abhorrence of all that was associated with the 
Vietnam experience (in particular the counterinsurgency lessons) and also an 
institution overly influenced by the technological revolution of the 1980s and 90s. 
The authors further argued that it was these institutional constraints that 
fundamentally limited the ability of the armed forces to ‘learn and adapt at the 
operational and strategic level’.198 Although the U.S. military had all the outward 
trappings of a learning organisation, including after-action reviews, lessons learned 
studies and many other instruments of institutional learning, they were a learning 
organisation in part only. The top down, bottom up approach discussed by the 
authors mirrors the idea of formal and informal doctrine discussed earlier in this 
chapter. Rotmann and his colleagues argue that the top down approach, spearheaded 
by General David Petraeus, impacted on formal doctrine (i.e. FM 3-24), while the 
bottom up, informal approach changed the way in which junior officers on the 
ground did their daily jobs. This parallel effort from both ends of the leadership 
spectrum resulted in the ‘remarkable institutional accomplishment’. This 
accomplishment resulted in a process of ‘tactical and operational learning [which 
allowed the military to be] more of a learning organization by encouraging 
                                               
197 Philip Rotmann, David Tohn, and Jaron Wharton, ‘Learning under fire: the US military, dissent 
and organizational learning post-9/11,’ Belfer Center Student Paper Series #09-04, (Cambridge, MA, 
May 2009.), p. 4 
198 Ibid., p. 7 
97 
independent thinking on the part of field leaders, promoting open communication, 
making space for questioning’.199  
 
The way of looking at the issue of organisational learning as outlined by Rotmann, 
Tohn and Wharton is very relevant to this work. In particular, the concept of looking 
at both formal and informal doctrine, while also taking account of the influence of 
junior officers in shaping institutional change is beneficial and is an approach that 
will be applied in this work. 
  
Max Visser, in his paper Organizational learning capability and battlefield 
performance, discusses the relative battlefield performance of British and German 
troops in the Italian campaign during the Second World War.200  While this is not 
directly relevant to this work, what is interesting in Visser’s paper is that he relates 
battlefield performance to the militarie’s organisational learning capability. He 
argues that this capability is related to an organisations ability to detect and correct 
errors. This capability has four distinct dimensions; degree of empowerment, degree 
of error openness, degree of knowledge conversion, and degree of adequate human 
resource management and development.201 He argues that the German army’s 
superior battlefield capability in the period studied, is directly related to the degree to 
which their organisation successfully implemented these four dimensions. Visser’s 
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approach to analysing an organisation using the four dimensions mentioned above 
dovetails well with some other approaches outlined in this chapter. 
 
Definitions 
To frame the influence which these concepts have on the subsequent research of this 
work it is important in the first instance to define what are the central concepts and 
what do we mean by them. This work will seek to understand in part whether the 
RAF can be considered a learning organisation, this will be achieved by analysing 
the development of air power theory, doctrine and practice relevant to the use of 
airpower in small wars, specifically it will focus on the impact that doctrine and 
theory had on operations, and the impact that practical application had on subsequent 
theory and doctrine. Three key concepts; organisational learning, systems theory and 
the learning organisation will inform the research. What is meant by organisational 
learning is that: 
 
Organizational learning typically adds to, transforms, or reduces 
organizational knowledge. Theories of organizational learning attempt 
to understand the processes which lead to (or prevent) changes in 
organizational knowledge, as well as the effects of learning and 
knowledge on behaviours and organizational outcomes.202 
 
Thus organisational learning will inform this work by trying to understand how air 
forces add to, transform or reduce organisational knowledge, while also trying to 
understand the cause and effect of the processes that do this. For example, what 
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impact did the experience of colonial policing have on the RAF in the years 
preceding the Second World War?  
 
The idea of systems thinking is a central reality in the drive to create learning 
organisations, only through a system-wide view can we understand the underlying 
causes and effect of what we do. As Peter Senge so succinctly defines it: 
 
Systems thinking is a discipline for seeing wholes. It is a framework 
for seeing interrelationships rather than things, for seeing patterns of 
change rather than static "snapshots."203 
 
In the case of this work this systemic view will be vitally important. Did air forces 
take a systems thinking approach, or rather did they evolve their thinking in silo’s, 
thus not appreciating the impact as experienced throughout the organisation. For 
example, the development of post Second World War U.S. aircraft technology was 
focused on two things; the ability to bomb the Soviet Union, and the ability to 
prevent the Soviet Union from bombing the U.S. The result of this approach was that 
when the Korean War began the U.S.A.F. inventory was more geared towards this 
role rather than providing tactical air support, something that they had evolved to a 
level of mastery by the end of The Second World War. This capability gap was 
bridged by utilising some older aircraft (eg. the F-51), while also heavily relying on 
US Marine Corp assets. Similarly, since the US is currently embroiled in more than a 
decade of counterinsurgency operations are they making another silo’d decision by 
wanting to retire the A-10? The ability to trace evolutionary change through seeing 
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advances in theory and the consequent changes in doctrine and practice is a 
fundamental aim of this research.  
 
Finally, the concept of the learning organisation is important to this work. A 
learning organisation is an organisation where: 
 
people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly 
desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, 
where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually 
learning how to learn together.204 
 
Does the RAF encourage individual and team learning? Is this influenced by mental 
models? Do they individually have a vision of what their organisations are and what 
they want to be? The importance of becoming a learning organisation in the modern 
era is as important for the military as it is for private enterprise,  ‘the organizations 
that will truly excel in the future will be organizations that discover how to tap 
people's commitment and capacity to learn at all levels in an organization’.205 In a 
modern world where branches of the military are asked to do more with less, to 
leverage technology as much as possible and to create small, effective professional 
forces, the ideal of the learning organisation should be obvious. 
 
This section has sought to introduce organisational learning theory, this has been 
done by discussing the early advocates of this discipline, while also providing an 
overview of contemporary approaches and furthermore by looking at how it has been 
applied within a military organisational context. 
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Having provided an overview of some of the different approaches to organisational 
learning, it is important to outline those which will be relied upon to provide an 
assessment of whether the RAF can be considered a learning organisation during the 
period in question. The approach taken within this work is to use a combination of 
ideas and approaches that have been outlined above. In particular, this work will 
focus on the following two key areas; firstly the concept of formal and informal 
doctrine; and secondly Davidson’s scan-intepret-act learning cycle.  
 
The former is a recurring theme throughout the works that have been reviewed for 
organisational learning within a military context. Official doctrine provides a 
roadmap of organisational learning, albeit one that develops at a very slow rate, 
however if you can couple this formal doctrine (eg. field manuals), with an insight 
into informal doctrine (eg. course curricula in military institutions, articles in 
professional military journals etc.), then it presents a more complete picture of a 
military organisations doctrinal approach. 
 
The latter is an approach that resonates extremely well with the research goals of this 
work. Janine Davidson, in describing the scan-intepret-act learning cycle, provides 
an appropriate approach to analysing the RAF during this period to determine if in 
fact they can be considered a learning organisation. Both approaches are 
complimentary and combined will offer a very robust form of analysis. 
 
Practically speaking these approaches will be combined to provide a thorough 
analysis of each of the periods under review, and from this determine whether, 
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through formal or informal doctrine, theory and practice, we can see a discernible 
evolution in the air force’s approach to utilising airpower in small wars. The analysis 
of formal and informal doctrine will provide a key insight into how air forces 
thought officially about this operational environment, while also providing clues as 
to how military personnel on operations approached the challenges posed by this 
environment. As the analysis progresses and we link one time period to the next (eg. 
the move from the interwar period into the Second World War), Davidson’s scan-
intepret-act learning cycle will be utilised to determine whether experiences of the 
previous period were correctly interpreted, disseminated, and ultimately applied in 
an operational context within the next period.  
 
This chapter has sought to provide a theoretical framework that will be contextually 
relevant for the subsequent historical analysis of the use of airpower in small wars. 
As can be seen from the evolution of both airpower and counterinsurgency theory in 
the 20th century, the role of airpower in small wars has been neglected from a 
theoretical standpoint. However, its actual usage within this operational environment 
was abundant, as will be discussed in later chapters. So, although military 
organizations were using airpower in small wars, this did not appear to filter through 
into the theoretical discussions surrounding airpower throughout this period, 
certainly not in any significant way. The ‘classical’ airpower theorists, and their 
contemporary equivalents were focused predominantly on the strategic effect that 
airpower could deliver, initially in a conventional, and latterly a nuclear conflict. 
With that in mind it is a central goal of this work to understand to what extent air 
forces learned from their practical experience of using airpower in small wars.  
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Chapter 2 – Interwar Air Control 
 
Before the beginning of the First World War there was no uniform consensus on 
what role airpower would play. Airships had been adopted by many European armies 
in the first decade of the twentieth century, and Italy had utilised airpower during 
their war with Turkey, in Libya, in 1911. However, the possibilities of airpower had 
not been envisioned, certainly not to their full extent, and the rapid development 
experienced during the First World War could not have been foreseen. However, in 
the two decades prior to the First World War there were those who predicted the 
future influence of air power on military operations, these included the author H.G. 
Wells and the British Army officer Major Fullerton.206 
 
Initially deployed in a reconnaissance role in the First World War, the aircraft’s 
success at this task naturally led to the investigation of broader utility. To counteract 
the effect of reconnaissance, opponents sought to restrict observation by deploying 
fighting machines capable of dissuading reconnaissance aircraft, this in turn led to 
the development of air superiority fighters that could gain control of air space in 
order to allow the free movement of ones own reconnaissance aircraft. By 1917 
aircraft had become a multi-faceted tool that could engage in observation, pursuit 
and bombing. The bombing initially focused on close air support, however both the 
Germans and the British engaged in strategic bombing during the First World War, 
neither to any great success. As Tami Biddle has argued, ‘virtually every 
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manifestation of twentieth century airpower was envisioned and worked out at least 
in rudimentary form between 1914 and 1918’, however the fact remains that 
airpower during the First World War was very much in its infancy, regardless the 
portends were such that its role in any future similar war would be significantly 
greater.207  The First World War ‘saw a pronounced quikening of aviation 
technology’, and this would be a trend that continued throughout the rest of the 
twentieth century.208  
 
In the wake of the First World War the RAF had the largest air force in the world, an 
air force that had been built with the expectation that the war would continue into 
1919, and that a knock-out blow would be required to defeat the forces of Germany. 
In the aftermath of the early victory over Germany the government in Britain faced 
the challenge of demobilising the military behemoth that had been built, while also 
refocusing their priorities on rebuilding their shattered economy and society. Having 
only been established as an independent service in April 1918, the RAF faced calls 
from the Navy and Army that one way in which budgets could be cut was by 
subsuming the function of the RAF back into the air arms of the Army and Navy, 
essentially reverting to the way in which airpower was organised early in the war 
years. This inter-service bickering would take the form of a series of governmental 
enquiries in the years following the end of the First World War, most notably; ‘the 
Balfour Sub-Committee of 1921, the Geddes Committee of 1922, Balfour again in 
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1923, the Haldane Inquiry of 1924 and the Colwyn Committee of 1925.’209 To 
defend itself against these attacks the RAF required a role in the post war world. 
Ultimately that role would be the policing of Britain’s imperial possessions, however 
the evolution of this role and the resistance the RAF faced from the older services 
would mean that the transformation required by the RAF in the post-war period 
would be anything but straight-forward. 
 
The end of the First World War led to relief in Britain at the conclusion of what had 
been a traumatic four years, and although there were celebrations in the street at the 
wars conclusion, the reality of the aftermath of the war would soon become apparent. 
The issues that Britain faced in the immediate post war period were significant, just 
some of these have been highlighted by Zara Steiner when she argued that, ‘the 
length and costs of the war meant that victors and vanquished alike were left with 
inflated money supplies, massive budgetary deficits, huge debts, and, in the case of 
most, collapsed or overstrained tax structures.’210 The Government in Britain needed 
to be able to perform a social and economic U-turn, transforming Britain from a war 
footing back to normalcy. Demobilisation would be one of the greatest challenges. 
Demobilisation would be an area that would have a huge impact on the Royal Air 
Force. In the immediate post-war period the RAF’s operational strength was reduced 
from 280 squadrons to a mere 30.211  
 
Apart from the challenge of demobilisation outlined above, Britain also faced 
significant financial pressures. At the end of the war the British would be in debt to 
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their American allies to the sum of $4.3 billion. 212 To counter the dire economic 
situation Britain would focus on three key tasks; firstly, they focused on balancing 
the budget, secondly on reducing military expenditure and thirdly on restricting 
credit, the combination of these policies would have a devastating effect on an 
international economy that was already shrinking.213 It was within the context of this 
dire economic situation that the young RAF would need to defend itself from 
attackers on all sides. 
 
In the immediate post-war period the services were jostling for position in an era of 
budgetary challenge. The older two services argued that the RAF should logically 
divest its operations back to the Army and Navy from which they came, thus 
providing an easy mechanism for cost savings. The Navy went on the offensive 
against the fledgling RAF with the goal of arguing for its disbandment. Indeed 
Stephen Roskill, has described the conflict over naval aviation, and whose 
responsibility it should be,  as ‘one of the greatest controversies of the interwar 
years’, in a similar vein Waldie has described the Army / Royal Air Force relations 
as ‘ferocious’ in the early 1920s.214 Sir Hugh Trenchard, then Chief of the Air Staff, 
vigorously defended the RAF against these attacks, however what he required in 
order to hold off the older services was a mission for the RAF, one that would enable 
him to justify the ongoing independence of his own service. Trenchard’s position 
was strengthened by a significant ally. Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for 
War and Secretary of State for Air, and had previously held the position of First 
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Lord of the Admiralty. In the emergence of air power, Churchill saw the opportunity 
to not only reduce military expenditure, but also to bolster the defence of the empire, 
something that Britain in the post-war period could not afford to do by more 
traditional, army centric, methods. As Churchill told the Commons in December 
1919, ‘The first duty of the Royal Air Force is to garrison the British Empire’.215 
Churchill and Trenchard’s relationship would be the key to the survival of the RAF 
and would lead to the RAF finding its role in the post war world, a role that 
ultimately would come to be known as Air Control. 
 
The traditional historical analysis of Air Control is that it represented an economic 
necessity for the government of Britain and a lifeline to the fledgling RAF. Not only 
was Air Control inhumane, furthermore many commentators have also argued that 
the term Air Control is misleading, and that in realty the scheme relied 
predominantly on ground forces.216 Priya Satia argues that regardless of the RAFs 
stated approach: 
 
[…] inescapably, however diligent the RAF may have been in giving 
villagers twenty-four-hour warnings by loudspeaker, leaflets, and 
“demonstration flights,” the “pacification” of Iraq proved horrifically 
costly in Iraqi lives’.217 
 
 
This chapter will re-examine some of these issues. Furthermore, this chapter will 
assess the learning process within the RAF to understand if the RAF can be deemed 
a learning organisation during this period. 
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This chapter will show that the emergence of Air Control as a practice in the early 
1920s was indeed out of necessity, but that as it evolved and matured, it became an 
essential part of the strategy for imperial control. Its emergence in the Middle East in 
the early 1920s was more as an idea or concept, and it was only through its practical 
application in this early period that a definitive doctrine and theory emerged. During 
the interwar period, we see a cyclical effect of operations impacting doctrine and in 
turn, doctrine impacting operations. This cyclical effect also points to the RAF being 
a learning organisation, and having the ability to allow practical experience to 
influence the creation and evolution of doctrine. 
 
Before proceeding to review the conflicts in which Air Control was applied by the 
RAF, it is important in the first instance to understand the theoretical and doctrinal 
context in which these operations were carried out.  
 
Theory & Doctrine 
As was discussed in Chapter 1, the focus of airpower theory in the interwar period 
was predominantly based on the idea of strategic bombardment. When analysing the 
twenty-year period between the World Wars, all the main airpower theorists posited 
the view that airpower offered a uniquely strategic tool, one whose use could 
circumvent the traditional attrition experienced in the First World War. This was 
most certainly the view held by the likes of Douhet, Mitchell and Trenchard. When 
one looks for theory relevant to the use of airpower in small wars during this period, 
it is not present. This is illuminating. It can be argued that the focus on the strategic 
use of airpower was a tactic employed by airpower theorists to elevate the position 
of air forces in relation to the traditional service arms. They wanted to position 
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airpower as offering something distinct and unique, they most certainly did not want 
to appear to position airpower as an alternative way to deliver tasks already 
performed by the other services.218 
 
Although airpower theorists may not have been writing about the use of airpower in 
small wars, this was the main function of airpower in the interwar years, this was 
especially true of the RAF. Due to this, air force commanders and personnel required 
instruction on the best use of airpower in these small wars environments, this 
instruction would come through the publication and circulation of both formal and 
informal doctrine.  
 
When we speak of formal doctrine, particularly related to the RAF in this period, we 
are talking about a set of RAF War Manuals, the first of these, CD22 Operations, 
was published in 1922, and subsequent editions known as AP1300 would be 
published periodically prior to 1940.219  Each of these publications covered the range 
of roles that the RAF would be asked to perform, and each incorporated a chapter on 
the use of airpower in small wars.  Supplementing the RAF War Manuals was a 
series of interim guidance documents, Air Staff Memorandum (ASM) and Air Staff 
Notes (ASN); these guidance documents would appear periodically between the 
publications of full doctrine manuals as a way of plugging the gaps in RAF thinking 
prior to the publication of updated official doctrine.220 This approach to the 
instruction of service personnel is enlightening as it relates to the assessment of the 
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RAF as a learning organisation. It points to the ability of the RAF to capture the 
lessons learned during operations and to feed them into a doctrine loop that not only 
resulted in the update of doctrinal publications, but also led to the publication of 
interim documents to bring practitioners up to speed as soon as possible. ASM 16 
and 46, discussed below, were great examples of this. Doctrines impact on military 
force is important, as Neville Parton has argued: 
 
[…] doctrine is more fundamental to the production of military force 
than is perhaps sometimes appreciated, for it shapes the development 
of the different branches of the armed forces, forms the intellectual 
envelope within which the majority of its officers will conceptualise, 
and drives the way in which training is carried out. These three aspects 
between them will largely determine how armed forces will react in a 
given situation.221  
  
 
In CD-22 Operations the RAF first enunciated its official doctrine on the use of 
airpower in ‘warfare against uncivilised enemy’. 222  The RAF stated that in this kind 
of operational environment that aircraft would have an important part to play, 
however they stated that it is ‘unlikely that they will be in a position to undertake the 
campaign entirely independent of military assistance’.223 Thus from the very 
beginning the RAF was cognisant of the fact that to be successful in these types of 
operations would take a joint approach, utilising both air forces and land forces. In 
CD22 the RAF discussed two main areas related to these kind of operations, the first 
was focussed on objectives, the second on the potential use of aircraft to pacify a 
country.  
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In terms of objectives, CD22 stated that operations in this environment would 
require the commander to ‘depart from the ordinary rules of war’.224 It stated that 
aerial reconnaissance and photography would play a key role in identifying the 
enemy’s sensitive points, namely these would consist of passes or narrow valleys 
that the enemy used for communications. Furthermore, when attacking the enemy’s 
home territory, the target set would include ‘large villages, live stock [sic] and 
crops’.225 From the outset the RAF argued that the moral influence of airpower was 
its greatest asset, something that would be a central pillar in the RAF use of airpower 
through to the end of the Second World War. In this regard CD22 states that ‘moral 
influences is a most important factor in this [type of] campaign […] a vigorous 
offensive is the only way of conducting operations’.226 
 
Another key aspect of operations was the perception of airpower and how it could 
instill obedience. Priya Satia has argued that in Iraq this was particularly impactful: 
 
Air control, like irregular warfare, was designed to work in a region 
believed to systematically exaggerate information: where there was 
one plane, Arabs would spread news of dozens; a few casualties would 
instill fear of hundreds.227 
 
Regarding the use of aircraft to pacify a country, CD22 also advised in this regard. It 
stated that in this type of operation forces must be dispersed to a certain extent to 
forward airfields, this was important to ensure timely intervention. CD22 also 
cautioned against the misuse of airpower in this regard, it stated that to protect 
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against this ‘power to take offensive action is vested in the Air Officer Commanding 
alone and must not be resorted to until the circumstances have been explained by 
wireless or by other means to the latter, and permission for action granted’.228 This 
latter point would be a key refrain from the RAF then, and still resonates today. 
Airpower should be commanded and controlled by air officers, and that authority 
should not be divested fully to ground force commanders, regardless of the ratio of 
air to ground forces. 
 
The publication of CD22 Operations was the first attempt by the RAF to codify the 
official doctrinal view of how airpower should be used in a small wars environment. 
This doctrine was not very far removed from that which governed the use of 
airpower in conventional operations. The concepts of centralisation, moral impact 
and the pursuit of a vigorous offensive, are all concepts that applied equally across 
the conventional and unconventional operational environment. Indeed Neville Parton 
argues that chapter XI essentially copied the armies approach to the punitive column, 
simply replacing troops with aircraft.229 The next significant doctrinal publication 
from the RAF appeared in 1924, it was an Air Staff Memorandum entitled ‘Note on 
the method of employment of the air arm in Iraq’.230 
 
In October 1922 Sir John Salmond became Air Officer Commanding all British 
forces in Iraq.231 Over the next two years he would start to formulate an approach to 
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applying the air force as a security mechanism within Iraq. In 1924, his approach 
would be communicated through Air Staff Memorandum No. 16. Within this 
document, ‘Notes on the method of employment of the air arm in Iraq’, Salmond laid 
out how airpower was utilised within Iraq. He was at pains to state that the approach 
to the use of airpower was one of restraint. He began by stating that in the clear 
majority of cases of unrest that the civil authorities deal with these without the 
requirement to engage the RAF. Furthermore, he provided an example of an 
operation where airpower was applied and the central focus of his description was 
about detailing the levels of checks and approvals that were required before 
offensive airpower was engaged. He states that, ’no air operations are in any 
circumstances initiated except at the request of the local British civil advisor’.232  
 
Salmond goes on to state the often-heard refrain about airpower, highlighting its 
chief characteristics, namely; speed, ubiquity and economic efficiency. The contents 
of this document do not provide any great expansion on the guidelines for Air 
Control documented in CD22, however, due to its focus, it does provide an 
interesting insight into the RAF’s need to defend Air Control as a policy. The fact 
that Salmond was at pains to talk about restraint, and to reiterate the economic 
efficiency of Air Control is illuminating. This focus can be explained due to the 
continuing opposition to the Air Control ‘experiment’ by the army, an opposition 
stated by Wilson during the Cairo conference in 1921 and an opinion that would be 
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voiced throughout the 1920s.233 There were also heightened objections at home to 
what at the time was perceived as an inhumane approach to the administration of 
‘semi-civilised countries’.234 This memorandum was presented to parliament in 
August 1924 and was a political tool used in order to address the issues highlighted 
above.235  To see the evolution in thought it is important to look at the next official 
iteration of the RAF War Manual, AP1300, to understand how the concept of Air 
Control developed in the early-to-mid 1920s. 
 
AP1300 published in 1928, and reprinted in 1930 and 1934 was the first significant 
doctrinal update to the principles espoused in CD22. AP1300 would not be 
significantly revised until a second edition, published in 1940. With the 1928 
publication of AP1300 we see a significant update and expansion on the principles of 
using airpower in small wars. In chapter XIV, ‘The characteristics of operations 
against a semi-civilized enemy’, we see a much more thorough examination of the 
use of airpower in this operational environment. Whereas CD22 contained three 
chapter sections and twenty-six numbered points, AP1300 (1928) contains seven 
chapter sections and a total of fifty-five numbered points. It is not only the scale of 
the coverage of this area that had expanded, it also shows an evolution in thought, it 
is reasonable to assume that this was because of operational experience in Iraq, and 
elsewhere, in the early-to-mid 1920s. 236   
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By the time of the publication of AP1300, the RAF had built up an operational 
knowledge of conducting operations in a small wars environment and from this 
perspective AP1300 showed a maturity of thought on the topic that was not present 
in its predecessor. CD22 had been very functional, and very simplistic, AP1300 was 
a much more substantive work. Whereas AP1300 still emphasized the requirement 
for aerial reconnaissance; quick and decisive operations; the influence of moral 
factors and the importance of showing the colours, AP1300 focused a lot more on 
critical success factors and provided a lot more substantive information on the way 
in which the RAF should approach operations. Significantly it highlighted what 
airpower could not do, for example it highlighted that the role of land forces was 
important, it stated that in certain circumstances joint operations were best and even 
in some instances airpower would act in a supporting role. Most illuminating is the 
approach to offensive operations, it stated categorically that the objective of 
operations was to induce the enemy to submit and where possible this should be 
done with the minimum destruction to life and property. As Walters has argued, 
‘contrary to folklore, the doctrine advocated minimizing casualties and was more 
humane than the use of punitive ground expeditions’.237 Furthermore it stated that 
offensive air action was only to be undertaken when political approaches had been 
exhausted. In counterpoint to this view, Priya Satia argues that: 
 
[…] it is certainly specious to excuse air control on the grounds that 
other tactics are also brutal, especially in view of the fact that aerial 
bombardment is surely, in its all-seeing omnipotence, much more lethal 
than lower-tech forms of barbarity.238 
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AP1300 also highlighted some innovations when it discussed the use of aircraft in 
troop transport and casualty evacuation, while also highlighting the necessity for 
ground to air communications. AP1300 would not be updated until 1940, however an 
interim expansion was published in 1930, in the form of Air Staff Memorandum 46 
(ASM 46).239 
 
When it was published in 1930, ASM 46 was ‘intended to supplement the general 
principles outlined in chapter XIV’ of AP1300 (1928).240 Within this publication, the 
RAF defined the term Air Control as a means of security that utilises air forces as the 
primary arm, these being supplemented by ground forces. Furthermore, it stated that 
the ideal operating environment for Air Control was one that ‘combine[s] 
inaccessibility […] with a population organised on a loose tribal basis’.241 An 
interesting aspect of ASM 46 is its statement on proportionality, it states that ‘action 
must be suspended as soon as the moral end is gained’, this is an important evolution 
and is a portent of the theory of coercive airpower used in later conflicts, most 
notably the bombing campaign in Vietnam.242  There are two further evolutionary 
points that are significant in this document. Firstly, it discusses the idea of communal 
responsibility. This in effect is used to negate the idea that airpower is indiscriminate 
and thus leads to collateral damage. In this regard, it states that: 
 
It is therefore sometimes necessary to drop notices on villages or tribal 
communities bordering on an area against which air operations are 
intended, to warn the inhabitants that the harbouring of people from the 
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offending tribe will be regarded as an offence, which will render the 
party affording asylum themselves liable to bombing. The principle of 
the community is therefore introduced.243 
 
In a similar vein, it also states that warning notices would be dropped on a target area 
to indicate that women and children should be moved to a safe place, as offensive 
operations are due to commence. As it relates to the idea of communal responsibility, 
these statements are somewhat derisory, just because you warn somebody you are 
going to do something, does not mean that the results of those actions are immune 
from criticism. Perhaps this thinking was influenced by The Hague Convention of 
1907 and its approach to bombardment. However, this most definitely shows an 
evolution in RAF thinking, even if that evolution was simply a way in which to 
deflect criticism.  
 
The second evolutionary concept put forward in this document is that of the 
civilising effect of airpower. In this regard, it states that airpower offers several 
advantages, including, providing medical services to effected peoples, and increasing 
the contact between the people and the administration through communication and 
reconnaissance by aircraft. It concludes by stating that if aircraft are available in 
sufficient numbers to deliver these additional elements that airpower ‘constitutes a 
definitely productive asset of considerable value in forwarding humane and 
constructive administration’.244 
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The final official doctrinal publication during this period was an updated edition of 
AP1300, published in 1940.245 Obviously by this time the RAFs focus was very 
much on conventional war in Europe, however the chapter relevant to Air Control 
did contain some updates. The chapter title itself was updated, no doubt based on its 
previous somewhat derogatory use of the term ‘semi-civilised’, the chapter was now 
entitled ‘operations in unadministered and undeveloped areas’. Within this edition, 
we see the RAF talk for the first time about precision strikes against ‘the house, fort 
or property of a particular individual or individuals’.246 This may seem to have been 
overestimating the ability of the RAF to perform precision strikes, however this was 
indeed possible in countries like Iraq where aircraft could operate at low levels, it 
certainly would not be achievable in the contested air space over Europe in the 
coming years. One area in which we see a classic example of doctrine reflecting 
operational experience is in the point made regarding the use of air forces in support 
of civil police forces. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the RAF would have 
difficulty in operating in a largely urban environment like Palestine. As will be 
shown, this was a lesson hard learned, but undoubtedly one that had been duly 
learned by 1940.  This issue had been adressed in ASM 52, however by 1940 it had 
been codified in major doctrine. In addressing this issue AP1300 states that: 
 
Aircraft can seldom be effectively used in support of civil police 
authorities in thickly and diversely populated areas. […] Under such 
circumstances the support of air forces is best confined to 
reconnaissance, to the dropping of warning notes, to the conveyance of 
police  authorities, and to other roles not entailing the use of the 
offensive armament of aircraft.247 
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The ability of the RAF to learn lessons during this period; to capture, analyse and 
disseminate lessons learned material through doctrinal publications was truly the 
action of a learning organization. This learning mentality was in place with the RAF 
from its inception, and Trenchard believed that the foundation of a strong service 
would be built on its ability to train and equip its men for the field. This learning 
environment was established with the creation of three key training centres; the Air 
Force Cadet College at Cranwell, the Air Force Staff College at Andover, and the 
technical training scheme based at Halton. This inculcation of a learning ethos is 
evidenced by the return of operational staff to these colleges to share their 
experiences in the field.248 Not only were operational staff teaching the lessons 
learned at the staff college, they were also sharing their knowledge to a broader 
audience through articles in professional military journals like the RAF Quarterly, 
and more commercial publications like Flight. However, interestingly, in the early 
years of the RAF this channel of communications (i.e. published articles) was 
restricted due to the belief of senior staff officers that ‘there are at present no officers 
capable of writing a [sic] article in the first place, or to censor it when written in the 
second place’.249 However, throughout the 1920s, and into the 1930s, this restriction 
would be loosened and more and more articles would be published by professional 
airmen. Another avenue of dissemination was RUSI lectures. However even these 
appeared to be somewhat restricted, as Neville Parton states: 
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Overall then, out of the fourteen papers and lectures produced or given 
by RAF officers during the five years in question [i.e. 1918-1923], six 
were either specifically concerned with, or contained a major element 
related to, the use of air power in small wars or imperial policing.250  
 
Having outlined the doctrine relevant to the use of airpower in small wars and some 
of the ways in wish this doctrine evolved, it is now important to look at Air Control 
operations in the interwar period and attempt to understand if, and how, these 
operations reflected, and affected, RAF doctrinal thought. The first such operation 
would be conducted in British Somaliland, and it would be operations conducted 
here that would help shape the tactic of Air Control. 
 
Part I – The Birth of Air Control 
British Somaliland 
 ‘Why not leave the whole thing to us? This is exactly the type of operation which 
the R.A.F. can tackle on its own.’ So said Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff, 
when asked whether the RAF could help in defeating Muhammad Abdullah Hassan, 
an insurgent leader that had plagued British Somaliland for twenty years.251 By 
1918, the War Office reported the ‘continued immunity of the Mullah [Hassan]’, 
someone who now represented ‘an unsubdued native potentate in Africa’.252 The 
RAF deployed a squadron of DH-9As and operations to defeat Hassan lasted for 
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three weeks.253 This ultimately led to his flight from the protectorate and his death 
shortly afterwards. Leopold Amery, Parliamentary Undersecretary for the Colonies, 
referred to the RAF led operation as the 'the cheapest war in history’.254 The 
Governor of British Somaliland stated that the RAF had proven to be the ’main 
instrument and decisive factor' in operations against Hassan.255 Immediately after the 
conclusion of operations and throughout the 1920s, RAF operations in British 
Somaliland would be held up as an example of the efficacy of using the RAF in 
colonial operations. At a cost of a mere £77,000, and completed in three weeks, the 
RAF had appeared to solve a problem that the British authorities in Somaliland had 
faced for over twenty years.256 However, the operations in British Somaliland were 
more nuanced than RAF proponents, then and now, would argue. This section will 
detail the context, operations and results of the campaign in British Somaliland to 
present an accurate reflection of the critical success factors of the operation, and to 
understand the performance of the RAF, and the lessons which were derived from 
the first colonial operation in which the RAF played a leading role. 
 
British Somaliland had been a protectorate of the British Empire since 1885, and had 
variously been under the control of first the India Office, then the Foreign Office, 
and after 1905, by the Colonial Office. 257  From 1899 the protectorate had faced an 
armed insurgency led by the enigmatic Muhammad Abdullah Hassan, later to be 
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known by the British epithet as the Mad Mullah of Somaliland. The British had 
mounted several expeditions against Hassan, however the drive to resolve the issue 
had been put on hold with the outbreak of the First World War. Indeed, during the 
war, with British focus elsewhere, Hassan would extend his control to over half the 
country.258 In the aftermath of that conflict the authorities once again turned their 
attention to Hassan. Plans from the army estimated a troop requirement of two 
divisions, and a potential operation lasting up to a year, ultimately there would be a 
comparatively small number of troops utilised during the campaign.259 As has been 
discussed earlier in this chapter, this type of expenditure was not something that the 
British government would be able to sanction, as priorities in the post-war period 
turned to more pressing matters. It is within this context that the RAF was asked 
whether they believed they could provide a solution.  
 
The RAF plan for the operation involved the deployment of a squadron of 12 DH-
9As (see photo 1, below), these would be transported by the Royal Navy from Egypt 
and assembled in Berbera. The DH-9As were formidable aircraft; capable of 
carrying a bomb load up to 460 lbs along with two Lewis machine guns and a 
forward firing vickers, able to fly at up to 111mph and this coupled with a range of 
four and a half hours, made the aircraft ideal for the task at hand.260 The combination 
of range, payload and speed, made these aircraft ideally suited to the geography of 
Somaliland, by being able to operate over long range and deliver a significant 
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payload once the targets had been identified. This geography meant that traditional 
miltary operations faced significant challenges, communications in the country were 
poor, with ‘camel trakcs and ancient desert trails’ being all that ground forces could 
use.261 Airpower would negate these geographical constraints. 
 
Photo 1 - Some RAF Force Z planes in Somaliland, 1920 
 
Source - http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/2007/298/74.shtml, accessed 04 October 2015 
 
The expedition would comprise of two distinct phases; ‘An independent Air Force, 
self-contained in all respects, under the command of Group-Captain (sic) Gordon, 
taking his orders from the Air Ministry, was to attack the Mullah […] In the event of 
these independent operations proving successful the rounding up of the Dervishes 
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would be undertaken by the ground troops’.262 The ground troops in this instance 
would comprise of the following elements; The Somaliland Camel Corps, ; a 
composite battalion, 6th and 2nd King's African Rifles; a half battalion, Grenadiers, 
Indian Army; an irregular Somali tribal levy; and 300 Illaloes (indigenous scouts).263 
What is interesting about this composite ground force is that the only additional units 
shipped in for the operation were the King’s African Rifles, all other units were in-
theatre. The full force created for this undertaking is outlined in Table 1 below.  
 
Table 1 - British Somaliland Expeditionary Force, January 1920 
Component Unit Forces 
Air “Z” Unit 12 x DH-9a’s, 36 Officers, 189 other ranks 
Sea Composite Unit Odin, Clio, Ark Royal 
Ground Somaliland Camel Corps 700 Rifles 
Ground 6th and 2nd Kings African Rifles 700 Rifles 
Ground 1st and 101st Grenadiers 400 Rifles 
Ground Somali Tribal Levy 1,500 Rifles 
Ground Illaloes 300 
Source: Data taken from, Douglas Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland (London, 1923), p. 263 264 
 
Phase 1 - Independent operations 
Independent air operations commenced on 21 January 1920, a flight of six aircraft 
departed Eil Dur Elan with the objective of attacking Hassan’s forces in the Medishi 
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area.265 Owing to poor weather only one aircraft successfully reached Hassan’s 
headquarters, however the attack proved to be significant, catching Hassan and his 
followers unprepared and uneducated as to the potentialities of airpower. On spotting 
the aircraft Hassan assembled his senior advisors to receive their guests, believing 
the aircraft were sent by their Turkish friends, the resultant bombing and strafing 
caused significant panic. Total casualties to Hassan’s forces were claimed to be 
twenty dead and a further twenty wounded.266 The other aircraft of the flight located 
Jidali Fort and attacked it and stock in the surrounding area.267 Follow-up attacks in 
Medishi on 22-23 January caused the haroun to be ‘set on fire by incendiary bombs, 
and the stock was scattered in all directions’.268 On 24 January, following the 
operations of the preceding three days, the Air Commander ordered an extensive 
reconnaissance of the area, this revealed that Hassan and his followers had scattered 
and thus no meaningful targets remained. Based on this he ordered all aircraft to 
commence ground support operations from the next morning.269 Thus after three 
days of independent operations, the campaign was now entering phase two, where 
airpower would be used to support ground operations, as per the original plan of 
campaign. 
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Photo 2 - Bombs explode NW of Tale Fort, 1920 
 
Source: Bombs Bursting N.W of Tale. 1,000 ft. OBS OFR O Gayford, TNA, CO 1069 
 
 
Phase 2 - Joint operations 
The bulk of operations performed by the RAF in the Somaliland campaign were joint 
operations, working closely with the fielded infantry and cavalry units.270 Beginning 
on 25 January 1920, the RAF performed support operations including; ‘interdiction 
of escaping enemy forces, reconnaissance (including photo-reconnaissance), the 
provision of air presence, contact patrols with forward ground units, 
communications, leafleting, air transport and casualty evacuation.’271 During this 
time airpower would be called upon to support ground objectives, thus in the first 
week of February air forces were called upon to mount an operation against Tale. 
This mission, which proved to be the last RAF bombing mission in Somaliland, 
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would involve a bombing run on the fort, followed by strafing runs so that the 
aircraft could ‘heavily and effectively’ engage the inhabitants.272 
 
Casualty evacuation by the RAF in British Somaliland, represented the first time in 
which the RAF had performed this duty in the field. This task was performed with a 
modified DH-9A that was specifically designated as an air ambulance, this can be 
seen in photo 3, below.  
 
Photo 3 - Z Force DH9 being operated in the air ambulance role, 1920 
 
Source: http://www.raf.mod.uk/history_old/line1918.html 
 
In total during the campaign the RAF were responsible for the evacuation of ’13 
officers and one hundred others’.273 Tasks such as leafleting, air transport and 
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casualty evacuation would become key operational duties of the RAF in small wars 
environments, and the experiences of the campaign in British Somaliland certainly 
influenced future operations of this nature. This second phase of the campaign 
amounted to mopping up exercises by the fielded infantry and cavalry units, this task 
was performed efficiently and successfully. Within three weeks Hassan’s forces had 
ceased to exist as any sort of cohesive unit, Hassan himself fled over the border into 
Abyssinia, where he would die a short time later. The monetary cost of this victory 
was negligible, but what is more surprising is the paucity of casualties, during the 
three-week campaign only one native soldier was killed and one wounded. 274 
 
British Somaliland would prove to be the testing ground for the use of airpower in a 
leading role in colonial operations. The experiences in British Somaliland would 
lead to the creation of the concept of Air Control, a concept that would be examined 
in Iraq.  
 
Iraq 
In 1919 Winston Churchill declared in parliament that the RAF would ‘garrison the 
British Empire’, in the newly acquired colony of Iraq, Churchill and the RAF would 
get to test this declaration.275 In the wake of the First World War the British Empire 
expanded considerably with the addition of several new territories and mandates. 
With the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the war, the British Empire 
and France took on new responsibilities, most notably in the Middle East. With the 
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signing of the Treaty of Sèvres in August 1920, the British Empire, through League 
of Nations mandates, took over responsibility for the administration of Palestine, 
Jordan and Iraq.  
 
This expansion of the Empire could not have come at a worse time for the British 
government. With these additional mandates came the requirement to garrison and 
administer the territories, something that the cash-strapped British exchequer could 
ill-afford. Iraq would prove to be one of the thorniest issues. The size of the country 
was immense and the budget estimates from the War Office for garrisoning Iraq 
were at a level that Britain was unable to meet. Winston Churchill, having become 
Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1921, looked for a way in which Iraq could be 
secured, without the expenditure of vast sums that the exchequer simply could not 
justify. Between the 12th and 20th March 1921 Churchill convened a conference in 
Cairo to discuss the Middle East. It would be a military subcommittee at this 
conference that would rubber-stamp the new policy of controlling the Middle East, a 
policy that would come to be known as Air Control.276 This ‘Cairo policy’ presented 
the British, according to Churchill, with the only viable option to maintaining control 
in Mesopotamia, the only other alternative would be the abondonment of the 
mandate.277 
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After the success of RAF operations in the colonies in the immediate post war years, 
most notably in Somaliland, the RAF were convinced that they could expand on the 
idea of using air power to control Britain’s imperial possessions. The opportunity to 
do this arose when the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, was seeking a way to 
reduce the cost of policing Iraq, to this end, on 29 February Churchill wrote a letter 
to Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff, in which he requested that the RAF 
provide him with ‘a scheme and state whether you consider the internal security of 
the country [Iraq] could be maintained by it’.278 From Churchill’s letter it is quite 
clear that this is something that had been considered before, as his thoughts on the 
idea were quite mature, no doubt influenced by the conduct of the RAF in colonial 
operations in the immediate post war period. Even at this early stage he highlighted 
the necessity of secure dispersed airfields, and the requirement for an integrated 
ground force component. 279 
 
By the 12th of March Trenchard submitted ‘a preliminary scheme for the military 
control of Mesopotamia by the Royal Air Force’.281 Within this document Trenchard 
outlined the guiding principles that would provide a framework for RAF Air Control, 
these included; leveraging the speed and range that aircraft provided, using 
reconnaissance and intelligence as a key component of operations, acting decisively 
and continuously once engaged, and engaging with the political officers within a 
territory. The RAF stated that they would be ‘satisfied that if the broad principles 
outlined are adopted, and the Air Officer Commanding is given full authority to 
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carry them out, the country can be held on the lines laid down in the attached 
scheme’.282 One of the key aspects of these principles was that the Air Officer 
Commanding [AOC] would have full authority, essentially the RAF would control 
all military forces in Iraq. The document goes on to lay out force structures, military 
strength and potential locations for bases. This document provides an interesting 
insight into the early planning and preparation for Air Control in Iraq, furthermore, it 
is obvious from a reading of this document that this had been something that the 
RAF had been planning for a considerable amount of time. The approach to 
operations had been well planned and it is clear through this document that 
considerable work had already been achieved in thinking through the most 
appropriate approach and methodology. The seeming success of operations in 
Somaliland had buoyed confidence in the ability of the RAF to conduct operations in 
colonial territories, furthermore the lessons learned from those early operations had 
helped coalesce the thinking that underlined the Air Control principal. 
 
By way of paving the way for the Air Control proposal, an Air Staff memorandum 
was published in March 1921 in a document titled ‘The part of the Air Force of the 
future in imperial defence’. This document contained a covering note from Winston 
Churchill in which he concurred with the Air Staff view that ‘the claim to maintain 
order [by the RAF] in certain barbarous countries is sound’.283 This memorandum 
goes on to state that its key purpose is ‘to consider to what extent the developments 
of air power may be of assistance to finding a solution for the problems in which 
                                               
282 'A preliminary scheme for the military control of Mesopotamia by the Royal Air Force', 12 March 
1920, RAF Hendon, Trenchard Papers, MFC 76/1/21 
283 'The part of the Air Force in the future of Imperial defence',  21 March 1921, RAF Hendon, 
Trenchard Papers, MFC 76/1/21 
132 
security and economy can be reconciled’.284 This one statement sums up the whole 
argument for Air Control and would be revisited consistently throughout the 1920s 
and into the 1930s. Air Control could offer a level of security within the imperial 
territories at a cost that was achievable for the Exchequer in the new post-war world. 
The rest of this memo argued that the development of the RAF was at such a level 
that it enabled their use in a small wars environment currently, furthermore it stated 
that the experience garnered to date in operating in such an environment has 
demonstrated that the RAF was ready to take on a much more significant role. It 
concluded by stating that ‘the efficacy of the Royal Air Force as an independent arm 
should be put to proof by the transference to it of the primary responsibility of order 
in some area of the Middle East, preferably Mesopotamia’.285 This emphasis on Iraq 
is interesting, Satia Priya has argued that there were certain spatial conceptions of 
Iraq that made it an obvious choice, further to this it was:  
 
an ideal system for the problems they faced in the Middle East […] it 
was essentially a system of control by intelligence, the epitome of the 
new operational intelligence, with aircraft substituting for the political 
officer who had long combined the tasks of intelligence and 
administration.286 
 
The RAF was building a case, both within military circles, and within political ones. 
Undoubtedly in Winston Churchill they had a very powerful political ally, the 
importance of this would be confirmed at the Cairo Conference later the same 
month. 
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The Cairo Conference was convened by Winston Churchill to discuss the mounting 
issues within the Middle East. Trouble in Iraq was still simmering and elsewhere 
murmurings of unrest were apparent. However, Cairo was not where Air Control 
was agreed, it was a fait accompli by this time.287 Starting in December 1919 when 
Churchill stated that the RAF would garrison the Empire, both he and Trenchard had 
spent fifteen months refining the principals and approach that would enable the Air 
Control experiment. What Cairo did was to rubber stamp the decision and this was 
done in the presence of all the relevant stakeholders, this included the army and local 
political administrative staff. Since the decision had already been made, none of the 
attendees could veto it, however they certainly voiced their concerns, most notably 
the army.288  Regardless, the decision had now been made to place the command of 
all British forces in Iraq under the control of an RAF officer, the concept of Air 
Control had been ratified, and the experiment was about to begin. 
 
The Cairo Conference put in place a timeline of October 1922 for the transference of 
command responsibility to the RAF. By August of 1921, in a memo from the Chief 
of the Air Staff, the RAF outlined the arrangements that would be put in place to 
control Iraq. This memo, entitled ‘the Air Force scheme of control in Mesopotamia’, 
was an expansion of the scheme of control highlighted in a similar Air Staff memo 
published prior to the Cairo conference in March of 1921.289 This document 
essentially reiterated many of the points of its predecessor, however it did so in more 
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detail. Once again, we see the RAF highlighting the importance of several elements 
of the Air Control scheme; armoured car companies, wireless communications, the 
adequate staffing of headquarters etc. It also provided some interesting budgetary 
details. The proposed budget for the employment of the Air Force scheme of control 
for Iraq included; £1,904,000 for the provision of eight squadrons, central and 
regional headquarters and additional wireless personnel, £199,800 for three 
armoured car companies; £55,000 for two armoured trains and two gunboats; 
£72,000 for one Indian pack battery; £850,000 for four infantry battalions (two 
British and two Indian); and a further £460,000 for administrative services.290 These 
budgetary forecasts projected a total spend in the region of three and a half million 
pounds, this is startling when one considers that the actual spend in 1921-22, prior to 
Air Control in Iraq, was 21 million pounds.291 It was this economy of the Air Control 
scheme that would be its greatest advantage, Trenchard himself, writing in a letter to 
Group Captain A.E. Borton stated that ‘the keynote of this scheme is economy’.292 
 
By November 1921 the Air Staff had begun to document the lessons they had 
learned from the operations conducted thus far in imperial territories. In a document 
entitled, ‘Air Staff note on the lasting effects of air operations on semi-civilised and 
uncivilised tribes’, the RAF argued that Air Control had already proved its value.293  
This document is another example of the RAF building the case for Air Control, 
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specifically this document compares the use of Air Control versus the traditional 
ground centric punitive column. One of the key arguments for Air Control was that it 
offered the potential for a more humane approach to policing the peoples of the 
Empire. However, there were many that argued that Air Control was inherently 
inhumane. The perceptions of the inhumanity of Air Control are highlighted by Sir 
Basil Embry, when in his memoirs, he states that: 
 
There were some people that argued that "Air Control" was inhuman 
[…] they seemed to think that every bomb dropped from the air and 
every bullet fired from an aeroplane was labelled "for women and 
children only", but that every shell fired from the ground had on it "for 
combatants only".294 
 
The charge of inhumanity would be one that the RAF would need to defend against 
repeatedly in the coming years.295 The Air Staff note states that at best the punitive 
column had a transitory effect, and that the use of aircraft offered an earlier and more 
permanent resolution to issues of internal policing. However, what is interesting 
about this document is that the RAF felt the need to continue to argue for Air 
Control, even after the decision to implement it in Iraq had been made. The final 
paragraph of this document is illuminating in this respect, it states that ‘time alone 
can prove this [the success of Air Control] provided that the scheme is given a fair 
trial’.296 It would appear from the language used that Trenchard was wary of the 
potential interference of the Army and Navy in his grand experiment, thus similar 
documents stating the case for Air Control would continue to be sent out from the 
Air Staff. 
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Another important document on this topic is a ‘Memorandum by the Air Staff on the 
effects likely to be produced by intensive aerial bombing of semi-civilised people’, 
although undated it is certainly from this time and from context would appear to 
have been produced in late 1921 or early 1922.297 This document provides a high 
level of detail on the objectives and process for Air Control operations. It states that 
the primary object of aerial bombardment in this instance is:  
 
to dislocate the normal life of the community, to destroy any outward 
and visible signs of authority […] and this by a continued offensive to 
bring home to its people the superior striking power of their 
opponents298  
 
This document, as with many of its predecessors, also argues time and time again for 
the efficacy of Air Control. In this instance, it includes excerpts from telegrams from 
the Civil Administrator, Baghdad, in which he states that the use of the Air Force 
represents ‘an inexpensive, efficient and merciful means of maintaining order’, 
furthermore in the telegram he argues that the use of Air Control is more 
discriminatory and thus avoids innocent casualties. A.T. Wilson, the Civil 
Commissioner, was not the only witness quoted, the document also includes 
favourable quotes from the General Officer Commanding, Iraq (an army officer), 
and from the Governor of the Somaliland Protectorate. While this document is 
undoubtedly a piece of PR where the RAF was trying once again to sell the concept 
of Air Control, it is also surprisingly blunt in some of its utterances. For example, it 
states unequivocally that war is brutal and goes on to defend the brutality of Air 
Control by stating that ‘it is not the idea of brutality which offends humanity but 
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rather the novelty of the method which disturbs the conservative prejudices’.299 This 
idea that Air Control represented an inhumane way to maintain control was a charge 
levelled by the army prior to the transfer of operational command of Iraq to the RAF. 
However, it would also be a charge that would be increasingly and more publicly 
levelled by newspapers and politicians at home within a few years of the RAF 
assuming control of Iraq. 
 
So why were Trenchard and the RAF so nervous? The simple fact is that by the 
summer of 1921 the decisions that had been taken at the Cairo Conference had not 
all been approved by parliament. Churchill’s broad approach had been approved, 
however the decision on the role of the RAF within that approach had been 
deferred.300 Some MP’s were sceptical of the large savings that had been promised, 
supposedly Air Control would save the British Exchequer ten million pounds in its 
first twelve months, this sounded too good to be true.301 Also, the RAF assumption 
of Air Control would involve a transition from the Army, and Wilson, the Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff, would use every opportunity to make the transition as 
difficult as possible. One example of this is the issue of the provision of armoured 
car companies in Iraq, which was an essential element of the Air Control scheme. 
While the RAF had originally wanted light tanks, the Army had pushed back on this, 
not wanting to hand control of this significant asset to the RAF. The army made it 
quite clear that the provision of these armoured car companies was something that 
the War Office would need to be heavily involved in. In typical Trenchard fashion, 
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the RAF negated this by building its own armoured cars in RAF workshops in 
England and Egypt. By the time the RAF assumed control of Iraq they had a full 
complement of armoured car companies.302 In October 1922, Sir John Salmond took 
over as the officer commanding all British forces in Iraq. From this point on he 
would carry out operations that would ensure the internal and external security of 
Iraq. 
 
Operations  
Once the RAF had taken operational control of Iraq it could proceed with trying to 
implement, in a complete sense, its Air Control scheme. To understand the various 
ways in which this was done it is important to look at some of the different types of 
operations that the RAF performed and discuss how, if at all, these related to the 
plans and doctrine that were discussed earlier. While the central concept of Air 
Control was the substitution of air forces for ground forces, and the use of aerial 
bombardment to replace the traditional ground punitive column, when we discuss 
RAF operations in Iraq during this period there are many different types of 
operations that they were involved in. These operations included; aerial 
bombardment, reconnaissance, aerial blockade, transport, re-supply, propaganda and 
casualty evacuation. This section provides some examples of functions carried out in 
Iraq to demonstrate the breadth of operations conducted by the RAF during this 
period, operations conducted from bases such as Hinaidi Aerodrome, pictured in 
photo 4, below. 
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Photo 4 - Aerial view of RAF Hinaidi Aerodrome, Mesopotamia c. 1923 - 1924. 
Source: Imperial War Museum, Q 114739 
 
As already stated, the vision for the Air Control scheme was around substituting air 
forces for ground forces and replacing the ground punitive column with aerial 
bombardment. This was one of the key missions of the RAF in Iraq. This approach 
of replacing the ground punitive column with air operations had several perceived 
benefits. These included the ability to react quickly to conduct operations over great 
distances, the ability to centralise forces without sacrificing mobility, the ability to 
target the morale of the enemy by attacking them with a force that they were unable 
to counter-attack, and finally the ability to engage with the enemy through 
propaganda and delivering political officers to the affected area to speed up 
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negotiations.303 This last point, the intelligence aspect, was of particular importance. 
Satia Priya has argued that in effect Air Control ‘was essentially a system of control 
by intelligence’.304 
 
One example of these type of operation was in the Samawah district in southern Iraq 
in late 1923 and early 1924. On this occasion two tribes were targeted due to their 
non-payment of taxes. Initially the tribal heads were summoned to Samawah to pay a 
deposit of money by way of assuring the tribe’s good behaviour. This was not 
forthcoming and the result was authorisation for the RAF to begin offensive 
operations.  
 
These operations involved ‘forty planes from four different squadrons’ and the 
ordnance dropped was significant, amounting to: 
 
[…] twenty five tonnes of bombs and 8,600 incendiary bombs as well 
as showering the area with 15,000 rounds of ammunition in two days. 
Bomb raids were carried out more or less continuously for these two 
days. 
 
A police force sent subsequently to the area found that ‘the town had been 
completely demolished’.305 
 
These operations achieved the objectives within the space of two days, the result was 
that, ‘the moral effect of the action taken against these two tribes was so great that it 
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was possible to summon to Samawah all the sheikhs and the principal headmen 
throughout the whole area. The Minister of the Interior addressed them and laid 
down certain conditions, which were accepted.’306 While success had been achieved, 
there had been a considerable cost to the local population; 144 people were killed 
and an unspecified number were wounded during the operations.307  However, from 
the Air Ministries point of view the operations in Samawah had been prototypical ‘of 
how air action should be used against uncivilised tribes’308. However, this operation 
raised numerous concerns. Glubb Pasha, writing in the aftermath of the operation 
noted: 
 
It is regrettable but it appears almost inevitable that aerial action should 
be associated with the payment of taxes. 
 
From a similar perspective, another RAF officer noted in 1924 that the tribes 
‘poverty and feckessness’ made then unable to pay their taxes regardless.309  
 
It was not only field personnel that seemed uneasy with the operations at Samawah. 
When the official report was submitted to London the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff 
commented that: 
 
If this report as it stands gets into the hands of undesirable people, harm 
might be done not only to the Air Force but also to [HM] Government 
[…] I think that certain paragraphs should not be sent out without 
further consideration. 310 
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Although offensive operations such as that described at Samawah are perceived as 
constituting the bulk of RAF operations in Iraq, in fact, as Sebastian Ritchie argues, 
‘proscription bombing was probably the offensive tactic employed least’.311 
Nevertheless, it was operations like these that would give those who opposed Air 
Control the ammunition to apply pressure to the Government at home. Perceptions 
were not aided by the language used to describe such operations, in a 1924 pamphlet 
the RAF described how an operation like that conducted in Samawah proved that  
the natives ‘now know that within 45 minutes a full size village […] can be 
practically wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured by four or five 
machines’.312 
 
Early in the Air Control of Iraq one of the key areas of operations for the RAF was 
in the northern district of Kurdistan. Within this mountainous terrain, the RAF faced 
two challenges; that of Turkish irregulars seeking to further Turkish territorial 
claims, and that of Kurdish separatists led by Shaikh Mahmoud. The geography of 
the Kurdish region was well suited to an airpower first approach, the terrain was very 
mountainous and thus it proved easier for aircraft to penetrate than traditional ground 
forces. However, in 1923, John Salmond, AOC Iraq, used a combination of air and 
ground forces. In the main throughout the first half of 1923 ground forces would 
represent the main component of Salmond’s forces in the region, however air power 
would prove to be a very effective force multiplier and would also demonstrate the 
different ways in which it could support and enhance the conduct of ground 
operations. Within a report published in the London Gazette in June 1924, Salmond 
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detailed some of the various ways in which the air forces supported the ground 
forces, these included; propaganda through leaflet drops, bombardment against the 
Sheikh’s headquarters and villages where his irregulars were based, and 
communications through the air lift of officers and orders. One of the key selling 
points about Air Control and the use of aircraft in this type of environment was that 
they offered the possibility to nip potential problems in the bud, due to their speed 
and mobility. This was something that Salmond believed that they achieved during 
these operations, as he stated in his report: 
 
It was without doubt largely due to those air attacks directed against 
Shaikh [sic] Mahmoud and his forces that he was unable either to 
perfect his organisation or to raise the tribes for resistance to the 
column.313 
 
Undoubtedly, as the AOC, Salmond was not a neutral commentator, however he had 
utilised a combined forces approach, and as a result had an appreciation of the part 
that air forces could play in combined operations. One of the key elements of the air 
force contribution to these operations was a very traditional one. Reconnaissance 
performed by the air component provided Salmond and his officers with a detailed 
picture of the area of operations and in that way enabled them to use their ground 
forces more effectively.314 However even at this early stage of Air Control 
operations in Iraq, the ability of the enemy to adapt to the new scenario was 
apparent. As Sir Basil Embry notes in his memoirs, while operating out of Kirkuk, 
‘Sheik Mahmud had an efficient intelligence and air-raid warning system’.315 
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Undoubtedly as the RAF continued operations in Iraq, their enemy would adapt, and 
thus require the RAF to modify their own approach. 
 
Photo 5 - Bristol M1Cs in Mesopotamia, 1919. 
Bristol M1Cs of No. 72 Squadron, Royal Air Force, lined up at an airfield in Iraq.  
Source: Imperial War Museum, H(AM) 1583 
 
Offensive operations, like those described earlier at Samawah could also be used 
against tribes that were raiding. Raiding was a natural part of the social and 
economic life of the mainly nomadic tribes of the Iraqi deserts, however to portray 
the administration as legitimate it needed to show that it could protect its people 
against unlawful activity. Operations against raiding tribes were similar in nature to 
those described previously; an ultimatum would be delivered and if refused then 
offensive operations would be initiated. Squadron Leader H.G.W. Dock describes a 
typical operation of this type in a lecture he gave to the Staff College in 1931. An 
incident of raiding was reported and aircraft were sent to stop and turn back the 
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raiders. Although the first day’s search proved unsuccessful, the next day the raiders 
were discovered and were made to turn back. Following this a wireless message was 
transmitted to base that brought out armoured cars (see photo 5, below) that arrested 
the leaders of the raiding party.316  
 
Photo 6 - RAF armoured car in the Iraqi desert. ND, interwar period. 
Rolls-Royce armoured car 'Cerberus' of a Royal Air Force Armoured Car Company in the Iraqi 
desert.  
Source: Imperial War Museum, H(AM) 496 
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Operations such as these were numerous and could be quite large in scale. However, 
they were not without risks. In an operation against raiders in March 1929 a wireless 
operator in the leader’s aircraft was shot and killed by rifle fire from the ground.317 
 
Related to the proscriptive bombing operations was also the concept of the aerial 
blockade. Essentially the aerial blockade, or inverted blockade, was a tactic used to 
disrupt the everyday life of belligerent tribes, to such an extent that they would 
acquiesce to Government demands. The blockade was about applying the minimum 
amount of force, the opposite of the operation in Samawah outlined above. The 
blockade would involve the delivery of an ultimatum to the tribe, if the tribe did not 
meet the demands of the ultimatum, a warning would be issued that offensive 
operations would begin within a particular time frame. Once the deadline had passed 
operations would begin and would be sustained until the Government demands were 
met. The offensive operations were meant to keep the tribes away from their homes 
and their livestock. ‘In effect, the tribesmen are blockaded from their normally daily 
lives’.318 Early on in Iraq the aerial blockade was only achievable during daylight 
hours, and tribes learned to resume their activities after dark when the RAF returned 
to their bases. To counter this the RAF sometimes flew night-time operations, as Sir 
Basil Embry has recalled, ‘the blockade would be conducted by single or pairs of 
aircraft patrolling overhead day and night for an indefinite period’, however night-
time operations were only carried out on perfect moonlit nights.319  Subsequently the 
RAF did develop a counter to the tribesmen's nocturnal activity, that was the use of 
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delayed action bombs to maintain the blockade during periods when the RAF were 
not overhead. This RAF tactical change was in response to the indigenous people’s 
adaption to the blockade.320 However as Gerald Gibbs in his memoirs recalls, 'they 
[the tribes, ultimately] gave up and came in because they could not stand the 
continual unending interference with their normal lives […]. There was no future in 
it, and no interesting fighting and no loot’.321  
 
Another key task performed by the RAF in Iraq was that of casualty evacuation, or 
casevac. Initially this task was performed using modified Vickers Vernon aircraft, an 
example of this can be seen in photo 7, below. 
 
Photo 7 – Casualty evacuation in Iraq. ND, interwar period. 
Wounded men being placed aboard a Vickers Vernon aircraft in Iraq. ND, interwar period. 
 
Source: Imperial War Museum, H(AM) 343 
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By 1925 two dedicated air ambulances were operational in Iraq and worked on a 
week on, week off schedule. Thus, at any time of the day or night, in any area of Iraq 
there was an air ambulance ready to respond to emergency calls. This was a 
significant development. Previously if a soldier was injured or became sick while 
operating away from their main base, there would be the requirement for them to be 
transported overland, typically by cart or donkey, this could take several days and 
would obviously not have helped their condition. With the establishment of the air 
ambulance service, most areas of Iraq could be reached quickly, and medical 
assistance given immediately, as typically a medical orderly, or sometimes a doctor 
or nurse, would accompany the flight.322   
 
This section has outlined only a small proportion of the type of operations that the 
RAF carried out in Iraq, additional to these there were detailed reconnaissance and 
photography missions; offensive operations in border regions against the Turks in 
the North and Nejd raiders from Saudi Arabia in the South; joint missions with 
ground forces; and air transport and air lift operations.  
 
During this period, the RAF were also involved in operations across the Middle East, 
including in Aden, Palestine and Transjordan. Within these territories, we see the 
ongoing evolution of the Air Control concept.  
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Part II – The Evolution of Air Control 
Aden 
Aden is situated at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, surrounded by Oman to 
the east, Yemen to the north, the Gulf of Aden to the south and the Red Sea to the 
west. To the south, across the Gulf of Aden lay British Somaliland. Thus, by 
controlling British Somaliland and Aden, the British controlled access to the Red 
Sea, and thus the Suez Canal. Aden was originally a Crown Colony; however, this 
was extended to the Aden Protectorate due to several treaties with local tribes, thus 
creating a buffer zone around the original Crown Colony, Aden was then divided 
into Eastern and Western regions for administrative purposes.323 
 
Even before the success achieved in Iraq with the policy of Air Control, the RAF 
were already making a case to use Air Control, and the policy of air substitution, to 
provide security in the British Protectorate of Aden. Soon after the Cairo conference 
in 1922, Aden was muted as a potential territory that would be suitable for Air 
Control.324 However it would take until 1926 for the Cabinet to approve the use of 
Air Control in Aden, and it would not be until January 1928 that the RAF would 
assume control. As in Iraq the main reason for the implementation of Air Control 
was one of economic efficiency; by increasing the RAF in Aden from a single flight 
to a full squadron, the corresponding reduction in army forces would produce an 
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annual saving in the region of £170,000.325 This reduction was illustrated in the 
House of Commons with the delivery of the Army Estimates in 1928, the 
transference of command of Aden from the Army to the Air Force resulted in the 
reduction of troops in Aden by 1,500, comprised of Indian and Colonial troops.326 
This economic efficiency can also be seen when one looks at the plans to subdue the 
external threat posed by Yemen. In 1928 the Army estimated that a division would 
be required to expel the Imam of Yemen’s forces from the Protectorate at a cost of 
between six and ten million pounds, in the end, as described below, the RAF 
achieved this objective with the expenditure of a mere £8,500, this being only £5,000 
over the typical expenditure on the air squadron in Aden.327   
 
The mission objectives of the Royal Air Force in Aden were like those of Iraq, the 
RAF had essentially two key missions in Aden. The first was to protect against 
foreign powers; in Aden, the threat was from Yemen to the north of the Protectorate. 
Secondly the RAF, as in Iraq, was concerned with maintaining internal security, in 
the case of Aden this involved operations to quell banditry. Details of these missions 
and how they were conducted are included below, however in summary they closely 
resembled those in Iraq, where first the RAF dealt with the external threat, before 
turning their attention to internal security. 
 
The terrain within Aden differed considerably from that of Iraq. In Iraq the east of 
the country had a certain level of infrastructure, however in Aden infrastructure was 
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non-existent outside of the port city of Aden, furthermore the terrain was largely 
mountainous, while the Eastern Aden Protectorate was largely unadministered. This 
type of terrain was perfect for the utilisation of aircraft to control and secure territory 
that otherwise would have been inaccessible to traditional, ground based forces.328  
 
Whereas Iraq relied on three component forces; the RAF, armored car companies, 
and local levies, in Aden, the RAF relied much more heavily on local levies: 
 
The Government have further undertaken the duty of forming levies 
from some of the tribes in our Protectorate, and I hope that these levies 
will be employed to redress the grievances that have been suffered from 
the actions of the Imam of Sanaa.329 
 
 
These local levies were the Aden Protectorate Levies (APL). To extend the 
capability and reach of the RAF a network of airstrips was built throughout the 
protectorate. This approach meant that the RAF could rely heavily on the 
intelligence network and look to nip trouble in the bud, before it evolved into more 
serious issues.330 Thus the intelligence officers and political officers became an 
important component of the overall force structure in Aden. 
 
Operations  
Beginning in June 1928 the RAFs initial task was to deal with the external threat 
posed by the Imam’s forces from Yemen in the north. The Imam did not accept the 
territorial boundaries between Yemen and Aden and desired to subsume Aden into 
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the Yemen. The focus of initial operations was the town of Dhala which Yemen 
forces had seized. RAF operations had three component parts. First the RAF flew 
ground support operations for local Protectorate tribes, secondly, they bombed 
targets within Yemen, and thirdly they conducted intelligence and reconnaissance 
flights in support of ground operations.331 The results of the operations were swift 
and decisive. Quickly trade within Yemen’s capital Sana had come to a standstill and 
most the population had fled.332 As a result, the Imam’s troops withdrew from Aden. 
The operation had been successfully prosecuted in under two months. Speaking of 
the operation against Yemen, the Permanent Undersecretary of the Air Ministry 
stated: 
 
in two months, by air action undertaken by a single squadron (which 
flew 900 hours under arduous and exacting conditions) the Imam had 
been forced to evacuate territory of which he had been in wrongful but 
virtually uncontested occupation.333 
 
Furthermore, a quote from a political officer working in Aden at the time gives some 
insight into the assistance provided by the RAF in operations, when he stated that: 
 
There is no doubt that the lesson of the Yemeni defeat at Dhala, the 
reported concentration of frontier tribes, and the movement of British 
officers in continual contact with aircraft in all those districts most open 
to Zeidi attack, checked the rapacity of the Imam334  
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This gives a clear indication that the focus of RAF operations in Aden was not 
simply to bomb with impunity, but rather to work closely with ground forces in a 
joint approach. Furthermore, the approach to operations was very like those 
conducted previously in Iraq, where a warning notice was issued to enable civilians 
to evacuate the target area.335 This seeming close cooperation with ground forces did 
not prevent Trenchard from stating that: 
 
I am continually telling all that twelve officers under a good squadron 
leader have ended a five year squabble in five weeks.336 
 
By 1934 the British and the Yemenis had signed a treaty delineating the border 
between the Protectorate and Yemen, however this would lead to an increase in 
banditry as border tribes sought to raid against caravans using the trade routes that 
crossed the border.337 While the threat from Yemeni forces did not go away 
overnight, the success of the operations meant that in the future the RAF would only 
have to deal with cross-border banditry, as opposed to any coordinated external 
threat. Thus, with the Yemeni problem resolved, the RAF could turn its attention to 
internal security. 
 
A major difference between the operations in Aden, as opposed to Iraq, was the 
intensity of operations as demonstrated in the chart below. This difference meant that 
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during the period 1919 to 1941, the RAF suffered only a single casualty during air 
operations in Aden.338  
 
Figure 11 - RAF operations by type in Aden, 1919-41 
 
Source: Data taken from; AIR/5/1300, Aden Operations Summary, 1919-1938; AIR/24/2, Air Staff, 
AHQ, Aden, Operations Record Book, 1940-1943;  J. E. Peterson, Defending Arabia, 
(www.JEPeterson.net, 2000), p. 55 
 
Furthermore, by the time that Air Control was instigated in Aden the RAF had 
benefited from years of experience in Iraq, thus the tenets of Air Control, as they 
were utilised in Aden, are by this stage very mature in their development. This 
maturity is seen in the predominant use of the concept of the inverted blockade, as 
opposed to mere prescription bombing. The inverted blockade relied on two key 
overriding principles, the concept of minimum force, and the primacy of political 
over military means.339 This concept is borne out by the chart above, although 
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bombing remained the most significant mission type of the RAF, the volume of 
those missions over the twenty-year period was minimal. Furthermore, Michael 
Longoria, has argued that this point can be further seen if one analyses the types of 
bombs used by the RAF in Aden during this period. In his study, he found that of 
28,000 bombs dropped against the Queteibi Tribe between March and May 1934, 
26,386, or 94% were in fact 5lb bomblets, an ordinance that caused a lot of noise, 
but did very little damage.340 By way of confirmation, between 1919 and 1939, only 
12 deaths were attributed to air attack within Yemen.341 
 
Thus, although the RAF were an ever-present threat to recalcitrant tribes in Aden, it 
would appear in the main that the threat of their presence appeared to be enough to 
keep the peace. However, some have argued that the utilisation of the RAF in Aden 
hampered the development of Aden, which would have occurred if the British had 
taken a more traditional ground-centric approach to colonial administration. Thus, 
Hoffman argues that the use of Air Control meant that the government did not need 
to invest in internal infrastructure, which would have been necessary to enable the 
army to travel to the interior, thus leading to neglect of the region.342 This was 
certainly a view expressed at the time. In 1920 the Army Commander in Chief of 
Iraq, General Haldane, argued that the introduction of Air Control would mean that 
the civil government would be less interested in road construction.343 There is some 
merit in this argument, traditionally road infrastructure in colonial territory was 
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developed to allow the army to reach deep into the territory to enforce obedience to 
the crown, if inhospitable terrain could be overflown, why would the administration 
invest in something that would not have any military relevance. Furthermore, the 
interior of Aden was of little interest to the British, as the focus was on the Port City 
of Aden, the rest of the protectorate can be said to have provided no more than a 
security buffer zone to the port. 
 
Along with operations in Aden, the RAF was engaged during this period in Palestine 
and Transjordan, and while Aden may have proved a similar challenge to that faced 
in Iraq, the challenge in these territories, especially Palestine, would be quite 
different. 
 
Palestine & Transjordan 
The British mandate in the Middle East extended to Palestine and Transjordan in the 
wake of the First World War, however their coupling for administrative purposes 
belied their vast differences. Palestine came under British influence because of the 
Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, which also allocated Iraq as a British mandate. 
Transjordan on the other hand was somewhat of a no-man’s land until officially 
recognised as a British protectorate after 1921. Transjordan from 1921 was ruled by 
the Emir Abdullah, with advice and financial support from Britain.344 Because of the 
Balfour Declaration in 1917, it was the stated goal of the British Empire to establish 
a new Jewish homeland within Palestine, this was in stark contrast to the increasing 
support for Arab nationalism, something that the British had encouraged during the 
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First World War.345  This situation would lead to conflict between the Arab and 
increasingly populous Jewish sections of Palestinian society, furthermore it would 
cause conflict between the Arab population and their British rulers.  
 
Palestine was politically and culturally diverse, with a predominantly Arab 
population, it was a populous and urban country, whereas Transjordan was very 
much a rural country, predominantly a tribal society. In effect Transjordan would be 
dealt with by the British very differently than Palestine, whereas Palestine would be 
administered and secured in full by the British, Transjordan would only be nominally 
under British control. These differences in administrative approach and societal 
organisation would lead to very different requirements for military control and 
security. This section will focus on RAF control of Palestine, as Transjordan was 
very much controlled in the manner of Aden and Iraq, thus a focus on Air Control in 
Transjordan would add little to the analysis. 
 
While Transjordan represented a similar problem to that of Iraq, and would seem to 
have been well-suited to the concept of Air Control, the RAF were wary of the 
requirements to secure Palestine. Speaking in 1929, Sir Hugh Trenchard made this 
clear when he stated: 
 
The Air Staff […] have never contended that air action is an instrument 
well suited to intervene in aid of the civil power in towns. An example 
may be derived from Palestine and Transjordan. In Transjordan, a 
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country of scattered populations and poor communications, conditions 
are well suited for Air Control; that is to say, the primary arm on which 
authority and security rests is air power, assisted by armoured cars and 
irregular forces. In Palestine, on the other hand, the focal points of 
unrest are found in more closely compact centres of population.346 
 
This opinion of the use of the Royal Air Force in Palestine is mirrored in the debates 
within the House of Commons in relation to budgetary estimates for Palestine. In 
1930, a supplementary sum of 140,000 pounds was proposed for Palestine, of which 
63,000 pounds was for the Royal Air Force, in response to this Major Ross, 
Conservative MP for Londonderry, questioned: 
 
How can an aerodrome have any material effect upon a disturbed and 
confused crowd which is rioting in the streets of a city?347 
 
 
This opinion of the utility of the Air Force in urban environments is mirrored in RAF 
doctrine in the inter-war period, indeed the RAF stated that the ideal use of Air 
Control is in countries that combined inaccessibility, with a population ‘organised on 
a loose tribal basis’.348 By 1940 it was the unequivocal opinion of RAF official 
doctrine that Air Control was not a concept that could be applied in a predominantly 
urban setting: 
 
Aircraft can seldom be effectively used in support of civil police 
authorities in thickly and diversely populated areas. […] Under such 
circumstances the support of air forces is best confined to 
reconnaissance, to the dropping of warning notes, to the conveyance of 
police authorities, and to other roles not entailing the use of the 
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offensive armament of aircraft.349 
 
Thus, within Palestine we had a territory that was under RAF command, however a 
territory that the RAF stated should not be subject to the principles of Air Control. 
The reasons for this are quite straight forward. At the Cairo conference the control of 
Palestine was foisted on the RAF because of their interest in the application of Air 
Control in neighbouring Transjordan. Indeed, in April 1930 Samuel Hoare stated 
that: 
 
The Air Force, so far as I know, never wished to be responsible for 
duties that can be best carried out by civil police. It was, however, 
found in practice to be difficult to separate the defence of the 
Transjordan frontier, essentially an Air Force responsibility, from the 
garrison problem in Palestine itself.350 
 
After the Cairo conference in 1921, along with Iraq, it was decided that the RAF 
should take over military responsibility for the territories of Palestine and 
Transjordan. Once again economic efficiency was a key driver; prior to the RAF 
taking command responsibility for Palestine, the garrisoning of this colonial territory 
cost the exchequer £3.5m per annum.351 By 1929 this figure had been reduced by 
90%.352 By 1925 the British Government felt that Palestine was settled enough to 
withdraw the last remaining garrison troops, thus from 1925 to 1929, the only British 
military personnel in Palestine and Transjordan were the RAF. For most of this 
period the RAF forces in the region were stationed in Transjordan, and not Palestine. 
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This was the situation faced by the RAF when trouble first erupted in Palestine 
during 1929. 
 
Operations  
Trouble first erupted in Jerusalem in August 1929, the initial trouble spot was the 
holy site of the wailing wall.353 At that time, the only security forces available to the 
RAF commander, Group Captain Playfair, was a single RAF squadron, one 
armoured car company, and the Transjordan Frontier Force (TFF). Knowing that his 
small force was inadequate to quell the spreading disturbances, Playfair requested 
additional forces in the shape of two infantry battalions and a second RAF squadron; 
naval aircraft and infantry also contributed.354 The two infantry battalions and some 
ancillary troops were dispatched from Egypt (see phpto 8, below).355 
Photo 8 - British reinforcements boarding a Vickers Victoria, ND 
 
Source: Sebastian Ritchie, The RAF, Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Middle East, 1919-1939 
(Cranwell, United Kingdom, 2011), p. 59 
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By September disturbances had spread throughout Palestine, Playfair used his 
ground forces to secure Jerusalem, while using the RAF squadrons to secure outlying 
areas. Due to the scarcity of ground troops available to the commander, one of the 
key tasks of the RAF was in the reconnaissance role, in this task the RAF could 
substantiate any reports of disturbances before dispatching elements of the limited 
ground force. The RAF also provided convoy protection and logistics support. The 
challenge now facing the commander was an insurmountable one with the forces he 
had available. In effect, he was facing a country wide sectarian conflict, one in which 
police forces, rather than the military, were better suited to quell the disturbances. As 
Hugh Trenchard stated in his final paper as Chief of the Air Staff before his 
retirement in 1929: 
 
Insurance against racial or political upheavals in such conditions is to 
be found neither in aircraft nor artillery, nor in infantry battalions, but 
in police and gendarmerie forces356 
 
The disturbances in Palestine would rumble on for three more years, albeit never 
really reaching levels of a full-scale revolt. The key learnings that the RAF and the 
British Government took from these experiences was that intelligence was a key 
factor, and that the Palestinian police force was wholly inefficient, and in need of 
total reorganisation.357 When trouble resurfaced in 1936 it would be fundamentally 
different from the earlier troubles; in 1936, the ire of the Arab population was 
directed not at the ever-increasing Jewish population, but at the British authorities.  
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When violence once again broke out in 1936 the RAF were severely constrained in 
relation to the rules of engagement (ROE) they operated under. As Dr Mark Lorell 
has argued constraints placed on operations have a significant effect on airpower 
operations in small wars: 
 
The effectiveness of airpower in peripheral conflicts is inevitably 
reduced by political, economic, and diplomatic constraints that typify 
such conflicts, including restrictive rules of engagement, politically 
controlled targeting, enemy sanctuaries, the requirement for reducing 
pilot and aircraft losses to the absolute minimum.358 
 
Initially they were unable to use bombs and could only use their machine guns in 
certain circumstances. This was more than likely as a result of the perceived failure 
of the RAF to sucessfully react to the troubles of 1929. By June however, with the 
conditions worsening, the ROE was relaxed to a certain extent, however the RAF 
were only permitted to use 20lb bombs, could not bomb within 500 yards of any 
kind of building, and could only use bombs where it was deemed more effective than 
machine gun fire. With the RAF now operating against armed groups in outlying 
regions, the necessity was for close cooperation between air and ground forces. This 
requirement saw the creation of the XX system, in effect this was what would be 
known today as a quick reaction force (QRF). An XX call from a ground unit or 
convoy would represent an immediate call for assistance and air forces would 
scramble to respond. Once overhead, air forces would receive further instructions 
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from the ground unit and act accordingly. In this scenario air forces would find and 
fix the enemy, and the ground forces would then engage and mop up.359  
 
Photo 9 - RAF plane dropping message, ND, between 1934-9 
 
Source: Library of Congress, Matson Photograph collection, LC-M33-9930, available at 
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/mpc2010004273/PP/, accessed 07 August 2015 
 
As the British Government debated the approach to securing Palestine it became 
obvious that there was the requirement for increasing the ground force component, 
this was subsequently done, and due to the scale of ground forces then deployed in 
Palestine it was decided that an Army officer should take over command from the 
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RAF, this was duly instigated in September 1936.360 Ground force levels rose and 
fell over the next two years, however with the rumblings of war in Europe from 
1938, the ground force commitment to Palestine was seen as being too expensive, 
thus in 1938 the Government acted: 
 
further reinforcements have been despatched to Palestine to bring the 
total strength of the garrison up to 18 battalions of infantry, two cavalry 
regiments, a battery of howitzers, and some armoured cars, with 
ancillary troops.361 
 
 
It was expected that this surge would provide the manpower to bring about a 
resolution in Palestine in a short period of time, this was achieved by the end of 
1938.  
 
As well as the XX system described earlier, there was also a further innovation in 
ground air cooperation instigated in Palestine. This was the concept of the air 
cordon. This was used where ground forces intended to search a town or settlement, 
essentially aircraft blockaded the position until ground forces could arrive: 
 
As soon as the cordon is established, the land forces, without any 
necessity for taking precautions to conceal their movements and 
without the fatigue and delay attendant upon involved encircling 
tactics, are at liberty to proceed to the search area rapidly and by the 
most convenient means […] Pamphlets are dropped on the area 
warning the inhabitants to remain within that area on pain of being shot 
from the air if they attempt to emerge362 
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In the main RAF operations in Palestine did not conform to the concept of Air 
Control as seen in Iraq and Aden. Although the RAF held command responsibility 
until 1936, in effect the RAF operated in support of ground forces. However, the 
impact of RAF operations in Palestine was marked. Speaking after the operations in 
1936, General John Dill, previously Commandant of the Staff College and Director 
of Military Operations and Intelligence, who had taken command of all military 
forces in Palestine in September 1936, wrote a lessons learned document, within it 
he stated: 
 
The value of the Air Force, when arrangements can be made for it to 
be at instant call, has been most marked, […] Rebels hold the Air Force 
in such respect that on occasions it had the effect of driving them to 
cover or dispersing them before the troops could get in touch with 
them.363  
 
When it came to striking at the enemy in the hills it was usually upon 
the bombs and guns of his aircraft that the commander would rely for 
a concentration of force at the decisive point. The fact that in some 
months more than 50% of enemy casualties resulted from air action 
bears witness to their effect. There were few engagements in which 
aircraft and troops did not work together in very close co-operation - 
so close in fact that 'combined action' is probably a better description. 
Practically every case of a successful attack on armed rebels resulted 
from the combined efforts of air and land forces; [Air] provided the 
commander with his principal weapon of offence. Local conditions of 
ground and policy combined to make it an especially effective weapon 
in Palestine.364 
 
 
Although RAF command of Palestine may not have resulted in a successful 
application of the RAF as the primary arm during the periods of unrest. What it did 
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achieve was the development of a sophisticated air ground cooperation scheme with 
the Army. This begs the question why a few short years later, the British forces 
fighting in Europe, did not possess these skills. Similar questions can be asked of the 
bombing techniques developed during this period in the Middle East. Throughout 
this period, the RAF developed techniques specifically for the situations they faced 
on operations in the Middle East. Due to a lack of evidence of these techniques in 
subsequent RAF conventional doctrine it can be assumed that these techniques were 
not deemed to be appropriate to a modern conventional war in Europe, and so in the 
main this expertise remained with the units engaged in these operations, and to a 
lesser extent they were shared as lessons learned in staff colleges in the UK. This is 
surprising when one considers that some of the key senior officers withing the RAF 
in the 1940s had been heavily involved in colonial operations, men like Arthur 
Harris and Charles Portal. However predominantly the focus of RAF tactics 
developed in the UK were based on the principle of strategic bombing, this was the 
role the RAF deemed to be its primary responsibility in any conventional conflict.365  
 
Another theatre in which the RAF played a significant, albeit secondary role, was in 
the North-West Frontier in India. 
 
NW Frontier 
The North-West Frontier of India is situated at the border between India and 
Afghanistan. For many years, it had been an immensely troubled spot for the British 
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administration of India and was significant because it was the buffer zone between 
Russia and India, any potential aggression from Russia would have to pass through 
the North-West Frontier. Geographically the North-West Frontier was one of the 
harshest and most difficult terrains in which the British colonial administration had 
to operate. It was mountainous and consisted of a series of high sided valleys in 
which the indigenous tribes lived. For many years, the administration in India 
struggled to come up with a coherent strategy for securing the region, and see-sawed 
between occupation on the one hand, and a light touch approach on the other, neither 
seemed to offer a satisfactory solution.  
 
Even prior to the operation in Somaliland, described earlier, the RAF had in fact 
been involved in active operations on the North-West Frontier. When the Third 
Afghan War broke out in 1919, it was RAF aircraft (BE2Cs) that initially provided 
decisive support to British ground troops, furthermore the bombing of Kabul and 
Jalalabad by a single Handley Page V/1500 led to the demoralisation of the Emir, 
and ultimately his agreement to an armistice in June 1919.366 This long-range 
bombing mission was one of the first of its kind in the world. The crew undertook a 
six-hour round trip to bomb Kabul. The bombing ‘achieved good results’, this was 
coupled with the fact that, in all probability, many of the people of Kabul ‘could 
never have seen an aeroplane before’.367 This initial impact on operations should 
have led to the solidification of the RAF as a key component of the military 
apparatus in the North-West Frontier, however the position of the RAF in India was 
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very different to the position of the service in other British colonial territories. 
Andrew Walters argues that the: 
 
the conservatively-natured Indian Armies were slow to recognise the 
conceptual shift required to fully exploit air power. This entrenchment 
was reinforced by inter-Service rivalry and the threat of aircraft 
replacing land forces with a concomitant loss of political standing. The 
enduring high-level internecine conflict resulted in the squandering of 
both resources and the opportunity to test independent, ‘strategic’ air 
power theory prior to the Second World War. Its legacy impacted on 
Army-RAF relations into the War.368  
 
Whereas the successes in Somaliland had led to the installation of the RAF as the 
primary military arm in Iraq, and subsequently Aden, Transjordan and Palestine, in 
India this was not to be the case. The army held all the service power in India, and 
while they appreciated and understood the impact that air operations could have in 
supporting their objectives, they would never countenance the prospect of the RAF 
assuming command control. Thus, the strategy of Air Control, and air substitution, 
would never be implemented in India. In attempting to increase the power of the 
RAF in India, Hugh Trenchard faced a number of challenges; firstly the Army 
controlled military expenditure in India, and secondly, Trenchard’s ally in the 
Colonial Office, Winston Churchill, who had been so instrumental in the 
development of the RAF position in the Middle-East, had no remit in the 
administration of India, it being administered by the India Office.369 Although the 
use of the RAF in support operations was to increase steadily throughout the 
interwar years, by the late 1930s the Chief of the Air Staff, Cyril Newall, still 
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lamented the fact that it would be impossible for the air force in India to modernise 
due to the fact that the army accounted for 93% of all military expenditure in 
India.370 
 
Not only was the inter-service power dynamic markedly different in India than what 
the RAF had experienced in the Middle East, there was also several significant 
differences in geography, politics and scale, all of which combined to make the RAF 
experience in India, very different to the Middle East. An interesting insight into the 
potential use of the RAF, or lack thereof, is given in a series of communications 
between Whitehall and the Government of India in 1923, related to the policy to be 
used in Waziristan. Initially in a communication dated 23 January the potential 
approaches are outlined; Whitehall favoured a policy of occupation by ground 
forces, whereas the Government of India stated that this approach was not achievable 
due to budgetary constraints. Ultimately a compromise was reached, however the 
compromise was not to use the RAF in some form of substitution, but rather to save 
expenditure on troops (using irregular as opposed to regular troops) and the road 
building project. The only mention of the RAF in this initial telegram is to state that 
further reductions was a ’question being left open for further consideration in the 
light of developments of aerial warfare'.371  
 
In a follow up telegram from India, its approach to Waziristan had changed, this was 
based on a recommendation from John Salmond to increase RAF forces and 
consequently reduce ground troops. This recommendation was because of a visit to 
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India by John Salmond the previous summer in which he was tasked with analysing 
the state of RAF forces in that region. Salmond’s opinion at the time was that the 
RAF were vastly under strength, with poor equipment and resultant serviceability 
issues. The document states that since their (the India Office) initial 
recommendations on Waziristan that they have since 'accepted Salmond's scheme for 
increase in Royal Air Force in India, with a consequential acceptance of a reduction 
in the Field Force’.372 The resultant response from London is unashamedly aghast at 
this about-turn, stating that this course of events has caused 'considerable uneasiness' 
in London.373 So did the Indian Government in fact embrace John Salmond’s 
recommendations? No, it would appear through a reading of these documents that in 
fact they had little intention to implement Salmond’s recommendations, however the 
whole episode would appear to have been used as political leverage to highlight the 
budgetary challenges faced with the security and administration of the North-West 
Frontier. As per Cyril Newall’s opinion above, by the late 1930s the RAF was still 
undermanned, and under-equipped. 
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Photo 10 - Westland Wapiti Mark IIA aircraft in India, ND, early 1930s 
Westland Wapiti Mark IIA aircraft of 'X' Flight, No. 31 Squadron, RAF, flying in line abreast 
formation over the North-West Frontier of India 
 
Source: Imperial War Museum, HU 70781 
 
Operations  
Army support operations were by and far the most common missions carried out by 
the RAF in India in the interwar years, and the Army placed great faith in their 
contribution. Typically, operations would revolve around a traditional approach, 
whereby the Army would use punitive columns to temporarily occupy territory, or 
engage a concentration of recalcitrant tribesmen. The RAF would be used 
extensively to support these columns, and in an offensive role to attack 
concentrations of the enemy. Speaking in 1936 about operations in North Waziristan, 
the Secretary of State for India states that ‘the Royal Air Force co-operated most 
successfully with the columns’.374 Even though the approach to operations was 
traditional, we see that the Army had begun to use the RAF in ways that would be 
familiar to those with knowledge of the principles of Air Control. Speaking about the 
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approach to these same operations in North Waziristan, the Secretary of State 
confirms that  
 
‘this discretion [to use the RAF] will extend to the bombing of villages 
from which contingents are clearly proved to have been sent. In this 
event, the usual warning to the inhabitants to evacuate the villages will 
be given’375  
 
The familiar Air Control refrains can again be evidenced in a memo from the 
Secretary of State about operations against the Upper Mohmands in 1935, he states 
on this occasion that the ‘proposal is to communicate to tribes that the air action 
being taken against them would be ceased if they acquiesced’.376 
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Photo 11 – Bombs exploding on the village of Kulala, ND, possibly 1932 
Vertical aerial photograph taken by a Type F.* aerial camera, showing bombs exploding on the 
village of Kulala during a raid by 'A' Flight, No. 60 Squadron RAF  
 
Source: Imperial War Museum, HU 91196 
 
One of the significant successes achieved by the RAF during their time in the North-
West Frontier related to the first large scale airlift ever performed. In 1929, a civil 
war broke out in Afghanistan and it was feared that the British inhabitants in Kabul 
would be negatively targeted. In response, the RAF organised an air lift involving 
eight Vickers Victoria transport aircraft (see photo 12) of 70 Squadron. These 
aircraft successfully air lifted 586 civilians from Kabul to India, and thus prevented a 
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potential disaster.377 The initial airlift, performed on the 24th December, would 
succesfully transport a party consisting of ‘four English wonmen, three young 
English children, four Indian women, four Indian maidservants, and five young 
children’.378 These twenty people would be the first in an operation that lasted two 
months, and became the first ‘major airlift of officials and civilians from one country 
to another’379. 
 
Photo 12 - RAF Vickers Victoria transport aircraft, ND 
 
Source: Kevin Baker, War in Afghanistan, A Short History of 80 Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan 
and the Northwest Frontier, 1839-2011 (New South Wales, 2011), p. 154 
 
Another role that the RAF played in the North-West Frontier was as a key 
component of the intelligence infrastructure. As early as 1923 the Chief 
Commissioner, North-West Frontier, highlighted this important role when he stated 
that 'by means of the aeroplane a Political Officer can obtain a far more intimate 
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knowledge of his charge that was possible in the past’.380 However the ability of the 
RAF to help in this ‘intimate’ approach to liaison with the tribes was a contentious 
issue. Viscount Plummer, speaking during a House of Lords debate in April 1930 
stated that ‘the Army provides a closer link to the populations that they govern and 
thus allow for an impression that British rule is characterised by integrity, justice and 
humanity’.381 This opinion was given in rebuttal to the view that Air Control could 
be used in the North-West Frontier, what Viscount Plummer possibly did not 
appreciate was that the RAF could be used as a key enabler of the existing system, 
and that its role in an Air Control approach was not simply about proscription 
bombing. Indeed, there was significant cooperation between the Army and Air Force 
in India, as Walters stated: 
 
Over time, local Frontier air tactics developed, such as punitive 
proscription, which the Air Ministry refused to recognise. In the late 
1930s, the mutual respect and willingness to compromise for in-theatre 
purposes by commanders such as Auchinleck, Ludlow-Hewitt, Peck 
and Slessor resulted in the Combined Frontier Manual. Despite this in-
theatre accord, the Manual took three years to publish due to high-level 
inter-Service discord.382  
 
Part III – The Impact of Air Control 
As Peter Gray has argued, ‘it is important to remember that British operations during 
the interwar period cannot all be lumped into the same generic title of ‘imperial 
policing’, the use of air power in Iraq, Palestine and India were very different from 
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each other. The issues in these colonial frontiers were different and the way in which 
air power was used was also different’.383  As we have seen through an analysis of 
RAF activity in the interwar period, each territory in which they operated required 
different solutions, these solutions needing to be formed to meet the particular needs 
of that territory. By way of summary the table below highlights these differences in 
approach. 
 
Table 2 - RAF approach to colonial operations in the inter war period 
 
As can be seen in the table above, in most theatres where the RAF held command 
responsibility, with the exceptions bring in British Somalia and Palestine, the RAF 
instigated a full system of Air Control and air substitution. In the theatres where the 
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Theatre RAF 
Command 
Responsibility 
Air Control 
Implemented 
Air 
Substitution 
Implemented 
Army 
Support 
Operations 
Iraq ✔ ✔ ✔  
British 
Somaliland 
✔ 
 
✔ ✔ 
Aden ✔ ✔ ✔ 
 
Palestine ✔ 
 
✔ ✔ 
Transjordan ✔ ✔ ✔ 
 
North-West 
Frontier 
   
✔ 
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Army still held command responsibility RAF operations can best be described as 
army support operations.  
 
This chapter will now analyse the use of the RAF in colonial operations throughout 
this period. Specifically, it will analyse whether these operations represented an 
application of doctrinal principles, showed evolution and innovation in its 
application and ultimately, the impact of operations in the different theatres. 
 
Application of Doctrinal Principles 
Neville Parton has argued that the formative years of RAF doctrine show an 
emphasis on the use of airpower in small wars. This is not that surprising when you 
consider the period through which the RAF was living. It required an independent 
role, and Air Control would seem to offer that role, furthermore small wars 
represented the majority of operations that the RAF was involved in within this early 
period. Parton argues that when viewed holistically: 
 
[…] the overall analysis of all of the doctrine material produced during 
this period demonstrates quite clearly where the Air Force’s centre of 
gravity lay, in terms of the area where most effort was placed in 
developing doctrine at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels—
which was, perhaps surprisingly given current understanding of this 
subject, that of air control or air policing. As Trenchard was attempting 
to keep the Army and Navy plans for dismemberment from becoming 
reality, what he needed was evidence of what the service could achieve 
now, and that was provided by the success of the RAF in areas such as 
Somaliland, Iraq, and the North West Frontier.384  
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Throughout the offensive operations in Iraq, outlined above, we see the thread of the 
original doctrinal guidance, first espoused in CD22 Operations. The importance of 
morale and a vigorous pursuit of the offensive once engaged, are central themes of 
RAF doctrine of this time, and can be seen in relation to the practical application of 
offensive aerial operations in Iraq. 
 
RAF operations in Aden and Transjordan seemed to follow the doctrinal instruction 
laid out in CD22 Operations (1922), AP1300 (1928) and Air Staff Memorandum No. 
46 (1930), particularly as it related to colonial operations. British Somaliland was a 
precursor to Air Control, and so for that operation there was no doctrinal point of 
reference. In Palestine and the North-West Frontier, Air Control was never 
implemented, and RAF doctrine related to combined operations was relatively 
immature at this stage.  
 
The initial doctrinal tenets were vague and lacking in any operational detail. This is 
not surprising, as Neville Parton argues, ‘doctrine can be regarded, at least to some 
extent, as simply a means of codifying lessons that have been learned from previous 
experience to inform future action’.385 Thus with the publication of CD22 the RAF 
had a limited amount of experience by this stage to draw upon, particularly in 
relation to operations in small wars. By 1924 and the publication of Air Staff 
Memorandum 16, we already see how operations within Iraq in the early 1920s were 
starting to filter through the RAF and drive doctrinal change. One of the 
considerable changes in RAF guidance on operations is mirrored in the approach to 
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the aerial blockade. This change is very apparent with the publication of AP1300 in 
1928. The concept of minimum force, which would guide British counterinsurgency 
operations into the future, had come to the fore. Undoubtedly throughout the 
interwar years proscription bombing was used, however it would appear after the 
mid-1920s that the favoured form of power demonstration was the aerial blockade, 
an approach that epitomised the concept of minimum force.  
 
Another important doctrinal transformation is the increasing importance of 
intelligence. From the outset of Air Control in 1922, the RAF had been conscious of 
the requirement for local intelligence, by the mid-1920s a network of Special Service 
Officers (SSOs) was established throughout Iraq to deliver just that. As Richard 
Newton has noted, ‘the concept of RAF SSOs on the ground had not existed 
prior to the air control scheme’.386 Work by RAF intelligence officers such as 
John Glubb had reinforced the notion that the ideal settlement of disputes was 
through political rather than military means. This was confirmed with the publication 
of Air Staff Memorandum 46 in 1930, with the guidance that, ‘the proper 
employment of air power requires the most intimate co-operation between the Air 
Force Commander and the political authority’.387 Ironically, a result of the 
deployment of SSOs was that they could provide the RAF with beneficial targeting 
information, as Priya Satia argues: 
 
Political officers’ untrammeled mobility in turn ensured that the RAF 
received good intelligence and could “[pick] out the right villages and 
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to hit [sic] when trouble comes.” By this ironic logic, the RAF’s 
successful persecution of a village testified to their intimacy with 
people on the ground, without which they would not have been able to 
strike it accurately.388  
 
The breadth and depth of the SSO’s impact on Air Control cannot be 
underestimated, as Richard Newton has argued they were pivotal to its success: 
 
The RAF SSOs, usually alone in remote, uncertain, and politically-
sensitive regions, orchestrated the inter-departmental activities 
(military, law enforcement, and civil) necessary to maintain the peace 
in their assigned regions. According to modern definitions, these 
airmen were Special Forces—uniquely trained, conducting unorthodox 
missions (especially for airmen), in high-risk areas to achieve theatre 
or strategic objectives389  
 
This represents key evidence of the RAF as a learning organisation during this 
period. At the outset of operations the SSO’s did not exist within the RAF, however 
in a very short period of time they became an integral part of operations, with the 
appropriate levels of organisation and training. 
 
When discussing the merit of Air Control, it is important to consider what the 
alternative was. Traditionally operations in a small wars environment were 
conducted by infantry forces, classically deployed in garrisons and strong points 
throughout the area to be controlled. These forces would then call upon the infantry 
column to extend control or to undertake a specific mission.  Although the infantry 
column, or punitive column, was effective, it had several significant issues. In the 
first instance, it was slow to react, requiring careful planning, logistics and 
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organisation. Secondly it invariably resulted in considerable casualties to the 
column, not only from the enemy, but also because of the harsh climate in which it 
needed to operate, typically this resulted in outbreaks of sunstroke and dysentery.390  
Thirdly, it was a blunt force implement; typically, when the Army had instigated an 
operation of this nature, it would ensure that once the column engaged the enemy, or 
reached the trouble spot, that it would engage with a vigour and level of violence 
that was required to justify its mission. Finally, the cost of mounting operations of 
this nature were high, something that in the post war period was hard to sustain. 391  
 
Air Control offered a way in which control could be maintained, while negating 
some of these issues. Aircraft could be deployed quickly over great distances, 
utilising a centralised structure with the ability to leverage forward airstrips. Air 
force casualties were minimal, indeed as Towle argues, ‘by 1932 the RAF had only 
had fourteen pilots killed and eighty-four wounded in air policing operations’.392 
Also the level of offensive operations could more easily be controlled, thus allowing 
the air force commander to ratchet up or down the level of violence, depending on 
the situation, thus missions could vary from shows of force to offensive operations. 
Air Control could also be achieved considerably cheaper than mounting a ground 
expedition, as has been demonstrated earlier. Finally, geography played a significant 
role in the success of Air Control as an alternative to the traditional approach, as 
Malcolm Smith has noted, ‘the natural shelter of deserts and mountains, which had 
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made the operations of the Army punitive column so costly and drawn-out, no longer 
provided safety for rebels’.393  
 
Not only did Air Control impact on the way in which imperial control could be 
maintained, operating within these kinds of environments also had an impact on the 
RAF. This impact, as with all military conflicts, led to innovation and evolution, 
both in the practical application of airpower, but also in the technology developed to 
meet the requirements of performing these types of actions. 
 
Evolution and Innovation 
Throughout this period, we do see an evolution in the RAF’s approach to operations 
and to certain challenges that they faced. The primary role played by the RAF in 
planning for the operations in British Somaliland is a case in point, furthermore, 
when faced with the challenges of Palestine, the RAF responded with several 
innovative approaches. In Palestine, we see the use of the XX system, as described 
earlier, something that we could draw a direct correlation with to today’s QRF 
(quick reaction force). Also in Palestine, we see the air cordon approach, which 
effectively cordoned off an area to allow for ground forces to engage and search 
areas of interest. 
 
One of the arguments posited about Air Control is that due to the nature of the 
operations performed, that Air Control led to a malaise within the RAF in relation to 
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tactics, and in relation to technological development.394 Many have cited that Air 
Control was the cause of the RAFs unpreparedness for a modern conventional war, 
the result of which was the poor performance in the opening stages of the Second 
World War.395 Furthermore, there is a school of thought that argues that the lack of 
navigational and bombing precision was because these attributes were not required, 
or were neglected, in a small wars environment, and thus their development was 
hampered in the interwar years.396 This neglect would lead to the poor bombing 
performance of the RAF in the first three years of the war in Europe. However, this 
argument is not wholly sound. Regardless of the lack of focus on navigational and 
bombing precision within the Air Control context, it was also neglected by the RAF 
in a wider institutional sense, thus to blame Air Control for the failings of the RAF 
to investigate these areas is misleading.397 Within the context of Air Control, the 
RAF did develop some innovative approaches to operations, while also developing 
technology that would assist them in performing their duties within a small wars 
environment. The charge against the RAF may more properly be that they failed to 
implement the lessons learned from Air Control, some of which could easily have 
been adapted for use in a conventional war environment.  
 
One example of the development of innovative approaches to the use of air power 
during the Air Control years was the development of casualty evacuation operations, 
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or casevac. In Iraq, this task was performed using modified Vickers Vernon aircraft, 
as outlined earlier.  
 
As has been alluded to earlier, the success of Air Control operations in overseas 
territories was based largely on the ability of the RAF to create and leverage 
intelligence. Indeed, Sebastian Ritchie has argued that the clear majority of air force 
operations in overseas territories in the 1920s were reconnaissance, as opposed to 
offensive operations.398 This is reflected in RAF sorties conducted in small wars 
throughout the interwar period. Intelligence was the foundation on which Air Control 
was built: 
 
The key to employing a relatively small number of aircraft effectively 
while avoiding unnecessary, counterproductive casualties was 
intelligence. A highly sophisticated civil/military intelligence service 
evolved which formed ‘the foundation on which successful Air Control 
is based’399 
 
Indeed by the end of the interwar period, the importance of intelligence was reflected 
in the teaching at the RAF Staff College in which it was cited as a key success factor 
when operating Air Control.400 In order to address this issue the RAF took over 
responsibility for the intelligence network in Iraq that had been established by the 
army in the early 1920s. Men like Sir John Glubb would, in Lawrence of Arabia 
fashion, integrate with local communities and become the eyes and ears of the 
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administration. Wireless communication would enable this information to be 
transmitted quickly and give the civil authorities, and their military advisors, a better 
picture on which to base their decisions. At a more basic level aircraft allowed Iraq 
to be accurately mapped for the first time, and so photoreconnaissance missions 
played a very significant part in RAF operations, particularly early in the Air Control 
era. By 1928 the RAF doctrine stated that 'a knowledge of the country is therefore of 
the greatest importance to all air personnel who may be called upon, all opportunities 
should be taken to add to this knowledge through aerial reconnaissance and 
photography’.401  
 
Another key development that evolved because of Air Control operations was the 
area of communications. During the First World War the ability of aircraft to 
communicate with ground forces was important, however the development of a 
satisfactory system did not happen prior to the end of that war. Within the Air 
Control environment, the close cooperation between air and ground forces meant 
that this problem needed to be solved. In Iraq, this air ground communication could 
be achieved through rudimentary systems. One such system described by Sir Basil 
Embry was based on the laying out of white cloth by the ground forces to 
communicate messages to the aircraft overhead (see photo 13, below), these were 
'ground strips made of white American cloth; for example, a square would mean all 
was well, an M that a doctor was wanted, an E that hostile tribesmen were about’.402  
The ability of ground forces to better communicate with air forces, and vice-versa, 
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would continue to develop during the inter-war era, this reached a new high point in 
operations conducted in Palestine in the 1930s. 
 
Photo 13 – An armoured car signals an aircraft 
A "T" signal and a flare light signal being fired by officer of armoured car (Ramleh Aerodrome), ND, 
between 1934-9 
 
Source: Library of Congress, Matson Photograph collection, LC-M33- 9927, available at 
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/mpc2010004270/PP/, accessed 07 August 2015 
 
Another area that developed rapidly as a key component of operations in Iraq was 
propaganda, or what would be referred to in modern terminology as psychological 
operations, or psyops. Dean, and others, have argued that psyops played a significant 
role in Air Control;  
 
psychological warfare was tailored to create a sense of helplessness 
among the target people and was an integral part of Air Control 
operations. Coupled with the "inverted blockade," psychological 
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warfare proved useful in Air Control operations403  
 
Not only were psyops used to create a sense of helplessness, they were also a key 
component of communication with the population. They enabled the coercive nature 
of offensive air operations by enabling the air force to communicate its requirements, 
while also providing the enemy with the information they required to bring an end to 
such operations. This use of leafleting as a means of communication would be 
something that the RAF would utilise in later operations in Malaya and Kenya. An 
evolution in this concept would come with the use of the loud speaker aircraft. 
Speaking in 1933 to the Imperial Defence College, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff 
stated that ‘we now have in the loud-speaker aircraft a sure and almost ideal means 
of delivering propaganda at its proper destination, the ear of the individual 
tribesman’.404  
 
Evolution and innovation is something that is apparent in any military conflict. As 
can be seen throughout history, the pace of evolution and innovation accelerates 
during periods of conflict and the Air Control era is no different. Above are just 
some of the examples of this, others that will be discussed in later chapters include; 
joint operations, aircraft development and close air support. What is important about 
this period is that the evolution and innovation experienced in the likes of Iraq must 
be viewed in light of the operations in that particular environment, and not used as a 
comparison for the development, or lack thereof, in conventional operations, as some 
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have done.405 The developments outlined above undoubtedly made Air Control a 
more effective and efficient military system; the charge that they in any way 
hampered the development of conventional operations and tactics of the interwar 
Royal Air Force is disingenuous. As David Omissi has argued, the doctrinal and 
technical developments that happened in relation to Air Control were valid for that 
environment and did not correspondingly hamper wider development in the RAF, 
doctrine on conventional warfare developed to meet the requirements in Europe and 
was not influenced by operations in the Empire, ‘nor did air policing have a 
detrimental effect upon the design of bombers intended to serve in Europe, as their 
specifications were issued without reference to imperial requirements’.406 However it 
can be argued that the fact that the RAF apparently operated in distinct silos during 
the period was counterproductive, the lessons of air control could have, and should 
have, influenced the developed of conventional doctrine and approaches in the wider 
RAF community. For example, the certainly some of the lessons about air-ground 
cooperation would have had equal applicability in the deserts of Iraq as in the fields 
of France. 
 
While it has been shown that to a certain extent operations in the interwar period did 
reflect doctrinal teachings, and that a period of evolution and innovation is apparent, 
the final assessment is what impact did these operations have in the territories in 
which they were conducted.  
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Impact of Operations 
British Somaliland 
As Sebastian Ritchie has stated, during the campaign in British Somaliland ‘air 
power was not merely to be employed in an offensive capacity’.407 The roles listed 
earlier, and conducted during phase two of the campaign, showed the wide utility of 
airpower in this type of operational environment. This multifaceted role was a 
glimpse into the future of RAF operations in the colonies and foresaw the broader 
operational duties of airpower in small wars and counterinsurgencies. From the 
outset of operations, the Royal Air Force was viewed as the primary instrument, 
however land forces would play a significant role: 
 
During the war an expedition against the Mullah was obviously 
impracticable, but a few months ago the whole situation was carefully 
reviewed, in the light of the experience gained in the war. It was 
decided that the operations should take the form of an attack from the 
air, followed up, if successful, by advanced patrols of mounted forces 
with infantry supports. These operations have now been carried out.408 
 
The role of airpower within the campaign was significant, however in the main the 
campaign can be described as a joint operation, one in which airpower provided 
initial independent action, and then in the following phase reverted to the role of 
ground support operations.409  The argument that airpower had been decisive in a 
matter of weeks, in a conflict that had been raging for twenty years, is inappropriate. 
However, the analysis of the operations in Somaliland would be brought up again 
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and again in the ongoing discussions about the efficacy of Air Control. Speaking in 
1926 in relation to a proposed use of Air Control in the North-West Frontier, the 
DCGS in India, Major General Walter Kirke, wrote ‘that the campaign in 
Somaliland was in no sense an “independent air operation”. In fact, aircraft were 
used according to the normal ideas of cooperation with ground troops’.410 
Furthermore, many have argued that the power of Hassan had been gradually eroded 
and by the time of the campaign in 1920, he was a spent force. Supporters of the 
Army even went so far as to say that in fact the use of airpower had hampered 
operations, and that ‘Somaliland had been somewhat of a hoax on the part of the Air 
Ministry’.411 Both points of view are extreme, the truth most likely lies somewhere 
in the middle. Undoubtedly the use of airpower aided the final campaign against 
Hassan, but more importantly it demonstrated the utility and efficiency of the RAF 
in colonial operations. Indeed, Winston Churchill, speaking in February 1923 said in 
the Commons: 
 
The total casualties of all the operations involved in the destruction of 
the power of the Mullah was one native African soldier died of wounds 
and one slightly wounded. That is what happens when you let air power 
have its way.412 
 
 
It would seem in Winston Churchill’s opinion that he had found a utility for 
airpower that would aid in Britain’s post war colonial obligations. In the same 
speech to the House of Commons Churchill would confirm that: 
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I have directed that the chief of the Air Staff to submit an alternative 
scheme for the control of Mesopotamia, the Air Force being the 
principal force or agency of control, while the Military and Naval 
forces on the ground and river would be an ancillary power.413 
 
Iraq 
It is important to remember that British operations during the interwar period cannot 
all be lumped into the same generic title of ‘imperial policing’, the use of air power 
in Iraq was very broad. The issues facing the RAF were diverse, from border 
security against outside threats, to internal policing, to garrison duties, these different 
roles required different responses. At its basic level, air power in Iraq was an 
experiment in an approach to imperial control that had no significant precedents. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the early doctrinal guidance and approach to operations 
in Iraq was undeveloped and unsophisticated. However, the RAF adapted quickly to 
its new operating environment, we see an evolutionary process both in terms of the 
doctrinal guidance and in the practical application of airpower. This is clearly 
evidenced in the doctrinal documents as outlined earlier, and in the approach to 
operations in Iraq. What was a rudimentary concept in the early 1920s evolved into a 
complex approach to the use of airpower in colonial territories. 
 
The results of the Air Control scheme, as it was operated in Iraq in the interwar years 
are clear. It was a success. Speaking in 1925 Henry Dobbs, the High Commissioner, 
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stated ‘Air Control has been so brilliantly magnificently successful […] that it has 
outstripped the expectations of the Cairo Conference of 1921’.414   
 
In his letter to Hugh Trenchard in March 1920, a year before the Cairo Conference, 
Winston Churchill asked a simple question; could the RAF maintain security of this 
new mandate (i.e. Iraq), while at the same time reducing the not inconsiderable drain 
Iraq was putting on the public finances? Thus, Air Control had two specific 
objectives, first to maintain security, and secondly to deliver this security more 
economically than existing methods. 
 
In terms of security, the RAF brought stability to the Iraq mandate that helped the 
development of the still immature Iraqi state. David Omissi has argued that ‘had Air 
Control not offered a cheap but effective alternative to military occupation, it is 
likely that the British presence would have been curbed or ended’.415  Not only did 
the RAF secure Iraq against outside threats, it also ensured internal security.  
 
Regarding how this security was delivered, debate has emerged as to the extent to 
which air forces or ground forces were used in proportion to each other, for example 
James Corum has stated that ‘all the major operations of the [Air Control] era can 
best be described as joint operations rather than airpower operations’, in a later work 
he goes further and states that ‘airpower served mostly as a support arm to ground 
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forces’.416  On the other side of the argument are those like Liddell Hart who argued 
that ‘[speaking of Air Control in Iraq] The air has made an attack and the ground 
detachment has walked in to receive a tame surrender. But, throughout, air has 
played the primary role’.417 This debate however does not really add to the 
discussion. The Air Control scheme was not concerned with the ratio of air 
operations, versus ground or joint operations. That said, its employment led to a 
significant reduction in the use of ground forces, and a corresponding increase in the 
use of air forces. Ultimately Air Control placed the mandate for control of Iraq in the 
hands of the Air Officer Commanding, it was his duty to utilise the tools at his 
disposal to achieve his objectives, and these tools included air forces, as well as 
ground forces. This joint approach was highlighted as early as CD22 Operations, and 
was a familiar thread throughout the doctrinal publications of this period. Airpower 
acted as a force multiplier, thus allowing for a significant reduction in ground forces. 
This idea of ‘jointery’ can be seen not only in doctrinal publications but also in staff 
college lectures in the interwar period. Courtesy of Neville Parton,418 the following 
excerpt from a RAF staff college lecture in 1938 is insightful: 
 
Finally, I would like once more to stress the attitude of mind we should 
adopt when approaching this subject . . . Let us remember that we and 
the Army alike are instruments of the Government we serve. We may 
differ in character, but we are there for the same purpose – to defeat the 
forces of disorder and lawlessness – and we are there to help each other. 
It is up to each service to be expert in its own particular sphere and to 
its commanders and staff officers to give impartial advice to the 
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political authorities – the users – before any operation is undertaken, 
and to be ready with that advice as the situation develops. This means 
the closest co-operation between all three, both in peace and during 
actual operations, and the recognition by the Army and ourselves of the 
paramount position of the Government, in whom alone is vested the 
right to decide upon the form specific operations . . . shall take.419 
 
The economy of Air Control is a subject that was much debated at the time. On the 
face of it defence expenditure in Iraq fell from a high of nearly £30 million in 1920-
1, to a figure of £3.4 million by 1925.420   However, there were those who at the time 
argued that the budgetary savings were overstated, Lord Lloyd speaking to the 
House of Lords in April 1930 stated that he felt the figures were somewhat 
skewed.421 Thus, the extent of the savings can perhaps be debated, the fact that Air 
Control delivered significant savings cannot, as is demonstrated in the graph below: 
 
Figure 12 - Cost of Securing Iraq, 1921-8 
 
Source: All analysis by the author, data taken from, HC Deb 27 February 1929 vol 225 cc2012-2014, 
2013 
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The charge of inhumanity is an oft-cited one against Air Control and this charge was 
supported by certain instances that seem to confirm it. For example, Trenchard’s 
proposal that civilian casualties should be reported in bulk numbers without 
distinguishing age and sex is marked.422 However when considering this it is 
important to consider the alternative. The traditional approach to this would have 
been the punitive ground expedition. The traditional approach had three major 
disadvantages when compared to the use of air forces, firstly, it led to increased 
casualties to British forces, secondly it resulted in significantly more casualties to the 
indigenous population, and thirdly it was considerably more expensive. Furthermore, 
although operations such as that described at Samawha are held to be representative 
of air force operations in Iraq. There is a body of work that argues that in fact this 
type of operation was rare, and became rarer as the years went by. However, as 
Walters has argued, ultimately, ‘Air Control became unacceptable because the 
West’s sense of humanity evolved faster than technology’s ability to reduce 
collateral damage.’423 What facilitated the continuing debate about the humanity of 
Air Control operations was the fact that in 1924 a new Labour Government came to 
power in Britain. This may have focused the mind of those who looked to undermine 
the Air Control approach, however, apart from some initial attention on this topic by 
the incoming government, it appears not to have had a lot of support and this faded 
into the background. Indeed the RAF in the years after the Labour election victory 
periodically addressed this issue, for example in a report entitled ‘Air power, the 
fallacies of inhumanity and rancour’, it states that the conduct of Air Control 
operations left no lasting resentment against the RAF in territories where it had been 
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used, indeed it quotes Sir Arnold Wilson, Civil Commissioner in Baghdad, as stating 
that 'I am convinced that this country [Iraq] offers exceptional scope for use of the 
Air Force as an inexpensive, efficient and a merciful means of maintaining order 
alike on hill and plain’.424 Satia Priya argues however that Air Control was anything 
but merciless, and states that: 
 
The inhumanity of the system stemmed from its inability to distinguish 
between combatants and noncombatants, a conflation no less iniquitous 
in the case of violent impoverishment of villages than in simple 
massacre of them.425 
 
Ultimately Air Control delivered on the twin objectives of security and economy, it 
also delivered something for each of its progenitors, as David Omissi so eloquently 
states,  
 
it was conceived by Churchill as an instrument for his own political 
advancement; it was adopted by Trenchard to ensure the survival of the 
air force; and it was implemented by the British government to save 
money without sacrificing oil-rich Middle Eastern territory.426  
 
Iraq was not the only country in which the RAF operated in an imperial policing role 
in the interwar years. In some countries, such as Transjordan and Aden, the RAF 
also applied the concept of Air Control in its fullest sense, while elsewhere in the 
Empire, such as Somaliland and the North-West Frontier, the RAF would be used as 
an adjunct to Army operations. It is within the wider context of these other theatres 
that we see both the success and the failure of the Air Control scheme. 
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Aden  
On the face of it the operations in Aden were not dissimilar to those in Iraq, the RAF 
had to deal with an external threat, followed by the objective of maintaining internal 
security. It achieved both missions very effectively, and efficiently. It would be easy 
to disregard the RAF role in Aden as being simply an extension of what they had 
been doing in Iraq, albeit on a much smaller scale, however that would be to 
oversimplify the situation. In fact, the operations in Aden show an evolution in the 
principle of Air Control, an evolution that had Iraq to thank, and an evolution that 
would add to the already strong body of evidence that the principal of Air Control 
and air substitution was a legitimate approach to colonial control. An approach that 
delivered on the twin objectives of security and economic efficiency. This evolution 
can be seen in the heightened appreciation of the importance of intelligence and 
political officers within the Air Control framework. With the building of a 
comprehensive network of air strips throughout the Protectorate, the RAF could 
transport intelligence and political officers to a trouble spot and effectively nip a 
problem in the bud, before the requirement arose for offensive air action. This was 
an approach first used in the early to mid-twenties in Iraq and one that the RAF 
relied heavily on in Aden. Within this approach, we essentially see the birth of the 
principle that recognized the indigenous people as being an important factor in 
colonial policing, not simply a target, this is something that the British would rely 
heavily on in later small wars, this principle was espoused succinctly by Charles 
Portal in 1938 when he stated that: 
 
In Aden it was our constant aim to get the native to think of a landing 
ground not only as a place from which he might be  bombed, but also 
as a point of contact with civilization where he could obtain some of 
its benefits without having to submit to what he regards as its 
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disadvantages […] Once these relations have been formed, the native 
is not slow to make the fullest use of his opportunities, and the network 
of unguarded landing grounds throughout the country becomes a very 
real blessing to him.427 
 
While the use of Air Control in Iraq and Aden was undoubtedly successful in 
achieving its objectives, it was not without its faults. The morality of proscription 
bombing discussed in relation to Iraq, and the consequent lack of infrastructural 
investment in Aden because of the predominant role of the RAF, have already been 
highlighted. Throughout the 1920s the RAF showed that the policy of Air Control 
and air substitution were now becoming a central cog in the machinery of colonial 
control. It would not be until the challenge faced by the RAF in Palestine that it 
would become apparent that perhaps Air Control was not the panacea for the British 
Empires colonial challenges. It would be this challenge that would bolster the 
detractors of Air Control at the time, and would be held up as an example of the 
failings of Air Control by commentators ever since.  
 
Palestine & Transjordan   
Palestine has been used in contemporary discussions to disregard the potentialities of 
the use of Air Control in modern small wars. However, what these detractors fail to 
appreciate is the simple fact that Air Control was not instigated in Palestine by the 
RAF.428 This was because from the very beginning of RAF operations in Palestine, 
they were acutely aware of its limitations, and that it was unsuitable for operations in 
densely populated areas. The RAF took over responsibility for Palestine, not as 
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another territory in which they could prove the principles of Air Control, but rather 
at the insistence of Churchill, who for administrative efficiency, wanted a unified 
command to secure both Palestine and Transjordan.429 Another colonial territory in 
which the RAF held a very clear subordinate position was in relation to India, in 
particular the North-West Frontier. 
 
Northwest Frontier  
Ultimately, like Palestine, Air Control was never implemented in the North-West 
Frontier. As Omissi argues, ‘the government of India remained unwilling to risk 
large-scale reductions to the Frontier Army, and preferred an expensive policy of 
road building and military occupation’.430 However what the RAF did do in the 
North-West Frontier was act as a force multiplier. Its activities spanned the range of 
air force capabilities at this time, their functions included; air reconnaissance, re-
supply, force protection, propaganda, air transport and offensive air operations. The 
inability of the RAF to implement Air Control in its fullest sense in India resulted 
from several factors; the political strength of the Army in India, and the lack of a key 
Air Control champion in the India Office. Another key element of this was the sheer 
complexity of the problems in the North-West Frontier, the region did not represent 
one single challenge, but rather represented a series of interconnected issues. ‘In the 
very north, in Malakand, home of the Yusufzai, there was effectively a monarchy, 
three tribal chiefs under the protection of the British. In the middle, in the Khyber 
region populated by the Afridis, there was a feudal aristocracy. In Kurram, among 
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the Shia Turis, there was a fairly well worked democracy. In North and South 
Waziristan, home respectively to the Wazirs and their ancestral cousins, the 
Mahsuds, there was anarchy’.431 It was this political and cultural complexity that 
undoubtedly led the Government of India to retain confidence in the Army, as 
opposed to trying something new and radical. 
 
Furthermore, the Army had lost the debate in relation to Iraq, Aden, Palestine and 
Transjordan, they would not lose the debate in relation to India. To a certain extent, 
India represented the last great bastion of colonial power, one which had relied upon 
the British Army to ensure its control and security since its inception, if the army 
held an unshakeable grip on the military power in India, it also retained its position 
as the senior military service alongside the Royal Navy. 
 
The genesis for the idea of the Air Control scheme is hard to determine. While some 
have argued that it had various originators, including; Trenchard, Churchill and 
Sykes, the more likely explanation is that it was an evolutionary process, where 
many differing ideas culminated in the formulation of the Air Control scheme. As 
early as December 1918, Frederick Sykes espoused the idea of a 'striking force 
which would be utilised when possible for Imperial police work, mail-carrying, and 
other public duties'.432 Jaffna Cox argues that ‘Syke’s scheme was too costly for a 
government anxious to disentagle itself from foreign commitments, or at least from 
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the associated burdens of large-scale military spending’.433 Although Sykes’ initial 
plan was rejected by the cabinet, it was this concept that contributed to the ultimate 
evolution of the Air Control scheme. Undoubtedly operations in Somaliland, the 
North-West Frontier and Iraq all added to the doctrine of Air Control and by 1925, 
as has been demonstrated, this approach was relatively mature. 
 
RAF colonial operations in the interwar period are certainly not a story of the 
evolution and expansion of the concept of Air Control. The story is also not one of 
the revolutionary development of airpowers utility. Rather the story is a lot more 
mundane than that. RAF operations in the interwar period throughout the British 
colonial empire was a story about necessity and practicality. Necessity in the sense 
that the British exchequer required a cheaper alternative to traditional ground centric 
approaches to colonial security, and practicality in the sense that a number of the 
territories that required securing were geographically predisposed to airpower, being 
in the main rugged and inaccessible.  
 
Furthermore, when we analyse doctrine and theory, and map this to operational 
realities, we can determine that the RAF during this period displayed the 
characteristics of what now would be deemed a learning organisation. As discussed 
in chapter 1, organisational learning: 
 
[…] typically adds to, transforms, or reduces organizational 
knowledge. Theories of organizational learning attempt to understand 
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the processes which lead to (or prevent) changes in organizational 
knowledge, as well as the effects of learning and knowledge on 
behaviours and organizational outcomes.434 
 
 
The RAF documented an initial approach to air operations in the colonies and over 
the course of twenty years this approach evolved based on operational feedback. 
This operational feedback added to and transformed the knowledge within the 
organisation. This knowledge not only influenced subsequent doctrinal publications, 
but was also taught at the staff college, and disseminated through professional and 
commercial publications.  
 
Thus, the analysis of RAF operations in the interwar period is a case of horses for 
courses. Where appropriate, and where the RAF held command responsibility, they 
pursued a policy of Air Control, based on an approach that instigated air substitution. 
However, where the Army held command responsibility, for example in the North-
West Frontier, the RAF were always in a subordinate position, having to adhere to 
the overarching policy of security as implemented by the Army. 
 
Regardless of which arm held command responsibility, or to what degree the 
operations could be characterised as Air Control, or army support, in the main RAF 
operations during the interwar period were successful. The RAF gave the British 
Empire the ability to secure, and thus hold onto, many imperial possessions, that 
they simply could not have maintained with a tradition approach of deploying 
ground forces. By 1939 the RAF were tasked with operations that were vastly 
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different to those that had been carried out in the deserts of Iraq or the mountains of 
the North-West Frontier. However, shortly after the conclusion of the Second World 
War, the RAF would once again be tasked with operating in a small wars 
environment, this time it would not be over arid desert, but rather over the lush 
jungles of Malaya, in South East Asia. 
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Chapter 3 – Post War Colonial Security 
 
The use of airpower in unconventional operations was very apparent during the 
Second World War; for the most part this manifested itself with the Allied support of 
guerrilla/resistance forces in many countries, including Greece, Yugoslavia, Norway, 
Poland and Malaya. This was characterised by logistical support and driven in the 
main by the Special Operations Executive (SOE). During the war the SOE landed 
7,000 agents behind enemy lines, these agents acted as liaison officers and advisors 
to the guerillas.435 Also, significant during the Second World War was the use, by 
the Germans, of outdated aircraft to counter guerrillas, in particular the Stuka Dive 
Bomber and Fieseler Storch.436 These aircraft, while outdated for front line service, 
proved very adept at operations against guerillas. With the development of the jet 
engine, the post war period would show that slower, older aircraft were ideally suited 
to counterinsurgency operations.  
 
Britain emerged from the Second World War intact, the mainland never having been 
invaded, however the majority of Britain’s colonial empire had faced prolonged 
fighting; the Middle East, Malaya, and territories in East Africa had faced invasion, 
occupation and ultimately liberation. Britain now faced the challenge of either 
reasserting her colonial rights over these territories, or in some cases beginning the 
transition towards independence, or at least some form of self-governance. Not only 
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had the world changed dramatically in the six years of war, but also the military 
machine at Britain’s disposal had evolved immeasurably. 
 
By the conclusion of the Second World War the RAF was a different air force than 
that which had fought insurgents in Britain’s colonial territories in the interwar 
years. This evolution, and near revolution, encompassed technology, operations and 
scale. From a technological perspective the evolution in aircraft, navigation 
equipment and armament had resulted in an air force that could deliver the basic 
functions of airpower; air strike, mobility and reconnaissance, but deliver it in a 
manner much more efficient and effective than it could a decade earlier. In terms of 
operations, the RAF had become very adept at ground support operations and 
interdiction, while also evolving their approach to strategic bombing. Operations 
conducted during the Second World War were significantly different to those 
performed in the colonies in the 1920s and 1930s. In the main operations had been of 
a conventional nature, time would tell if the skills learned on these operations could 
be applied once more to counterinsurgency operations in colonial territories. The 
scale of the RAF had also changed drastically in the space of a decade, however the 
contraction experienced in the wake of the First World War was not to be repeated 
on the same scale with the cessation of hostilities in 1945. However, by 1947 the 
RAF had still shrunk by over one million personnel, and by March 1947 contained 
330,000 personnel.437 Certainly, the post-war RAF had to be downsized, however the 
looming Cold War would ensure that the requirement to maintain a strong air force 
would be a necessity, and not a luxury. 
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In the wake of the Second World War the world was changing. A tide of nationalism 
was sweeping colonial territories and this was very apparent in British colonial 
territory. Over the next three decades’ colonial powers would come under increasing 
pressure to support self-determination and withdraw from territories that had 
traditionally been a key component in their financial and social fabric. This 
movement would particularly effect Britain; countries like Malaya, Kenya, India, 
Burma and many more would embark on the painful transition from colonial 
territory to independent state. Within these conflicts the importance of psychological 
operations would come to the fore, as Martin Thomas has argued, the wars of 
decolonisation in the period 1945-1975 were ‘always as much a struggle for minds 
as for territory’, the RAF would play a significant role in this regard.438 This chapter 
will focus on the small wars and insurgencies that the RAF would play a part in 
during this period, in particular engagements in Malaya and Kenya. 
 
Whereas in Malaya the RAF brought to bear the might and technological strength of 
airpower, in lesser theatres, RAF personnel were having to make do with equipment 
that was probably more reminiscent of the Air Control era. Kenya, it can be argued, 
falls into this category of post-war peripheral colonial conflicts.  
 
This chapter will place these RAF operations in the context of the theory and 
doctrine that was prevalent at the time, along with analysing whether traits of the 
interwar Air Control tactics can be seen in the approach to operations in the post war 
era. A key component of this analysis will be to see to what extent operations 
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impacted doctrine and theory, and correspondingly, how doctrine and theory 
impacted operations. By performing this analysis, it will become apparent whether or 
not the learning organisation that the RAF created in the interwar period, as 
discussed in chapter 2, survived into the post-war period and whether we see a 
continuation of the approach to learning and knowledge creation that was apparent in 
the 1920s and 1930s.  Furthermore, it will look to see whether evolution and 
innovation occurred in how the RAF approached these operations from one theatre 
to another, once again this will provide evidence on whether the RAF continued to 
be a learning organisation by understanding whether the knowledge and experience 
gleaned in one theatre was transmitted to personnel operating in other theatres. This 
period is particularly important as it provides a link between the birth of RAF 
operations in small wars (i.e. Air Control in the interwar period) and the current 
operations being carried out by the RAF in Afghanistan against the Taliban and the 
Middle East against ISIS. 
 
Before focussing on the conflicts mentioned above and the operations that were 
carried out, it is important in the first instance to view the theoretical and doctrinal 
context in which these operations were carried out. 
 
Theory & Doctrine  
With the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki the US 
introduced a new and devastating weapon into warfare. The effect that this weapon 
would have on airpower theory was dramatic. Although the Second World War had 
proven the importance of tactical airpower in combat, the development and use of 
atomic weapons heralded a new chapter in airpower theory, one dominated (once 
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again) by strategic bombing, in this case of the nuclear variety. As John Buckley has 
argued, 'the atomic bomb negated the need for a massive air superiority campaign, 
for one aircraft with one atomic bomb could do the task of a whole fleet of 
conventional strategic bombers in one mission’.439 In 1946 Bernard Brodie 
summarised the effect that this would have by stating that now; any city in the world 
could be destroyed and that no adequate defence then existed against the use of 
nuclear weapons.440 For the next twenty years airpower theory would be consumed 
by the question of how to utilise nuclear weapons. This focus on nuclear strategy 
was at the expense of tactical airpower, the effect of this neglect would be felt 
strongly in later conflicts like the Korean War. The effect of the focus on the nuclear 
dimension of future war was that general airpower theory suffered greatly, there was 
a significant lack of theory in the period 1945 to 1975, while theory related to the use 
of airpower in small wars was limited. While there may have been a dearth of 
airpower theory, particularly related to its use in small wars, there was a body of 
doctrinal knowledge that practitioners of airpower could rely on. 
 
The first update to post-war RAF doctrine came with the publication in 1950 of the 
RAF War Manual. 441 Although a huge amount of development had happened in the 
RAF since the publication of their pre-war doctrine manuals, both tactically and 
technologically, this development had in the main concerned conventional 
operations. Thus the 1950 publication reiterated many of the points that had been 
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published in the 1920s and 1930s in relation to colonial operations. Even the 
language used is similar in the way it described indigenous peoples: 
 
These barbarous or semi-civilised peoples can be formidable enemies, 
and they usually have valuable allies in the climate and the terrain. 
Their very lack of formalised military organisation may in itself be a 
source of strength to them [...] They will be largely self- supporting, 
capable of living on the country and independent of lines of 
communication in the accepted sense. 
 
Furthermore, it was cognizant of the strengths that these opponents had, regardless 
of the modernity of the forces that the RAF could bring to bear: 
 
Unencumbered by complicated equipment they will be highly mobile 
and elusive opponents, operating in a climate and in country familiar 
to themselves but presenting considerable difficulties to normal 
modern land forces. 442 
 
 
Already by 1950 we see, however, some changes in the way in which the traditional 
doctrinal principles could be carried out. For example, the following paragraph 
alludes to the potential use of loud hailing aircraft to communicate with insurgents: 
 
The first thing to do is to inform the people in unmistakable terms of 
what is required of them […] They must also be given a clear warning 
of what will happen to them if, within a stated time, they have not 
complied with our terms. This is done either verbally or by political 
officers or by dropping pamphlets in the tribal area concerned, or even 
sometimes by loud-speaker from the air.  
 
 
This is interesting in that it shows how the RAF was reacting to the development of 
new technology, and that within a relatively short period this had filtered through to 
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doctrine. Although the 1950 doctrine talked of leveraging new technology, it was at 
the same time firmly mired in the tactics and techniques of the 1920s and 1930s: 
 
The next step is to issue a further notice that air action will begin within 
an area which must be clearly defined, from a certain time [...] The 
enemy should be told to evacuate his habitations and advised to send 
his women and children out of the prescribed area.  
 
On the expiration of the warning period, air action should begin and be 
continued until the enemy complies with our terms.443  
 
 
Although it did take note of some early lessons from post war operations, the manual 
of 1950 was predominantly based on the pre-war Air Control principles. It would not 
be until an updated doctrine was published in 1957 that the true lessons of the 
Emergency in Malaya would begin to filter through to doctrinal thinking. 
 
The publication of AP1300, Royal Air Force War Manual Part 1: Operations, in 
1957 witnessed two significant changes to the way in which the RAF viewed their 
role in counterinsurgency operations.444 
 
Firstly, one of the main tenets of pre-war Air Control was significantly 
deemphasized; the importance of the principle of dislocating the enemy’s normal 
way of life was no longer a central principle of air operations in colonial territories. 
In the 1950 manual, this section had run for nine paragraphs, in the 1957 publication 
this had been reduced to just two. Secondly, and more importantly, the emphasis on 
the use of air power in this type of operation had changed. In the 1957 publication, 
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the overwhelming emphasis was placed on ground support operations, including; 
reconnaissance, offensive support, air transport, protection of surface lines of 
communication, the air cordon or ‘air pin’ system, and psychological warfare. It also 
emphasized the importance of intelligence, jungle operations and ‘conduct after 
capture’.445 Indeed as early as July 1948 plans had been discussed at cabinet about 
the ‘formation of jungle units for offensive operations against guerrillas [sic]’.446 
Perhaps an indication that the emphasis on ground force utilisation was being 
stressed over the interwar primacy of airpower. 
 
What can be surmised through an analysis of early post war doctrinal publications is 
that the operational realties of post war counterinsurgency operations were filtering 
through to the doctrinal creation process. Knowledge was being captured and 
communicated, thus there is an indication that the learning organisation that the RAF 
had fostered in the inter war period had survived the Second World War. 
Furthermore, the commanding officers of the post war period had served in the 
interwar period and so knew the challenges men in the field faced, thus they were 
not unfamiliar with counterinsurgency operations in these environments and the 
fundamentals that needed to be instilled through doctrinal teaching. However, one of 
the challenges with doctrine is the inherent lag between experiences in the field, and 
the ability to capture and disseminate these through doctrine. Thus the 1950 
publication does not really include the early experiences of operations in Malaya, 
rather it relies on the experiences of the interwar period. However, by 1957 the 
                                               
445 Sebastian Ritchie, RAF, small wars and insurgencies: later colonial operations, 1945-1975 
(Cranwell, United Kingdom, 2011), p. 7 
446 TNA, CAB 129/28/40, 19 July 1948 
212 
experiences of Malaya (the Emergency having begun in 1948) had been distilled and 
captured, and thus impacted on the doctrinal publication of 1957. If one thinks about 
the doctrinal creation process, and all that is involved, it is not difficult to see how 
this lag occurs. As will be discussed later in this work, one of the challenges for 
contemporary doctrinal creators is to minimize this lag through changing the 
doctrinal formulation process, while also using technology to enable the timely 
capture and dissemination of operational experience. It is to the operational reality of 
Malaya that this work now turns. 
 
Malaya 
One of the challenges faced by the British in the wake of the Second World War was 
re-establishing rule in its colonial empire. Many of these colonies had been invaded 
during the hostilities and so had spent a number of years under different rulers. The 
challenge now was for the British to not only re-establish rule, but also to re-
establish their legitimacy to rule. One such colony was Malaya.447  
 
The Malayan peninsula, situated in South East Asia, is surrounded by the sea; the 
South China Sea to the east and the Strait of Mallaca to the south and west. Its only 
land border is with Thailand and stretches for approximately 170 miles. Malaya is 
roughly the size of England and Wales together, and about 80 per cent of the land is 
covered in equatorial rain forest. Its major exports were rubber and tin, and it was 
these valuable commodities that drew colonial interest to the peninsula. From the 
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18th to the 20th century the region was known as British Malaya and encompassed 
the peninsula and the island of Singapore.  
 
Map 1 – Map of Malay Peninsula, 1949 
 
Source – available at http://unostamps.nl/country_federation_of_malaya.htm, accessed 26 February, 
2017 
 
214 
Malaya, as it was known, was not a single entity but rather a collection of states, as 
the British Cabinet so presciently noted in May 1945, ‘Malaya forms neither a racial 
nor a constitutional entity, and an appreciation of this fact is essential to any 
understanding of the problems we shall meet on our return’.448 The planning for the 
return to Malaya began at this point and by August 1945 a memorandum was 
presented to the Cabinet detailing the post war approach to Malaya and Borneo.449 
From a security perspective, even at this early stage a role was envisaged for the 
RAF, however its scope of operations was quite limited, being seen predominantly 
as a tool that could provide a presence in remote areas, while also being of utility in 
protecting Malaya from outside threats.450 
 
In 1942, the Japanese army had invaded Malaya and was to retain control until the 
end of hostilities. During this occupation, the British aided the Malaya Peoples Anti-
Japanese Army (MPAJA), a rebel group fighting against the Japanese occupiers. At 
the end of the Second World War, elements of the MPAJA would become the core 
of the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), the military wing of the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP). In 1948 with the rejection of a British proposal to create 
an independent state, the MCP declared war and the British authorities instituted a 
state of emergency.451 The Emergency as it would become known, would last until 
1960. The emergency regulations allowed for  
 
the re-imposition of the death penalty for the offence of carrying arms, 
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and the authorities have been empowered to detain any person without 
trial, to search persons and buildings without warrant and to occupy 
properties.452 
 
This work now turns to look at the scope and scale of operations conducted by the 
RAF in support of the Emergency.  
 
Operations 
On the one hand Malaya was unlike any counterinsurgency operation that British 
forces had conducted in the interwar period, however British forces had become very 
skilled jungle fighters in the course of the Second World War, and it was these 
experiences that would be brought to bear against the insurgents in the jungles of 
Malaya. Undoubtedly Malaya was a ground centric campaign that relied heavily on 
the use of small combat teams inserted and supported within the jungle. These teams 
would be supported by the establishment of strong points and the fortification of 
villages across Malaya. While the strategy was ground centric, airpower become a 
key enabler of operations. One of the ways in which airpower played an important 
role was in the enablement of intelligence operations, which became a vital part of 
the counterinsurgency strategy in Malaya.453  
 
The Malayan theatre was a difficult one for airpower to operate in; the jungle canopy 
was thick and deep, thus making target acquisition and identification extremely 
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difficult (the thick canopy also meant that bombs sometimes exploded in the canopy 
and not on the jungle floor), the weather took its toll on men and machines, while the 
infrastructure was distinctly undeveloped.454  
 
By December 1948, a mere six months after the declaration of the Emergency, RAF 
strike aircraft were being used in complex operations against communist terrorist 
(CT) targets on the ground. On one occasion an operation entailed Beaufighters 
attacking a ground target in the first instance, followed twenty minutes later by 
Spitfire, two hours later ground forces arrived, however most of the CTs had fled by 
this stage with only one being arrested. At an adjacent camp two more CTs were 
arrested who had been frightened by the bombing and thus had sought shelter instead 
of fleeing. The RAF deemed this a successful operation, justifying this opinion by 
stating that the concentration of CTs had been broken up, thus potentially disrupting 
a force that could have ambushed the ground forces.455 This operation was typical of 
early engagements where the remoteness of the target area hampered any successful 
follow up by ground forces. Furthermore, sometimes the length of time between an 
air strike and the arrival of ground forces made it extremely difficult to accurately 
survey and report on the results of the air strike operation. This operation was 
distinctive as being one of the last operational duties of the Beaufighter, which was 
withdrawn from service shortly after.456 
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As early as January 1950 serious concerns were being raised about the utility of 
bombing, Air Vice Marshal Mellersh (Air Officer Commanding, AHQ, Malaya) 
noted that the opinion towards bombing in Britain and Australia was not 
favorable.457 However, in April 1950 operations involving significant bombing were 
still occurring; for example, in the Selangor region an operation was mounted that 
involved the dropping of 110 tonnes of bombs on jungle targets.458 The success of 
such operations were however very difficult to measure, thus it is no surprise to hear 
many argue that airpower played only a small role in the Malayan Emergency. For 
example, Major General Richard Clutterbuck, who served in Malaya, stated that: 
 
Except for occasional successes with pinpoint bombing, offensive air 
strikes were almost wholly unsuccessful in Malaya; they probably did 
more harm than good.459 
 
However there needs to be a reassessment of this opinion. The way in which the 
effectiveness of airpower in counterinsurgency operations is evaluated needs to 
change. Coming out of the Second World War there was an emphasis on the 
scorecard when it came to air operations; how many men/tanks/enemy aircraft had 
been destroyed. In counterinsurgency however, the scorecard is very different. The 
kill is not necessarily the ultimate measuring stick, rather other factors need to be 
analysed, for example mobility, reconnaissance, ground support, casevac etc. In 
counterinsurgency operations, as in most types of conflict, airpower is an enabler of 
ground operations; Malaya offers a great example of how true this is. Air Vice 
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Marshal Mellersh, who voiced concerns about the attitude to bombing in Britain and 
Australia, noted that: 
 
Without our bombing the bandits would have the entire initiative and 
could operate against our forces on their own terms. The result would 
be that our own casualties would be higher460 
 
As mentioned above, the primary goal of the air force in Malaya was support of the 
ground forces, to enable them to find, fix and destroy CTs. Although early in the 
Emergency strike operations were key, by the early 1950s and the implementation of 
what became known as the Briggs Plan, the RAF had deemphasized strike operations 
in favour of ground support.  
 
The Briggs Plan was a relatively straightforward operational plan for the conduct of 
manoeuvres during the Emergency, with the goal of re-establishing control across 
the peninsula. The plan was composed of the following key elements: 
 
[The plans] are based on full co-ordination of the military, police and 
civil forces. The military forces will clear the peninsula area by area, 
from south to north: the job of the police and civil administration will 
be to establish effective control in each area as it is cleared to enable 
the military forces to move on to the next.461 
 
These elements would deliver on the aim of the Briggs plan to; instil a feeling of 
security among the population, to break-up the communist organization within the 
populated areas, to isolate the CTs from their food and support, and finally to force 
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the CTs to engage on the security forces terms.462 To deliver on these aims, airpower 
would be used to support this ground centric campaign. 
 
The primacy of ground support operations was confirmed by Air Vice Marshal Sir 
Francis Mellersh, speaking at a lecture in 1951, when he said that the prioritisation 
of RAF roles in Malaya were ‘air supply for the Ground Forces; offensive operations 
on targets beyond the reach and resources of the Ground Forces; and 
intercommunication’.463 The following section will detail each of these types of 
operations and provide analysis on the impact and importance of each in Malaya. 
 
Air strike operations in Malaya fell into two broad categories, pinpoint attacks and 
area attacks. The former was used where intelligence indicated the precise location 
of an enemy target, the latter in circumstances where the enemy was known to be 
active in a particular area. Operations utilized a myriad of air assets, including; 
fighters, light bombers, heavy bombers and for a period, Sunderland flying boats.  
 
Early in the campaign pinpoint attacks were a lot more prominent. A typical 
engagement, and what proved to be one of the most effective and efficient of the 
whole Emergency, occurred on 29 February 1949. The strike occurred in 
Mengkuang and involved eight Spitfires and four Beaufighters, the result was nine 
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CTs killed out of fifteen.464 A month later in April another operation was conducted 
which demonstrated the difficulty of operating in Malaya. In this instance a camp 
was identified, but was too remote for ground forces to reach and in the end only one 
of a planned three Spitfire attacks could happen due to low cloud.465  
 
However, this type of operation did not last, and it was quickly realized that the 
effect of offensive air strikes went beyond merely killing terrorists. In a memo to the 
Cabinet on the situation in Malaya, the Secretary of State for Colonies would state in 
1955 that: 
 
The continued use of a bomber and ground attack force is essential, for 
the purpose of keeping the terrorists on the move, disrupting their 
organisation and lowering their morale by creating a general sense of 
insecurity.466 
 
 
It was this ‘general sense of insecurity’ that it was hoped area attacks would instil. 
Avro Lincoln aircraft would be used extensively in area bombing sorties, see Photo 
14. 
 
A typical area attack was a well-coordinated strategy to blanket an area known to be 
occupied by CTs to unsettle and dislocate the enemy. The Avro Lincoln pictured 
above, was the key heavy bomber asset utilised in theatre for these types of 
operations. The approach for such an attack would follow a proscribed format: 
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[…] the area to be attacked was first bombed by medium bombers using 
500lb or 1,000lb bombs. This strike, of perhaps six to ten aircraft, 
would be followed immediately by fighters using lighter bombs, 
rockets and guns. […] Raids would then be followed by Sunderlands 
dropping fragmentation bombs over the next 24-48 hours to keep the 
CT in a state of shock and to inhibit the removal of the wounded.467 
 
Photo 14 – Avro Lincoln of No 1 Squadron, RAAF, August 1950 
One of the first Avro Lincoln aircraft to set off from Tengah, Singapore on a bombing operation to 
inaugurate No 1 Squadron's anti-bandit activities in Malaya, revving up its engines before taxying out 
to the runway. 
 
Source – Imperial War Museum, GOV 2667 
 
The effectiveness of these area attacks is hard to discern. The evidence suggests that 
in some instances the area bombing proved ‘terribly frightening’ to the CTs on the 
ground, in other instances the bombing, although intense at times, would appear to 
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have had little or no impact. 468 One CT having withstood three days of bombing 
stated that it had little impact and in fact most of the bombs had exploded in the tree 
tops. 469 Even in Malaya the effectiveness of area bombing was an ongoing debate. 
General Briggs believed that the effectiveness was based on the effect on CT morale, 
as opposed to any destructive power. This opinion led him to argue that a reduction 
in the number of aircraft being used on operations would have little impact, this was 
an opinion the RAF found to be abhorrent.470 
 
As the Emergency evolved from 1948 through to 1960, the reliance on pin point air 
strike operations dwindled. This was for several reasons. Firstly, in the early months 
of the Emergency the CTs did not fully appreciate the impact of airpower and thus at 
times presented targets of opportunity to the RAF. Later they would become very 
adept at dispersal and camouflage, thus making target acquisition and identification 
very difficult for strike aircraft. The second reason is that British forces were very 
successful against the CTs, thus the number of targets in the field dwindled as CT 
casualties mounted. This is ably demonstrated with an analysis of the loss of life 
during the emergency presented in figure 11 below. 
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Figure 13 - Loss of life during the Emergency, 1948-56 
 
Source: All analysis by the author, data taken from; Victor Flintham, Air wars and aircraft: a 
detailed record of air combat, 1945 to the present (New York, 1990), pp 326-38 
 
 
Although from 1952 there is a downward trend in deaths across the MRLA, security 
forces and civilians, the losses by the MRLA were significantly higher than that of 
the other two groups. Thus, there were fewer CTs to target as the Emergency 
progressed, also they were more dispersed, and these two factors obviously led to a 
decrease in the efficiency and effectiveness of air strike operations. As air strike 
operations reduced, the counterpoint was a significant increase in air mobility 
operations, this is particularly apparent from 1954 onwards (see figure 12, below). 
 
The ability of airpower in Malaya to transport troops into and around operational 
zones was one of airpowers significant contributions to the Emergency. The 
importance of this role was clear as early as 1946, when RAF Group Captain G. 
Barnett prophetically stated that: 
 
Since the essence of occupation is the presence of troops in the country, 
it is probably that the greatest contribution which the air force can make 
is to carry the Army around the country […] If, in addition to being 
carried by air, the ground forces can also be maintained by air, the 
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whole problem of control is greatly simplified.475 
 
This ability to move men and material around the operational zone was greatly 
enhanced with the introduction of helicopters in the early 1950s. Although they were 
very expensive, and difficult to maintain, their growing importance is aptly 
demonstrated in figure 12. 
 
Figure 14 – Number of Troops transported by helicopter in Malaya, 1950-60 
 
Source: All analysis by the author, data taken from; Victor Flintham, Air wars and aircraft: a 
detailed record of air combat, 1945 to the present (New York, 1990), pp 326-38 
 
The growth in troop transport by helicopters in the period from 1954 to 1955 is 
marked, rising from just under 10,000 troops per annum, to close to 30,000 a year 
later. A figure of 20,000 troops plus moved per annum by helicopter would be 
maintained until the winding down of the Emergency from 1958 to 1960. This 
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drastic increase in helicopter operations is a direct result of the influence that they 
had in 1953. Speaking in May 1954 this influence was recognized by Brigadier 
General K.R Brazier-Creagh: 
 
In this type of warfare, the initiative tends to remain with the enemy 
[…] [However] the initiative is being wrested from the terrorist by 
relentless hunting, by improved security, and by increased mobility. In 
the last, the advent of the helicopter has considerably strengthened our 
hand.476 
 
This ability that the helicopter enabled, supported the wider operational and strategic 
goals encapsulated in the Briggs Plan, it allowed British troops to operate in small 
force units, and to be supported in the field for considerable periods of time.477 
Troops could be inserted in small jungle clearings, as seen in photo 15 below, and 
then supported thereafter by supply drops. At times these patrols could remain in the 
jungle for two months or more.478 Helicopter operations grew in importance as the 
Emergency progressed, in 1956 it was also proposed that Westland Whirlwind 
helicopters of 155 Squadron should be used to drop parachute troops into the jungles 
of Malaya, however in the main the operations involved mobility, reconnaissance, 
casualty evacuation and search and rescue.479 
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Photo 15 - Air mobility in Malaya, ND 
Gurkha’s disembark from a Sikorsky Whirlwind HAR.21, WV192 'D', of No 848 Naval Air 
Squadron, Fleet Air Arm, at a jungle-landing zone, ND. 
 
Source: Imperial War Museum, HU 90443 
 
The ability to support these types of operations was not only enabled using 
helicopters, but also by aircraft capable of short take-offs and landings. Aircraft, 
such as the Auster AOP9 and Scottish Aviation’s Pioneer, could operate from 
landing strips of minimal length, the Pioneer required only 225 feet of runway to 
take off. However, these types of operations were not without danger to the pilots. 
On the 23 May 1956 for example, Sergeant K. G. McConnell of 656 Air Observation 
Post Squadron went missing while on a routine mission from Ipoh to Kuala Lumpar, 
he would be found safe and well by aborigines, but not until he had spent three 
weeks in the jungle.480 Despite the danger, a network of landing strips was vital to 
the conduct of operations, as prior to the Emergency, Malaya had only 17 
airstrips.481 Following the start of the Emergency a construction programme began to 
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address this, and as a result a network of major, minor and remote airstrips were 
constructed.482 As part of the Briggs Plan jungle forts were constructed in remote 
areas and typically Pioneer aircraft, similar to that shown in photo 16, made this 
strategy possible by supplying these forts through the use of nearby remote landing 
strips.  
 
Photo 16 - Scottish Aviation Pioneer in Malaya, ND 
A Senoi guard armed with a blowpipe on guard beside a Scottish Aviation Pioneer aircraft at Fort 
Kemar in the central mountain range of Malaya. Such forts protected the local population from raids 
by communist guerillas and also provided forward bases for British operations. 
 
Source: Imperial War Museum, MAL 45 
 
Undoubtedly one of the key roles of airpower in Malaya was in relation to 
psychological warfare operations. As can be seen in the analysis of psychological 
warfare operations contained in figure 13 below, after 1952 the increase in this type 
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of operation was very marked. The purpose of these operations was very simple, ‘the 
main aims of the 'war of words' that was inaugurated during the Malayan campaign 
were to induce surrenders amongst the terrorists’.483 The Royal Air Force were but 
one of several ways in which to deliver these messages, however they were a 
significant one. The operations carried out by the RAF fell into two broad categories, 
leaflet sorties, and broadcast sorties. 
 
Figure 15 – No. of Psychological Operations in Malaya, 1948-58 
 
Source: All analysis by the author, data taken from; Victor Flintham, Air wars and aircraft: a 
detailed record of air combat, 1945 to the present (New York, 1990), pp 326-38 
 
Leaflet drops were typically made by aircraft of the medium transport force; Valettas 
or Dakotas (see photo 18, below). These aircraft could carry loads of up to 800,000 
leaflets, and upon dropping it was found that they could achieve coverage of an area 
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1,000 yards square, this was achieved by dropping leaflets in bundles of 5,000.484 
The scale of the leaflet dropping operation was quite staggering, in June 1951, 
2,250,000 leaflets were dropped in support of ‘Operation Warbler’ in Johore.485 By 
the end of the Emergency the RAF had dropped 500 million leaflets. As the 
Emergency progressed the importance of Psychological Warfare operations 
increased, this was highlighted in a House of Lords debate on the situation in 
Malaya, when the Earl of Munster stated: 
 
[…] psychological warfare is playing an increasingly large part in the 
present operations in Malaya. The object is to persuade those who wish 
to surrender that they will not be ill-treated, and to explain to them how 
to surrender, either individually or by units. A special operational force 
was formed last year in which surrendered terrorists can enlist if they 
wish to do so.486 
 
The contents of the leaflets varied greatly. Some were generic and offered medical 
assistance or safe passage. Others were very specific, these could be pleas from 
former colleagues for remaining CTs in an area to surrender, or even messages about 
family members who wanted their relatives in the jungle to come home. A selection 
of leaflets from the Malayan Emergency is shown below in Photo 17 for illustrative 
purposes. 
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Photo 17 – Malayan Propaganda Leaflets 
Clockwise from top left. 
• 3135/HPWS/4 – A leaflet promising medical help 
• 4786/HPWS/181 – Safe conduct pass, 1958 
• No. 459, Rewards for the capture of Communist Terrorists 
• No. 352C, You will be well treated 
 
   
  
Source: Psywar leaflet archive, available at https://www.psywar.org/apdsearch.php?cf=1948 
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Photo 18 - Leaflet drop in Malaya, ND 
Royal Air Force personnel secure boxes of information leaflets inside a transport aircraft. Such 
leaflets, produced in four languages, were dropped over remote rural areas of Malaya to inform the 
local inhabitants of the activities of Communist Terrorists (CTs). 
 
Source: Imperial War Museum, DM 112 
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The second type of psychological warfare operation carried out by the RAF was 
broadcast or loud hailing sorties. These involved Dakota aircraft (see photo 19 
below) that were fitted with four externally mounted tannoy speakers. Initially 
Gerard Templer, British High Commissioner of Malaya, secured the loan of a US 
Dakota aircraft for this purpose.487 These aircraft flew at between 2,500 and 3,000 
feet and this allowed the broadcast messages to be heard for 2,500 yards below and 
to the port side of the aircraft.488 In photo 19 the tannoy speakers can be clearly seen 
mounted on the undercarriage. After the success of trials the RAF proceeded to 
equip two Valetta aircraft with loud hailing equipment, these Valettas were 
operational by early 1953. 489 
 
What was crucial to the success of broadcast sorties was the speed with which the 
police and the air forces could respond to developments on the ground. Broadcast 
messages were not always generic, quite a lot of the time they targeted specific CTs 
and referenced specific incidents, thus making them much more relevant and 
powerful. Requests for broadcast sorties could be actioned in less than 24 hours. To 
aid in the speed with which these sorties could be mounted, Austers were converted 
to loud hailing aircraft, and could be scrambled at short notice.490 One analysis 
suggests that by 1955 some 70% of all surrendered CTs had been influenced by the 
‘sky-shouters’.491 
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Photo 19 – Loudspeaker Dakota, ND 
 
Source: https://www.psywar.org/malaya.php, accessed 16 October 2016 
 
One example of the effectiveness of psychological operations is demonstrated 
through a quote from a surrendered CT: 
 
After the attack on our cultivation area we fled to another area where 
we saw many Government propaganda leaflets and safe conduct 
passes. I picked up some of the leaflets intending to use them when 
coming out to surrender. A few days later we heard voices coming from 
an aeroplane calling on us all to surrender and offering good treatment. 
We all agreed to this suggestion.492 
 
 
Other instances of the success of psychological operations includes the instance of 
Wei Keiong, a Platoon Commander in Selongor who attributed his surrender to radio 
broadcasts and surrender leaflets.493 Furthermore, during a test flight of loud hailing 
aircraft, a guerrilla section commander, Wong Lo, surrendered.494 These instances 
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need to be viewed in light of the RAF’s obvious motivation to portray the success of 
psychological operations, however it is interesting to note the frequency that 
surrendered CTs referenced loud hailing and leafleting as contributory factors in 
their decision to surrender. It was reported that one leaflet, no. 256, led to the 
surrender of 207 terrorists.495 
 
Having reviewed the operations conducted during the Malayan Emergency, this 
work now turns to look at how, if at all, these operations were mirrored in the RAF 
operations in Kenya. It is also beneficial to provide a brief overview of other colonial 
operations the British were engaged in during the post war period. 
 
Other Colonial Operations 
As mentioned earlier, in the immediate post war period, the British government 
faced many challenges in reasserting its control on colonial possessions, while also 
dealing with a rising tide of nationalism in its colonies. This section provides a high-
level overview of those engagements, the first in Oman. 
Oman 
Oman represented a significant area of influence for the British government. Due to 
its withdrawal from Iraq in the 1950s this became even more important due to the 
significance of middle eastern oil to the postwar economy. The challenges that 
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British forces faced in Oman in the 1950s were significant. As was the case in 
Transjordan, Oman was a desolate and inhospitable place, but more challenging was 
the fact that the British had to deal with foreign powers, namely Saudi Arabia and 
South Yemen, who supported Omani insurgents and provided them with supplies 
and shelter. While the operations in Oman mainly involved ground forces, on 
occasion the RAF were tasked with specific objectives. When a rebel force landed 
near Muscat and seized control of an area the RAF were called into to provide an 
immediate reaction. The engagement involved ground attack operations, but 
interestingly it also involved operations whereby the RAF would ‘mount regular 
patrols to deter rebel movement during the hours of daylight’, so called proscription 
operations.496  
 
Oman displayed quite a few similarities to other British air operations during this 
period, including the use of leafleting and loud hailing for psychological warfare. 
Leafleting in particular was extensively used, both to provide ultimatums, but also to 
deliver propaganda messages.497 One area that was new, was the use of special 
forces in conjunction with the RAF. It was ultimately a SAS led ground operation, 
with RAF support, that ended the insurgency in early 1959. Another interesting facet 
of the operations in Oman was the fact that the British never committed significant 
ground forces to the theatre, rather the manpower for the ground campaign were 
local forces, and these were supported by special forces and the RAF. This is an 
approach that we have seen repeated in more recent counterinsurgency campaigns in 
Libya and Iraq.  
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Aden 
RAF operations in Aden in the post war period were significantly different to the 
operations carried out in Aden in the interwar period. With Aden’s economic growth 
in the post war period came an influx of migrant workers, these workers would be at 
the centre of unrest that would ultimately lead to the withdrawal of the UK. 
Sebastian Ritchie has identified three groups at the heart of the disturbances; 
radicalised groups from Aden and Yemen, as well as rebel tribal factions from the 
protectorates.498 Although RAF forces were deployed in roles familiar in the Air 
Control era, like proscription bombing, reconnaisance and mobility, they also 
performed patrols to deter Yemeni men and supplies from crossing the border, as 
well as interdiction on these supply routes.499 The effectiveness of the older air 
control approaches in Aden in the postwar period are questionable. As Spencer 
Mawbry has argued: 
 
The inefficiency of proscription [bombing] in this instance was 
demonstrated not only by the loss of life and the destruction of crops 
but also by the failure to make any real progress with pacification. 
 
Mawby concludes that air action alone was unable to deliver on the promise of 
pacification of the tribal hinterlands, and it was not until a combined operation, 
utilising the Aden Protectorate Levies, that the rebels were expelled from the 
region.500 
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Ultimately the British Government decided that reform in Yemen was inevitable, 
however in order to enact this and to ensure its survival, the British had to eliminate 
radical elements from Yemen, thus an intense counterinsurgency campaign was 
launched in April 1959, and would last for eight years, until the final withdrawal of 
British forces in 1967. 
 
Operations in Aden evolved over this nine year period and as a result the tasks that 
the RAF were being asked to perform naturally changed. The conflict itself became 
more and more characterised by urban terrorism and as such the RAF played an 
increasingly marginal role. The Air Control approach, utilised in the late fifties to 
questionable effect, gave way to a more joint approach where the RAF performed a 
supporting role. Due to this in 1964 command responsibility for British forces in 
Aden transferred from the RAF, who had maintained command responsibility in 
Aden for three decades, to the Army.501 Thus marked an evolution away from an 
airpower first approach, to one which emphasized ground force operations, with 
airpower in a supporting role.  During the mid-1960s the RAF sortie rates in Aden 
were staggering, particularly due to the small number of aircraft stationed there, 
these high sortie rates were delivered to support ground operations in the Radfan 
region.502 To illustrate the high intensity of operations the following table shows the 
sorties flown by strike aircraft from Khormaksar in March 1965: 
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Table 3 - Aden, Strike Sorties from Khormaksar, March 1965 
Aircraft type Allocation Hours flown 
Hunter FGA.9 25 662.35 
Hunter FR.10 5 116.40 
Hunter T.7 3 78.25 
Shackleton MR.2 4 190.00 
Total flying hours 
 
1,047.40 
Source – http://www.radfanhunters.co.uk/Ksar-1965.htm (accessed 01 September 2018) 
 
However, as the nature of the conlict changed thus this requirement would dissipate. 
There is considerable debate as to the success of RAF operations in Aden, indeed all 
operations in Aden during this period. In one instance the UN condemned RAF 
operations in the Radfan region for being indiscriminate, in particular a raid on Harib 
Fort, inside Yemen. Also, in what would be a pointer of challenges in deploying 
airpower in modern counterinsurgency campaigns, the rebel groups in Aden were 
quick to highlight and sensationalise casualties from RAF bombing raids. This was 
to make Whitehall wary of further operations, particularly any that could be deemed 
indiscriminate.503  
 
However, once again we see how airpower acted as a key enabler of ground force 
operations, in his book on this period in Aden, Julian Paget argues: 
 
The RAF strike aircraft were superb, brilliantly handled and always on 
the spot within minutes. The closest liaison was established with the 
ground forces, who had complete confidence in the air support 
provided.504 
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Cyprus 
Cyprus represented a very different challenge to Malaya or Oman. The insurgency 
was borne from a failed movement by the Greek majority to instigate a scenario 
where ultimately Cyprus would become part of Greece. The insurgent’s ire was 
directed squarely at the British government, military and police forces, and resulted 
in the death of 153 security force personnel between 1955 and 1959.506 
 
Due to the nature of operations and the scale of the opposition (estimated at some 
300 fighters), the RAF role in Cyprus was limited to support operations, mainly 
reconnaissance and interdiction of supplies, both at sea and in the air. The bulk of 
RAF operations in Cyprus would rely on rotary wing aircraft, as was demonstrated 
in other theatres, helicopters proved invaluable in environments where they could 
offer rapidity of operations, flexibility and mobility. The tasks performed are best 
understood when one analyses a typical month’s operations for the helicopter force. 
In Cyprus, this consisted of: ’70 reconnaissance flights, 214 troop sorties (449 
troops) 407 supply drops (78,000lb), 697 communications sorties (961 passengers), 
12 casualty evacuations and two sorties for the governor’.507 
 
RAF operations in Cyprus can be characterized as ground support operations in the 
main, and involved mainly reconnaissance and mobility sorties, however this 
represented a key enabler of ground force operations, and made a significant 
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contribution to the cessation of hostilities in 1959. In Kenya, the RAF would be 
tasked with a much broader operational role. 
Kenya 
Unrest in Kenya was borne from a strategy of the settlement of white farmers in 
what was previously local farming land. Many local farmers believed that they had 
been cheated out of their land and that the responsibility for this lay with the white 
farmers themselves and also the British government officials who sanctioned this 
activity. At the centre of the unrest was the members of the Kikuyu tribe, who felt 
that their land had been particularly targeted. 
 
During the Second World War the Kikuyu Central Association was banned due to 
the organization’s political activities. After the Second World War the Kenya 
African Union (KAU) was formed and from this sprang the extremist Mau Mau 
organization. The authorities believed at the time that the KAU was the political 
wing of the increasingly extremist Mau Mau movement.508 The core of the 
movement was the Kikuyu tribe, an immensely religious tribe whose spiritual and 
cultural life centred around the taking of oaths, these oaths included initiation and 
oaths of loyalty.509 Initially the unrest revolved around agitation for land rights and 
the reclamation of tribal land that had been taken over by white settlers. By 1952 
however, the unrest had spread, and between May and October of that year fifty-nine 
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Africans loyal to the government were murdered, including one of the key loyalist 
Chiefs.510  
 
Photo 20 – Sir Evelyn Baring 
The Governor of Kenya, Sir Evelyn Baring, inspects troops of the King's African Rifles during a 
ceremony to present them with new colours, 1957. Sir Evelyn Baring declared the State of Emergency 
in October 1952. 
 
Source – Imperial War Museum, MAU 240 
 
Sir Evelyn Baring the Governor of Kenya, reported to London that the situation 
required the declaration of an Emergency, this was duly enacted in October 1952. 
The Emergency came as no surprise to the authorities, as early as 1950 the security 
forces were already preparing for the requirement to liaise more closely with the 
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Kenyan police in the event of such a situation.511 As a result of the declaration of a 
state of Emergency the authorities sent for reinforcements, this initially entailed the 
dispatch of an additional infantry brigade.512 By April 1953, the Emergency had 
already cost an estimated £1 million pounds to the authorities and was running at a 
monthly outlay in the region of £250,000.513 
 
 
Kenya offered a very different type of environment than that of Malaya. Kenya was 
a vast country; however, operations were focused on two specific areas; Mount 
Kenya and the Aberdare Range (see Map 2). These two areas offered a combination 
of challenges for the RAF, the first was altitude, and the second was the thick forest 
canopy that carpeted a significant part of the area of operations. Initially there had 
been an element of urban operations that the security forces had to deal with, 
however after a crackdown on Mau Mau in Nairobi in April 1954, the remaining 
Mau Mau retreated to Mount Kenya and the Aberdare Range. Until the end of the 
Emergency this would constitute the area of operations for both land and air security 
forces.  
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This concentration of operations allowed the RAF to operate at a high intensity level, 
with what was a very meagre force. This intensity is demonstrated by the following 
analysis of sortie numbers by aircraft during 1954:  
 
Table 4 - Kenya, Sortie Numbers by Aircraft Type, 1954 
Aircraft No. of Sorties 
Lincoln 1,118 
Harvard 3,316 
Kenya Reserve Police Air Wing 1,309 
Total 5,743 
Source – All analysis by the author, data taken from 'Kenya Emergency: report by General Erskine, 
25 April 1955', TNA, WO 236/18 
 
One of the key differences from operations in Malaya, and elsewhere in the Empire 
at this time, was a distinct lack of RAF resources and access to reinforcements. This 
sparsity of resources was also reflected in the allocation of troops to the region, with 
commitments increasing in Malaya and the Middle East, there was pressure building 
elsewhere that was deemed of a higher priority.514 
Operations 
The type of RAF operations conducted during the Emergency in Kenya were very 
like those conducted in Malaya and elsewhere during this period. Furthermore, the 
operations in Malaya undoubtedly influenced tactics utilised in Kenya.515 
Manoeuvres entailed ground support operations, air strike operations, mobility 
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operations and psychological warfare operations. One of the key differences in the 
conduct of these operations in Kenya, as opposed to Malaya, was the resources that 
the RAF had available to carry out these missions. When the Emergency was 
declared in October 1952 the RAF had at its disposal six aircraft, part of a 
communication flight based at Eastleigh. However, two significant developments in 
the coming months would increase the aircraft available. Firstly, with the 
disbandment of the Rhodesian Air Training Group (RATG) it was decided to 
transfer several of its Harvard IIIBs to Kenya, these were formed into 1340 Flight 
and transferred to Eastleigh in March 1953. Secondly the Kenya Police Reserve Air 
Wing (KPRAW) had several light aircraft, including; Austers, Piper Pacers and Tri-
Pacers, these proved a valuable addition to the inventory.516 Members of the 
KPRAW are shown in Photo 21, below. These aircraft would be supplemented from 
November 1953 by the rotation of Lincoln bombers to Kenya, these bombers would 
play a significant role in the Emergency in the coming years.  
 
RAF operations focused on two specific geographic areas, the Aberdare Range and 
Mount Kenya (see Map 2 – Kenya, Areas of Operations, below). These areas were 
up to 12,000 feet and 17,000 feet respectively. Operating at these altitudes the pilots 
faced several challenges, particularly those piloting the smaller light aircraft, as 
above 7,000 feet these aircraft struggled to perform. However, it was found that 
lightly-loaded Cessnas and Tri-Pacers of the KPRAW could perform well at these 
altitudes and they were duly utilized.   Another advantage the KPRAW had over its 
RAF colleagues was the fact that their pilots were intimately familiar with the 
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geography and so could use local knowledge to help them climb up through the 
mountain ranges effectively and safely. 
 
Photo 21 – KPRAW Pilots, 1954 
Pilots of the KPRAW, photographed at Mweiga: (L to R) Ian Munro, Bill Jones, "Punch" Bearcroft, 
Pakenham Walsh and Robin Lindsay 
 
Source – Flight Magazine, 12 November 1954, p. 710 
 
The pilots of the KPRAW became a key component of the air forces that could be 
deployed. It was originally formed in 1948 and had been involved in the Emergency 
since its beginning, by 1954 it had seventeen full-time pilots and eight part-timers. 
These pilots operated a fleet of light aircraft including; ten Piper Tri-Pacers, a 
Cessna 180, and a Chipmunk. By 1954 the KPRAW was delivering 500-600 flight 
hours a month out of a total of approximately 1,000 flown.517 
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Along with altitude, another challenge was the dense forest. The thickness of the 
forest canopy caused several challenges for both air and ground forces.518 In the first 
instance it allowed the Mau Mau to easily stay hidden from overhead aircraft thus 
making it extremely difficult for strike aircraft to find, fix and attack targets. 
Secondly the thick canopy made it difficult for the light aircraft to locate ground 
troops that they had been sent to support and supply, invariably this was overcome 
by ground forces guiding the aircraft to their location via walky-talky. This was 
achieved by aircraft flying to a pre-arranged location and then being guided to the 
troops based on the ground forces listening for the aircrafts engine sounds. 519 
 
The British military in Kenya believed that the use of airpower greatly enhanced 
their ability to target Mau Mau within the forests, which would have proved 
operationally challenging to engage solely with a ground force: 
 
While ground forces are being primarily directed against targets in the 
Reserves, heavy bombers and Harvard’s represent the chief weapon in 
our hands for attacking terrorists in the forest.520 
 
Knowing that the bulk of the targets were within the Aberdare Range and Mount 
Kenya, the government made these areas prohibited zones and anybody caught 
within them were subject to attack without warning.521 While this may seem 
extreme, the counter to this was that RAF forces were not allowed to conduct 
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offensive actions outside of the prohibited areas, this directive was put in place to 
avoid unnecessary casualties: 
 
[aircraft] will not take armed offensive action against any target outside 
the prohibited areas. It is emphasized that it is of the greatest important 
that our own forces and loyal Africans should not be subjected to 
offensive action from the air.522 
 
The area of operations can be seen in Map 2 below.  
 
 
Map 2 – Kenya, Areas of Operations 
 
Source - Sir David Lee, Flight from the Middle East (London, 1980), pp 64-5 
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One of the key tasks of the air force in Kenya was the non-kinetic support of ground 
forces. This involved several mission types including; resupply, casualty evacuation 
(casevac) and reconnaissance.  
 
One of the most important missions was the resupply of forces employed in the field. 
Like operations in Malaya this involved light aircraft dropping supplies to forces 
who were deployed in forested or mountainous terrain. It was found that the light 
aircraft of the KPRAW were best equipped to carry out this mission. Typically, these 
light aircraft would drop supplies from low-level to ground patrols. Furthermore, 
these light aircraft also used a network of 35 small landing strips, 20 in the Aberdare 
Range, and 15 close to Mount Kenya, these landing strips were typically sited near 
ground bases. 
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Photo 22 – Supplying Infantry Patrols 
Rations are sewn into hessian sack covers to protect the contents from damage when dropped at low 
level from aircraft to infantry patrols operating in the Aberdare Ranges. 
 
Source - Imperial War Museum, BF 10952 
 
 
Another key role in Kenya, and one also carried out in Malaya, was the use of 
aircraft for casualty evacuation (casevac). In Kenya, this was conducted by fixed 
wing and rotary aircraft. Unlike Malaya, casevac was predominantly carried out by 
fixed-wing as opposed to rotary aircraft. In fact, rotary aircraft were not favored in 
Kenya as it was believed that they would be difficult to maintain in the Kenyan 
climate. It would not be until late 1954 that helicopters were deployed.523 The Bristol 
Sycamore, shown in photo 23 below, was a popular helicopter in Kenya. 
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Photo 23 – Bristol Sycamore in Kenya, ND 
A Bristol Sycamore helicopter of the Royal Air Force being used for casualty evacuation duty in the 
forests of Kenya. 
 
Source – Imperial War Museum, MAU 414 
 
Also important in Kenya was the role of reconnaissance. Reconnaissance took 
several different forms in Kenya, from flights of the KPRAW to more specialized 
aircraft such as Meteor PR10s. Prior to the arrival of the Meteor PR10s in August 
1954, the KPRAW light aircraft were supplemented with modified Lincolns which 
had been fitted with photo-reconnaissance equipment.524 Once they arrived in theatre 
the Meteors worked to perform reconnaissance ahead of bomber strikes by Lincolns 
that performed area bombing sorties within the Aberdare Range and Mount Kenya. 
                                               
524 Stephen Chappell, 'Air power in the Mau Mau conflict', in The RUSI Journal, 2011, volume 156, 
no. 1, pp 64-70, p. 68 
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Air strike operations in Kenya were in the main undertaken by two aircraft, the 
Harvard IIIBs that had been transferred from the Rhodesian Air Training Group, and 
Lincoln bombers. 
 
The Harvards were fitted with underwing bomb racks (see photo 25, below) that 
enabled them to operate in an independent strike role as well as supporting ground 
operations. Over the course of the emergency the Harvard’s would bear the brunt of 
RAF operations, for example, in 1954 the Harvards accounted for 58% of all sorties 
flown.525 There were several reasons why the Harvard’s were so heavily utilized in 
Kenya. One reason was that there was a reticence to over use the bomber force due 
to the potential negative press this could generate. The air force hierarchy in Britain, 
as well as in headquarters of the Middle East Air Force, warned in 1953 that the use 
of the Lincoln force in anti-Mau Mau operations could prove to be ‘political 
dynamite’.526 Steve Biddell argues that in spite of this the Lincoln bomber force had 
a significant impact in Kenya, with 900 insurgents either killed or wounded between 
November 1953 and June 1954.527 
 
  
                                               
525 See Table 3 – Kenya, sortie numbers by aircraft type, 1954 
526 Andrew Mumford and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, 'Unnecessary or unsung? The strategic role of air 
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527 Wing Commander Steve Chappell, ‘Air power in the Mau Mau conflict: the governments chief 
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Photo 24 - Kikuyu Reserve and Aberdare Forest Outpost, 1954 
Typical Kenya landscape photographed from the KPRAW’s Cessna 180, top image shows the Kikuyu 
Reserve, the bottom image an isolated Home Guard outpost in the Aberdare Forest (Kenya, 1954) 
 
Source – Flight Magazine, 12 November 1954, p. 708 
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Another reason for the heavy use of the Harvard force was the availability of 
offensive aircraft, apart from a fleeting deployment of Vampires, the RAF was 
stretched with global commitments, particularly in Malaya, and so the RAF in Kenya 
had to meet their obligations with a force cobbled together. 
 
Photo 25 – Harvards in Kenya 
Harvard IIIBs operated in Kenya and were fitted with underwing bomb racks 
 
Source - Flight Magazine, 12 November 1954, p. 708-9 
 
 
Although the RAF were wary of using the Lincoln bomber force, it did eventually 
begin operations. However, the concern was raised again by the Home Office when 
it was proposed to use 4,000 pound bombs dropped from the Lincolns. 528 Ultimately 
the Lincolns would be used extensively in Kenya. In 1954 they would average just 
under one hundred sorties a month, while this would only represent 19% of all 
sorties flown, in the context of the type of opponent that the security forces faced, it 
represents a significant proportion of air strike operations.529  The efficacy of these 
                                               
528 'Air operations in Kenya, message from HQ Middle East Land Forces, 15 October 1954', TNA, 
AIR 8/1886 
529 See Table 3 – Kenya, sortie numbers by aircraft type, 1954  
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type of bombing operations is always difficult to determine. General Erskine’s 
summary however was unequivocal when he commented on this: 
 
in circumstances of this kind you have to be satisfied with indirect 
results […] It is seldom that you can expect actual casualties […] I am 
convinced that the air effort prepared the way for ground action530 
 
By 1954 the scale and scope of RAF operations in support of the ground forces was 
significant. The following information from an Air Operations Order is enlightening 
in this regard, by providing a sample of the type of operations that were conducted 
daily: 
 
Table 5 - Air Operations Order, 19 February 1954 
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Source – All analysis by the author, data taken from, ‘Mau Mau emergency: joint operations centre 
air operations order No. 4/54’, TNA, WO 276/458, 19 February 1954 
 
However, by May 1955 General Lathbury succeeded Erskine and felt that all of the 
Lincolns should be withdrawn. The operations had, in Lathbury’s view, entered a 
                                               
530 'Situation in Kenya: reports from GHQ Middle East Land Forces, War office to East African 
Command,  03 November 1952', TNA, WO 216/811 
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new phase, one that would rely more heavily on the indirect support of airpower. 
This indirect use of airpower in Kenya is illustrated in its use for casualty evacuation 
and psychological warfare. 531   
 
Before Erskine would leave Kenya he would write a report that gave a glowing 
commendation to airpower and its impact on operations in Kenya. Not only had it 
proved to be a significant enabler of operations, it has also evolved to a significant 
level of sophistication. He argued that through the use of radar stations that the RAF 
could carry out bombing 'in all weathers and by day or night over a wide area'. 532 
While these claims may have been a little exaggerated, the fact remained that in a 
relatively short period of time the RAF had brought together a disparate group of 
pilots and aircraft and utilised them in an impactful way, as is evidenced in Erskine’s 
report.  
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532 'Kenya Emergency: report by General Erskine, 25 April 1955', TNA, WO 236/18 
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Photo 26 - Kenyan Propaganda Leaflet, 1954 
Mau Mau gang leader General China (Waruhiu Itote) receiving medical attention after his capture by 
Government forces. 
 
 
Source: Psywar leaflet archive, available at 
https://www.psywar.org/product_1954MAUMAU001.php 
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As in Malaya the use of psychological warfare was for persuading anti-government 
forces that the struggle was futile and that they should surrender. As the Secretary of 
State for Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, reported to the House of Commons in 
October 1954: 
 
Three hundred and twenty-nine terrorists surrendered between the end of August, 
1953, and the end of August, 1954. Between 1st September and 12th October a 
further 106 surrendered. The rate of surrender is increasing and the Kenya 
Government, whose aim is to end the fighting, have always been ready to consider 
any approach for a mass surrender from gang leaders who are able to influence large 
numbers of terrorists into surrendering. They are using all possible means to bring 
this to the notice of the terrorists.534 
 
All possible means included the use of psychological warfare tactics that had been 
trialled and proven to be successful in Malaya. This involved two main tactics; the 
first being the use of leafleting, and the second the use of loud-hailing aircraft. 
Leafleting had started as early as 1948, although this was prior to the Emergency, its 
use to communicate with aggrieved farmers during that time laid a precedent for its 
use in Kenya. During the Emergency, the use of this approach was significant. In 
January 1955, the RAF dropped 100,000 leaflets in support of Operation Hammer, a 
further 5 million were dropped in June of that year.535 
 
                                               
534 HC Deb 26 October 1954 vol 531 cc1761-8, 1763 
535 Chappell, Stephen, 'Air power in the Mau Mau conflict', in The RUSI Journal, 2011, volume 156, 
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The second significant psychological warfare operation undertaken in Kenya was the 
use of loud-hailing aircraft. This tactic became increasingly important as the Mau 
Mau were dispersed and did not offer obvious targets for strike operations. The 
challenge for General Lathbury was the fact that the Emergency in Malaya was in 
full swing and that conflict had utilised the majority of the available loud-hailing 
aircraft, there were no additional aircraft to be had for Kenya. 536 
 
Photo 27 – Auster 6 Loud Hailing Aircraft, Kenya 
 
Source: Chappell, Stephen, ‘The RAF’s contribution to the Kenyan Mau Mau conflict, 1953-56’, 
presentation to the RAF Historical Society (05 February 2015), accessed at 
http://brcmac.org.uk/20150203Chappell_Kenya_V2_REDACTED.pdf 12 Nov 2016 
 
 
When one looks at the analysis of airpower in Malaya and Kenya one is left to 
conclude that too much emphasis has been placed on the direct contribution of 
offensive air operations and not enough emphasis put on the full spectrum of air 
                                               
536 'Air operations in Kenya, minute of 10 June 1955', TNA, AIR 8/1886 
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operations. These conflicts came at a time when the RAF had just come out of a six-
year global conventional conflict, that had naturally focused its attention towards the 
key conventional roles of airpower, namely; strategic bombing, air to air combat and 
ground support operations. What was needed in post-war operations was a return to 
the thinking that had shaped the Air Control operations of the interwar years, this 
realignment is easier said than done. Before proceeding to review the impact of RAF 
operations in these theatres, in the first instance it is instructive to analyse whether 
operations in Malaya and Kenya represented an application of doctrinal principles 
and whether during the conduct of operations we see a thread of evolution and 
innovation in RAF tactics. 
 
Application of Doctrinal Principles 
What is interesting about doctrine in the immediate post-war period is that it retained 
many of the characteristics of the pre-war doctrine in relation to counterinsurgency 
operations, even though the RAF had been engaged in conventional war on a global 
scale in the preceding six years. However, this is not as surprising when one looks at 
the make-up of the senior ranks in the RAF in the post-war period. In the late 1940s 
and into the 1950s we see a cadre of senior officers who had begun their careers 
engaged in colonial operations in the 1920s and early 1930s. It was these officers 
who in the post-war period appreciated the ability to retain the experience and 
knowledge that had been gleaned from twenty years of colonial operations in the 
interwar period. The question remains, did operations during this period mirror the 
doctrinal principles that were espoused in the RAF war manuals published in 1950 
and 1957? The answer is partially. 
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The 1950 War Manual spoke of air power in terms of the lessons learned from Air 
Control in the 1920s and 1930s, however Air Control was not something that could 
be repeated, certainly not in the approach that was taken in earlier decades. The 1950 
War Manual still spoke in terms of airpower being the primary arm, although it did 
talk of operations in support of ground forces. The aim, as per earlier doctrinal 
publications, was to be: 
 
 
achieved not by killing the enemy or occupying his country, but by 
making life a burden to him – by so dislocating the normal existence 
of the community that they submit to terms rather than endure the 
continuance of inconvenience and discomfort537 
 
Although there was a certain element of operational truth in this in Malaya, 
particularly as it related to the destruction of jungle camps and cultivation plots. The 
overall use of airpower in Malaya did not correlate to that which had gone before. 
Airpower in Malaya undoubtedly played a significant role, however always it was in 
subordination to ground forces. This may have been because of lessons learned 
during the Second World War, but also certainly was because of the operational 
reality of conducting manoeuvres in dense jungle conditions.  Independent 
operations, while carried out in some instances, were rare and ultimately of 
questionable utility. Thus, we see over the course of the 1950s a reduction in 
independent bombing sorties and a huge increase in other mission types, including; 
psychological warfare, ground attack, casevac and mobility.  
 
                                               
537 ‘RAF Air Publication (AP) 1300, Royal Air Force war manual part 1: operations’ (unpublished 
doctrine manual, Air Ministry, 1950), TNA, AIR 10/9364 
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The conclusion drawn is that in the early 1950s the RAF did not apply the doctrinal 
principles espoused in the 1950 publication, this was because the operational reality 
on the ground had moved on, whereas the doctrinal tenets had not. However, by the 
publication of the updated war manual in 1957, the fruits of the experiences of 
Malaya would be translated into doctrine.  
 
We see in this publication a de-emphasis on the old Air Control principle of the 
‘dislocation of the enemy’s normal mode of life’.538 Also a corresponding increase in 
the emphasis of operations in support of the ground forces. These support operations 
included; reconnaissance, offensive support, air transport, protection of surface lines 
of communication, the air cordon or ‘air pin’ system, and psychological warfare. 
Thus, the operational reality in Malaya in the late 1950s undoubtedly mirrored the 
doctrinal principles of the 1957 war manual.  
 
1961 saw the publication of Air Ministry Pamphlet 375, Internal security air 
operations, and while it was published after the end of the Emergency, it is 
instructive in relation to the impact that Malaya had on the doctrine related to 
colonial operations. This publication signals a significant shift away from doctrine 
that specifically relates to colonial or Air Control operations, and instead focuses 
predominantly on key functions of air power. As Sebastian Ritchie has argued: 
 
The publication of Air Ministry Pamphlet 375 clearly marks an 
important shift in the RAF’s doctrinal position away from the language 
of the Air Control era and towards something far more recognisable 
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from a modern-day perspective539 
 
 
While Ritchie argues that this publication represents a significant change in RAF 
doctrinal position, it did not signal a significant shift in operational reality. Rather 
this pamphlet captured in doctrine that which had been practiced for fifteen years in 
post-war operations. Furthermore while it may not have discussed Air Control, or the 
principles upon which this concept was built, it does owe its past to the doctrine that 
had gone before. If doctrine is anything, it is inevitably evolutionary, and rarely, if 
ever, revolutionary. This chapter now turns to highlight some of this evolution and to 
assess whether or not innovation was present in the RAF operations in Malaya and 
Kenya. 
Evolution and Innovation 
One of the great advancements made by the RAF in the immediate post-war period 
was the development and progress in casualty evacuation. Casevac was not new, and 
had been started in the colonial operations of the 1920s (see chapter 2 for further 
details), however in Malaya and Kenya it evolved to a level of sophistication that 
ensured it became a key operation in future engagements. Casevac operations were 
significantly enhanced with the introduction of helicopters to Malaya in April 1950, 
and to Kenya from early 1954. Although at first deemed unreliable, and expensive to 
operate, their flexibility and ability to support troops in isolated locations far 
outweighed any perceived challenges. As early as March 1952, one MP noted that 
‘their value has been demonstrated for recovering casualties from very difficult 
                                               
539 Sebastian Ritchie, The RAF, small wars and insurgencies: later colonial operations, 1945-1975 
(Cranwell, United Kingdom, 2011), p. 11 
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country’.540 The growth in popularity of helicopter operations is amply demonstrated 
by an analysis of casevac operations in Malaya from 1950 to 1960. As can be seen in 
figure 14, below, after the introduction of helicopters in early 1950 (consisting of 
one flight, FEAF Casualty Evacuation Flight),541 their initial use was low, but by 
1952 their utility had been proven and there is a corresponding dramatic increase in 
casevac operations: 
 
Figure 16 - Casevac operations in Malaya, 1948-60 
 
Source: All analysis by the author, data taken from; Victor Flintham, Air wars and aircraft : a 
detailed record of air combat, 1945 to the present (New York, 1990), pp 326-38 
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This lesson had been learned by the US in Korea, when in ‘1951 an official 
American report stated that the versatility of the helicopter as an instrument of war 
had received formal recognition in the United States’.542 
 
The growth in casevac capability and capacity had two significant effects. Firstly, 
casualty evacuation provided a great boost to the morale of men in the field, 
particularly those who were inserted deep into the jungle for significant periods of 
time.543 The ease of mind which casevac provided enabled the morale of these troops 
to remain high, which undoubtedly increased effectiveness. Secondly, and more 
obviously, it provided for the better care of injured personnel, thus increasing 
recovery rates. There was also another side to casevac operations that is not 
highlighted, that is the ability of troops on the ground, where appropriate, to utilize 
the casevac capability to assist civilians, a so called ‘hearts and minds’ effect.  
 
Casevac was but one mission type that helicopters performed in Malaya and Kenya. 
Other significant operations included mobility and aerial resupply. As early as May 
1952, one army officer, in a letter to Gerard Templer, noted that the Naval S-55s in 
use had ‘revolutionized the conduct of operations’ and that the RAF should be 
encouraged to provide further helicopter support to Malaya.544   
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Photo 28 - Casevac in Malaya, ND 
Men of 22 Special Air Service Regiment load a casualty aboard a Bristol Sycamore HR14 helicopter 
of 194 Squadron, Royal Air Force (RAF), in a jungle clearing at Ula Langat, near Kuala Lumpur. 
 
Source: Imperial War Museum, D 87946 
 
 
In Kenya, while slow to appreciate the impact that rotary wing aircraft could have, 
once introduced in 1954, the helicopter became an important component of air 
operations. For the first time the helicopter allowed the army not only to get small 
numbers of troops deployed into isolated locations, but more significantly, they 
could be supported for long periods of time once there. This operational flexibility 
that helicopters granted was essential to the tactical and operational approach in 
Malaya in particular, as the Secretary of State for Colonies stated in a memo to 
cabinet in 1955, while decrying the shortage of helicopters: 
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The importance of helicopters to operations in Malaya is immense. 
Throughout the year the helicopter has demonstrated its versatility and 
has been used extensively in its various roles of casualty evacuation, 
troop lifting, reconnaissance, communications flying, and for search 
and rescue 
 
Furthermore, he highlighted that troop transport by medium helicopters was now the 
primary role and was ‘vital in achieving the maximum effectiveness of the security 
forces against the terrorists’.546 This importance is illustrated by the growth in troop 
transport in the middle of the 1950s, ultimately, between 1952 and 1960 more than 
110,000 troops would be lifted by helicopter:547 
 
Figure 17 – Troop transport by helicopters, Malaya, 1950-60 
 
Source: All analysis by the author, data taken from; Victor Flintham, Air wars and aircraft : a 
detailed record of air combat, 1945 to the present (New York, 1990), pp 326-38 
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Aerial resupply was another area where helicopters contributed in Malaya, although 
to a lesser degree in Kenya. Although not their primary role, it was used to support 
troops in isolated areas where there was no access to a landing strip, or when it was a 
new position that had yet to be supplied with a landing strip. However, most aerial 
resupply was conducted by the short take-off and landing aircraft, thus in 1954 
helicopters were responsible for freight operations totalling 238,000 pounds, this 
contrasted against a total annual air supply activity totalling 6,793,000 pounds, thus 
contributing just 3.5% in 1954.548 
 
Photo 29 - Aerial resupply in Malaya, ND 
A Bristol Sycamore HR14 helicopter of 194 Squadron, Royal Air Force (RAF), practicing underslung 
load-carrying at RAF Kuala Lumpur airfield. 
 
Source: Imperial War Museum, MAL 65 
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Another area in which helicopters contributed was mobility. Between 1954 and 
1960, helicopters were responsible for delivering over 17,000 passengers throughout 
Malaya. While a significant figure, it is dwarfed by troop movements in the same 
period of over 100,000. Thus, while helicopters moved troops, passengers, freight 
and casualties around Malaya, it was the mobility of troops which undoubtedly led to 
its greatest impact on operations. This is clearly demonstrated through an analysis of 
helicopter load types in Malaya in the period 1950-60, see figure 16, below. 
 
Figure 18 - Helicopter operations by load type in Malaya, 1950-60 
 
Source: All analysis by the author, data taken from; Victor Flintham, Air wars and aircraft : a 
detailed record of air combat, 1945 to the present (New York, 1990), pp 326-38 
 
Psychological warfare was another area of evolution and innovation. Psychological 
warfare operations were not a new phenomenon, however in Malaya, and Kenya 
they were a central part of the overall counterinsurgency operations. In Malaya, 
Operating under the Psychological Warfare Department of the Director of 
Operations, the role of this unit was to increase the surrender rate of CT’s549. The 
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part played by airpower was as one of several delivery mechanisms for leaflets and 
broadcasts. As we have seen, by 1957 this role of airpower was ingrained within the 
official doctrine, indeed there was a chapter dedicated to this role. However, the role 
was not a new one, during the Air Control operations of the interwar period, as we 
have seen, leafleting was an important element. What had changed by the post-war 
period, was that the sophistication of such operations had advanced, while the part 
they played in overall strategy had become more important. Although by 1950, two 
years into the Malayan Emergency, the requirement for more focus on this area was 
highlighted by the Secretary of State for the Colonies when he stated: 
 
There is need however for better direction of effort against the 
Communists in both (a) general propaganda work and (b) direct " 
psychological warfare " against the bandits. The latter is in its infancy, 
although a start has now been made by the appointment of a Public 
Relations Officer to General Briggs's staff and of a " propaganda 
section " of the C.I.D., which works in close co-operation with him.550 
 
 
Not only did these types of operations appeal for the surrender of CTs, what it also 
did was enable specificity; messages directed against individuals and groups, 
targeting them with direct, relevant communications. This of course was enabled by 
the intelligence network, and the ability of it to collect, interpret and disseminate 
information. Thus, we see in Malaya for the first time in colonial operations, the 
multi-faceted and multi-layered approach to operations, this was built into the 
foundation of the Briggs plan, a plan that brought together the political, martial, and 
police agencies to deliver on the overall goal of ending the Emergency by defeating 
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the CTs. In Kenya, we see some of the fruits of this approach in Malaya, when these 
tactics were mirrored in order to help with the fight against Mau Mau terrorists. 
 
Psychological operations were part of an overall pivot away from purely direct, 
offensive air operations, to a more nuanced and mature model of counterinsurgency 
operations. This argument is summed up well by Robert Asprey when he states that 
Malaya represented: 
 
a realignment of tactical thinking-away from conventional terms of 
"battle" and "victory" to much more sophisticated terms of "pressure" 
and "gain".551 
 
This pivot is central to an understanding of the impact of airpower operations in any 
counterinsurgency environment. 
Impact of Operations 
 
Just like Kenyan operations had been influenced by those in Malaya, operations 
carried out in Kenya would influence the conduct of British forces in other theatres. 
One example of this is the way in which new settlements in Kenya were constructed 
taking account of lessons that had been learned in Malaya about provision of water 
supplies and the risk of flooding.552 
 
These lessons also were apparent in the use of airpower. Specifically, the use of 
helicopters for casualty evacuation, and the extensive use of aircraft for 
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psychological warfare operations, were because of experiences in Malaya and 
elsewhere.  
 
It is difficult to accurately determine the impact of airpower operations in the 
conduct of, and the ultimate success, of British forces against the Mau Mau in 
Kenya, and Communist Terrorists in Malaya. However, all evidence would tend to 
suggest that air operations were certainly impactful. In Kenya, Air strike operations 
were responsible for the death of ‘almost 900 insurgents […] as a direct result of air 
attacks by June 1954’.553 Furthermore the unambiguous statement by both Erskine 
and Lathbury certainly support the thesis that airpower played a decisive role in 
enabling the successful conduct of operations against the Mau Mau. 
 
In Kenya we do not see a significant evolutionary or innovatory trend, rather we see 
a reinforcement of the evolution and innovation experienced in Malaya. The scale of 
operations in Kenya did not necessitate evolution and innovation in tactics, rather 
they took what had and what was working in Malaya, and implemented them 
successfully. This in itself shows a level of knowledge creation and transfer across 
the RAF, something that is a key requirement for a learning organisation. 
 
The previous decade had made the RAF focus on conventional operations and this 
was seen in their doctrine, combat capability, tactics and technological development. 
Thus, it is not suspiring to see a lag in doctrine and tactics, and it is not really until 
the early 1950s that we see the RAF focus turn from offensive air operations to a 
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fuller spectrum approach. This full spectrum approach realised that airpower was a 
component part of a much broader strategy, and that the key contribution that 
airpower could provide would be to support the other components. This resulted in 
airpower delivering a range of operation types, including; casevac, mobility, 
psychological warfare, along with their more familiar roles of reconnaissance, 
ground attack and air strike operations. Also, the change in the emphasis of 
operations conducted, evolving from a focus on direct to indirect as the engagements 
evolved, can be explained in the case of Malaya very simply by an analysis of the 
strength of the MRLA during this period: 
 
Figure 19 – MRLA strength and incidents, 1948-56 
 
Source: All analysis by the author, data taken from; Victor Flintham, Air wars and aircraft : a 
detailed record of air combat, 1945 to the present (New York, 1990), pp 326-38 
 
Direct operations were conducted in the early years of the Emergency, however this 
waned as the 1950s progressed, a simplistic explanation, as shown above, is that 
there were less targets for direct offensive air strikes, however this is a little too 
simplistic. The reality is that as the Emergency progressed the sophistication of the 
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approach by the Director of Operations necessitated a more sophisticated approach 
by airpower, an approach to provide better support to the broader strategy. Thus, as 
the 1950s progress we see a significant increase in indirect operations conducted by 
airpower. Similarly, in Kenya, as the Mau Mau got dispersed they represented a 
harder target to find, fix and engage, thus more indirect airpower roles came to the 
fore. 
 
Was airpower effective in Malaya and Kenya? Again, airpower must be judged 
across the full spectrum of operations and not judged solely by the typical measuring 
stick of enemies killed. Gordon Simpson sums this up well when he concludes that: 
 
The effectiveness of airpower in the Malayan Emergency was mixed. 
From the standpoint of defeating guerrilla forces, “the air campaign 
could hardly be judged other than a colossal misuse of resources.” Yet 
in terms of taking the war to the enemy both psychologically and 
physically, it must be considered a success. It was a force multiplier, 
maximizing efforts to both eliminate the insurgents and win hearts and 
minds.554  
 
 
His argument is convincing, coupled with this is not only the psychological effect on 
the enemy, but also the psychological effect of airpower on your own forces.555 The 
ability of airpower to deliver casevac and mobility operations in Malaya and Kenya 
had an enormous effect on force morale.556 When one considers the environment in 
which British forces had to operate, the knowledge that they could be resupplied, no 
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matter how remote their location, and the comfort of knowing that if you got injured 
you could be flown out was a huge boost to the men on the ground. In this respect 
the helicopter proved an immense asset in Malaya, and while underutilised in Kenya, 
the same advantages were delivered by the light aircraft force of the KPRAW.  
 
One of the key lessons learned in Kenya about the use of airpower in small wars 
environments, as argued by Steve Chappell, is that the avoidance of civilian 
casualties is paramount: 
 
senior RAF officers and members of the Cabinet were fully attuned to 
the need to avoid CIVCAS [civilian casualities] from air action.  
This was first seen when the rules concerning the use of Harvards were 
issued: ‘...[aircraft] will not take armed offensive action against any 
target outside the prohibited areas. It is emphasised that it is of the 
greatest importance that our own forces and loyal Africans should not  
be subjected to offensive action from the air.’ Likewise, another  
report reveals that both Erskine and the Kenyan Government did not 
support indiscriminate bombing of the Kikuyu as it stated that 
offensive air operations would occur only in those areas prohibited to  
civilians.557  
 
The challenge the RAF would now face was the fact that due to the Cold War, the 
emphasis on force structure and aircraft procurement was very much centred on the 
jet aircraft, and the requirement to prepare for a conventional war against the Soviet 
Union in Europe.558 This emphasis would deliver what the RAF required, in terms of 
structure and aircraft, however it would be at the expense of operations that would 
not conform to this paradigm.  Kenya would have a lot of similarities to Malaya, 
however in certain ways it was quite different. While the scale of the operations in 
                                               
557 Wing Commander Steve Chappell, ‘Air power in the Mau Mau conflict: the governments chief 
weapon’, in Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal, no. 55, pp 25-55, p. 33 
558 Philip Towle, Pilots and rebels: the use of aircraft in unconventional warfare, 1918-1988 (1st ed., 
London ; Washington, 1989), p. 95 
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Malaya necessitated a significant investment of men and resources, in Kenya this did 
not happen. Thus, we see in Kenya the ability of the RAF to conduct operations from 
a force cobbled together. However, what the RAF achieved in Kenya was to confirm 
the ability of airpower to significantly influence and aid the conduct of operations in 
a small wars environment. Particularly in theatres where operations were conducted 
in areas that proved challenging for ground forces to consistently secure. This would 
be an advantage that airpower delivered at the time, and still delivers today. What 
the RAF had demonstrated in Kenya was that airpower was still very relevant in 
policing the Empire, if not the decisive leader it had proved to be in the interwar 
years. Furthermore, it demonstrated that tactics developed and deployed elsewhere, 
in particular Malaya, were relevant to the RAF’s role in counterinsurgency 
operations around the Empire. 
 
So as our attention turns to more contemporary operations, the question remains; was 
the RAF still the learning organization that was seen in the interwar years? The 
answer to this is partially. Undoubtedly, during the post war period we see the RAF 
show a capability to capture and transmit knowledge, we see that in the way that 
lessons from Malaya are implemented in Kenya. However, the great limiter of the 
RAFs ability as a learning organization in the small wars environment during this 
period is the fact that the focus is predominantly on conventional operations, nuclear 
operations and the Cold War. As the Cold War era faded and RAF turned their 
attention to Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s, initially conventional operations 
would again take precedence, however in the wake of the end of conventional 
operations in these two theatres, the RAF would once again be asked to operate in a 
small wars environment. 
276 
Chapter 4 – Airpower in Contemporary & Future Small Wars  
The onset of the Gulf War in 1991 pitted a coalition of Western powers against what 
was at the time the fourth largest army in the world. At this time, Iraq seemed to be a 
formidable foe, however as subsequent experience showed, the Iraqi army and air 
defences proved to be a house of cards, that after initial strikes, tumbled to the 
ground. In retrospect, many commentators have disregarded this conflict precisely 
for this reason, as Martin Van Creveld said, ‘looking back over the last few centuries 
[…] it would be hard to find any campaign in which one side enjoyed such a huge 
qualitative advantage over the other’, while this is certainly true, this does not take 
away from the fact that the First Gulf War was a key point in the development of 
modern airpower.559 It witnessed a new approach to warfare, one influenced heavily 
by technology, that relied on a highly advanced, elite air component, backed by 
ground forces. This would be an approach which would influence the US and its 
allies in  subsequent wars in Afghanistan in 2001 and again in Iraq in 2003. 
Although representing a new approach to modern wars, interestingly this approach is 
in line with earlier British policy, the so-called ‘steel over flesh’ approach to the 
Second World War being a case in point. In this war, the coalition deployed 1800 
aircraft, against the Iraqis’ 600, this quantitative edge, coupled with the qualitative 
difference, meant that within days of hostilities beginning the coalition air forces 
could operate with near impunity over Iraq. The air campaign broadly followed John 
Warden’s industrial ring theory (see chapter 1 for further detail), coalition aircraft 
targeted Iraq’s command and communication systems, its industrial and utilities 
                                               
559 Martin Van Creveld, The age of airpower (1st ed., New York, 2011), p. 321. 
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infrastructure and finally focused devastating firepower on Iraq’s fielded forces.560  
The result of this mismatch in airpower was highlighted in the duration of the 
subsequent land campaign, a mere 100 hours.  
 
While the Gulf War represented such a mismatch in opponents, it did highlight the 
new direction that modern conflict was taking, this was a direction that had airpower 
as a core component. Supporting this pillar was the new wave of technology that 
enabled commanders to see the battlefield in unprecedented clarity (Joint 
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System, JSTARS), and the emergence of 
precision guided munitions (PGMs) that allowed the coalition aircraft to accurately 
engage key targets. 
 
By 2003, the new approach to war, alluded to above, had developed significantly. 
The air forces would lead the way followed by a small, elite ground force 
component. Donald Rumsfeld would famously call this approach “shock and 
awe”.561 A phrase coined by Ullman and Wade in their 1996 work ‘Shock and awe, 
achieving rapid dominance’.562 If the First Gulf War had been a mismatch, the 
second was even more so. Iraq had never recovered from the losses of the first war 
and this was amplified by a decade of economic sanctions.563 The coalition opened 
the Second Gulf War by launching 1,000 precision-guided cruise missiles, this was 
followed up by a devastating air campaign utilising the most technologically 
                                               
560 David Jordan, ‘Air and space power in the contemporary era: 1990-2030’, in David Jordan, James 
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562 Harlan Ullman and James Wade, Shock and awe, achieving rapid dominance (National Defense 
University, 1996) 
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advanced air forces in history. While the outcome of this conventional phase of the 
war was never in doubt, what is interesting about the Second Gulf War is that the 
conflict did not end when major combat operations did, in the following years 
coalition forces would be faced with a rising insurgency, and it is this facet of the 
war that will be analysed in detail later in this work. 
 
In the last forty years, the RAF has been engaged in several small wars throughout 
the world. In the last twenty years, these have focussed on engagements fighting 
alongside the United States in the global 'war on terror'.  These conflicts, in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Libya, and more latterly the conflict against ISIS, have entailed the 
deployment of British land, sea and air forces, initially to fight conventional 
conflicts, and subsequently to bolster internal security and fight insurgencies. 
Coming in the post-Cold War era these deployments have been problematic for both 
the RAF and its coalition partners. Having spent 45 years preparing for a 
conventional conflict with the USSR in Europe, the ability of the RAF to be flexible 
to meet the challenges in modern counterinsurgency would be sorely tested. 
However, with a long history of the deployment of airpower in small wars 
environments, the RAF should demonstrate a level of experience and expertise in 
operating within this challenging environment.  
 
One of the difficulties surrounding the use of airpower in small wars is the 
measurement of success.  Whereas in conventional conflict the measurement of 
success is the degradation of the enemy’s ability to fight, in counterinsurgency the 
measurement of success, especially in recent conflicts, should be based on the ability 
to ‘weaken and deter insurgents long enough for the indigenous government to get 
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on its feet’.564 This has certainly been the approach to operations in Afghanistan, Iraq 
and in the fight against ISIS. This is not a new idea, Curtis Lemay, whilst Chief of 
Staff of the U.S. Air Force stated: 
 
In this type of war [irregular] you cannot – you must not – measure the 
effectiveness of the effort by the number of bridges destroyed, 
buildings damaged, vehicles burned, or any of the other standards that 
have been used for regular warfare. The task is to destroy the 
effectiveness of the insurgent’s efforts and his ability to use the 
population for his own ends.565 
 
 
This chapter will attempt to analyse the ‘success’ of airpower in contemporary small 
wars and try to understand what if any debt this success owes to the past. 
Furthermore, it will review contemporary doctrine and understand through an 
analysis of the role of airpower and the resulting operations in small wars 
environments, whether airpower can play a significant role in small wars into the 
future. Before continuing, it is important firstly to provide some context to the 
modern small wars mentioned above. In the RAFs case these have entailed 
operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and latterly against ISIS across the Middle East. 
 
Airpower in Afghanistan 
The conflict in Afghanistan began in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the objective 
of the invasion was to remove the Taliban from power. It was believed that the 
                                               
564 Richard Andres, ‘The new role of air strike in small wars’, in Small Wars Journal, blog post | Jul 
19 2008, available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-new-role-of-air-strike-in-small-wars 
(accessed 02 April 2017) 
565 U.S. Department of the Air Force, Irregular Warfare, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Air Force, August 1, 2007), vi. General Curtis Lemay, fifth 
Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force referring to irregular warfare. 
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Taliban represented a power bloc that supported the use of terrorism against the US 
and its allies. The goal of the operation was regime change. The coalition planned to 
do this by leveraging three key components; airpower, special forces, and indigenous 
opposition forces. Afghanistan represents one of the first instances of western 
powers utilizing this approach, essentially it represents an airpower first strategy, 
with the special forces troops providing eyes and ears on the ground to supplement 
air intelligence assets, as David Deptula has described: 
 
The opening phase of OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] saw a 
measured application of modern airpower in conjunction with a light 
footprint of special operations and other government agency personnel 
on the ground acting as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) sensors, partnering with the Afghan Northern Alliance ground 
forces.566 
 
 
Photo 30 - RAF Tornado in Afghanistan, 2010 
 
Source: available at http://helmandblog.blogspot.ie/2010/04/raf-tornado-squadron-hands-over-
duties.html (accessed, 09 April, 2017) 
                                               
566 David Deptula, Air power in the Middle East, a contemporary assessment, available at 
http://www.hoover.org/research/airpower-middle-east-contemporary-assessment (accessed 30 January 
2017) 
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What is interesting about this approach, is that as operations continued the NATO 
coalition relied more and more on ground force intervention. Thus, we see the initial 
strategy as an airpower first one, however this then evolved into a traditional ground 
centric counterinsurgency strategy.567  
 
 
There are several key reasons why an airpower first strategy was superseded by a 
ground centric campaign. Firstly, airpower could deliver rapid mobilization to kick-
start the beginning of the campaign. Thus, almost immediately airpower could bring 
kinetic effect to bear against the Taliban in Afghanistan, while at the same time 
delivering special forces teams and the equipment they required to the theatre. As the 
conflict continued, NATO was in a better position to transport ground forces to the 
theatre and build up the ground component. Secondly, the inability of the indigenous 
forces to bring operations to a successful conclusion necessitated NATO in 
supplementing their capabilities with ground forces. 
 
The initial airpower centric approach, utilised in Afghanistan, has come to be known 
as the ‘Afghan Model’.  
 
in which indigenous allies replace American conventional ground 
troops by exploiting U.S. airpower and small numbers of 
American special operations forces (SOF).568  
 
 
The Afghan Model has been a controversial approach and many commentators argue 
                                               
567 David Deptula, Air power in the Middle East, a contemporary assessment, available at 
http://www.hoover.org/research/airpower-middle-east-contemporary-assessment (accessed 30 January 
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568 Stephen Biddle, ‘Allies, airpower and modern warfare: the Afghan model in Afghanistan and 
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on the one side, that it foretold a new approach to global conflict by western forces, 
one which will result in a transformation of traditional ground force capabilities to 
smaller highly specialised armed forces. On the other side Stephen Biddle, amongst 
others, argues that the evidence does not point to this conclusion and that in fact; 
 
Ground and air forces are thus powerful together, but are poor 
substitutes for one another: even twenty-first-century precision 
airpower cannot replace suitable skills on the ground.569 
 
 
As NATO ground forces increased, the requirement for air support operations, both 
kinetic and non-kinetic, increased rapidly. In a country where road and rail transport 
is nearly non-existent, the ability of fixed wing and rotary aircraft to support fielded 
forces was vital.  
 
Afghanistan is an interesting conflict from an airpower perspective for several 
reasons; the heavy reliance on airpower in the initial stages, the role of combat air 
support, the task of air supply and air mobility, and the early steps towards the 
establishment and support of an indigenous airpower capability. These roles are 
within the remit of modern air forces, however, as we will see, not all modern small 
wars are the same. 
 
Airpower in Iraq 
In 2003, coalition forces would return to the Middle East for the second time in the 
space of 12 years. In the 1991 Gulf War, coalition forces had forced an Iraqi 
                                               
569 Stephen Biddle, ‘Allies, airpower and modern warfare: the Afghan model in Afghanistan and 
Iraq’, in International Security, vol. 30, no. 3 (Winter, 2005/2006), pp 161-176, p. 175 
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invasion force out of Kuwait and back behind its border. A decision was made at that 
time not to pursue the retreating Iraqi army, and in the ensuing years the coalition 
maintained pressure on the Iraqi government by implementing a stringent no-fly 
zone over northern and southern Iraq, while also introducing sanctions to reduce the 
ability of Iraq to rearm and redevelop their military forces. With the 9/11 terrorists 
attack, Iraq was identified by the US as a state that supported terrorism, this coupled 
with a belief that Iraq had stocks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD's), gave the 
justification for the US and British led coalition to once again go to war with Iraq. 
The difference this time was that the objective of the conflict was regime change.  
The conflict in Iraq, like that of Afghanistan, was split into two distinct phases. First 
came the conventional phase, where coalition forces defeated Iraq's fielded military 
forces. This phase lasted less than six weeks. However, what is of interest to this 
work is phase two of the Iraqi conflict. This phase was defined by an insurgent 
uprising, initially against coalition forces, and then latterly against Iraqi government 
forces.  
 
The insurgency was borne out of several issues, firstly there was the civil strife 
between the Sunni and Shia populations, and secondly there was the presence of Al 
Qaeda in Iraq. Initially there was violence between Sunni and Shia militia groups, 
then the violence spread and was targeted against coalition forces and later Iraqi 
government forces. For coalition forces the challenge was in discerning who was the 
enemy and who was not. Ground forces were the best means in overcoming this 
challenge through the utilization of checkpoints and search and destroy missions, 
however, the ability of ground forces to operate effectively was supported in no 
small part by airpower.  
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The use of airpower in Iraq included the full spectrum of airpower missions, both 
kinetic and non-kinetic. From fire support, CAS (close air support) and precision 
strike, to ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), mobility, casevac (casualty 
evacuation) and transport. Like Afghanistan, airpower played a key role in enabling 
ground forces within Iraq. 
 
Airpower against ISIS 
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has become a growing menace to states 
across the Middle East.570 The group itself has its origins in the late 1990s and 
formed an alliance with al-Qaeda to fight against the US and its allies in 2004 as part 
of the Iraqi insurgency. With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, ISIS sent forces 
into Sunni regions of Syria and from there they have grown their support base within 
Syria, as well as establishing areas of influence within Iraq. ISIS claim that they are 
establishing a global caliphate, and it is against this threat that many countries have 
come to the aid of Iraq to help bolster their armed forces and support their operations 
with airpower. A significant development in 2016 has been the deployment of 
Russian forces, including Russian airpower, to support the Assad regime in Syria.  
 
                                               
570 The ISIS group is also known as ISIL and Daesh, for the purposes of this work it will be referred 
to as ISIS throughout. 
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Photo 31 - US Army soldier with captured Islamic State flag in Iraq, 2010 
 
Source: Available at http://archive.is/lNIJe (accessed 10 April 2017) 
 
To date (mid-2017), coalition forces deployed against ISIS have been limited to SOF 
(special operations forces), training forces, air forces, and some ground support 
personnel. In the main the role of the airpower components has been in strike roles; 
close air support, interdiction and precision strike, and support roles; ISR, air 
refuelling and transport. The UK airpower involvement is called Operation Shader. 
The main UK component of the coalition is made up of 901 and 903 Expeditionary 
Air Wings (EAW). 903 EAW represents the bulk of RAF capabilities in the Middle 
East and the strike aircraft at its disposal are Tornado GR4 and Typhoon FGR4s, 
these are supported by C-130 Hercules, and Voyager air-to-air refuelling aircraft. 
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Significantly, 903 EAW also includes 1 Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance Wing (1ISR) detachment.571 
 
Photo 32 - 903 EAW Tornado during counter-Daesh operations 
 
Source: Tweet, 19 March 2017, by https://twitter.com/RafPhotog (accessed 18 April 2017) 
 
Before discussing the operations conducted by the RAF in these two conflicts and 
their relative success, it is important in the first instance to review contemporary 
doctrine and theory to provide some doctrinal context to the operations. 
Theory & Doctrine 
As was discussed in Chapter 1, there is a dearth of contemporary airpower theory. 
The theory that did influence contemporary operations was that written in the 1970s 
by John Boyd, and 1980s and 1990s by John Warden. Outside of these two there is a 
sparcity of theoretical writing. There is an abundance of writing on airpower topics, 
including a huge amount of publications related to airpower history, and some on the 
                                               
571 RAF, 903 Expeditionary Air Wing, available at http://www.raf.mod.uk/83eag/903eaw/ (accessed 
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future of airpower, however in the main these publications seem to avoid any 
theoretical considerations. There are exceptions, John Andreas Olsen is one, who’s 
significant contribution to the debate on airpower can be found in his series of 
published works in the last two decades, David Jordan is another, where in 
Understanding modern warfare, he talks about the future of airpower and more 
presciently about the evolving threat landsacpe in a post 9/11 world dominated by 
insurgencies. 572  
 
Before outlining contemporary RAF doctrine it is important first to discuss how 
doctrine has changed during this period, and to provide the context in which 
contemporary doctrine sits. While this work is not focussed on the doctrinal creation 
process, but rather on the impact that doctrine has on operations, and operations on 
doctrine, it is important to understand how this process differs in a contemporary 
context. 
 
The modern doctrine creation process is significantly different than what the RAF 
experienced in the inter-war and post-war period. Firstly the emergence of nuclear 
power in the post war period garnered a huge amount of focus and undoubtedly 
influenced the doctrine that emerged from the RAF. This is evidenced in the 
foreward to AP1300 (fourth edition), when Air Chief Marshal Sir Dermot Boyle 
states that ‘providing the great deterrent [i.e. nuclear capability] is the primary 
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function of air power today’.573 Furthermore the growth in NATO also influenced 
RAF doctrine, and the RAF became a key contributor to the development of NATO 
doctrine. This influence culminated with the withdrawal of AP 1300 in the early 
1970s, which had last been updated in 1964, and thus the RAF relied solely on 
NATO doctrine. 574 
 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the reliance on purely NATO 
doctrine, which focused on a conflict envisioned against the Warsaw Pact, was 
highlighted, and as a result the RAF recognised: 
 
The need for commanders, planners, aircrews and airmen to understand 
the characteristics and fundamental tenets for the employment of air 
power […] and [as a result] AP 3000, Air Power Doctrine, was first 
published in 1990575  
 
Re-introducing RAF authored doctrine to the service was not without its challenges. 
As Christopher Finn has argued there were two main challenges, firstly there seemed 
to be a ‘scepticism and suspicion’ about written doctrine, and secondly there was a 
perception that introducing an RAF doctrine would conflict with NATO doctrine and 
thus lead to seemingly lack of solidarity within the alliance.576 Despite these 
challenges, a second edition was published in 1993 and a third in 1999. 
Contemporary RAF doctrine is encapsulated in AP3000, 4th edition, published in 
2009. While NATO’s preeminence and the subsequent fall of the Iron Curtain were 
                                               
573 Group Captain Christopher Finn, ‘British thinking on air power – the evolution of AP3000’, in Air 
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two significant events that impacted RAF doctrinal development, a third was the 
establishment of the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (formerly called 
the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre) in the late 1990s.  
 
The role of the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) is to help 
‘inform defence strategy, capability development, operations and provides the 
foundation for joint education’. This role is delivered with a focus on a number of 
key areas, namely;  
 
the Strategic Trends Programme which provides the long term strategic 
context for policy makers; concepts, which outline how our armed 
forces and defence may operate in the future; doctrine, which provides 
guidelines for commanders based on best practice and operational 
experience; and oversight of the legal content of operational law 
training.577 
 
Thus contemporary RAF doctrine has at its core a joint approach, although the RAF 
still produces Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) documents, its overarching 
doctrinal philosphy is based on the joint doctrine emanating from DCDC. Another 
important aspect of modern British doctrine is that in essence they are public 
documents, for the consumption of all, this must be borne in mind when comparing 
older doctrinal publictions to contemporary documents. 
 
Contemporary RAF doctrine is encapsulated in AP3000, the most recent 
manifestation is edition 4. Its purpose, as stated in the introduction is: 
 
AP3000 Edition 4 therefore explains how British air and space power 
can be applied in an uncertain world, where expeditionary warfare is 
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as likely to be enduring as interventionist, but where success in 
contemporary counter-insurgency operations, conducted within a 
framework of joint action, must be balanced against the retention of a 
contingent, full spectrum capability, able to deliver national security 
objectives whatever the nature of the crisis.578  
 
What is significant about this stated purpose is the prominence that 
counterinsurgency operations are given. The RAF, throughout AP 3000, states that it 
is cognizant of the changing contemporary threat landscape, and while it needs to 
retain a capability in conventional conflict, it understands that the ability to counter 
asymmetric threats is key.  
 
While the essence of violent conflict has remained constant, the 
character of warfare is changing, largely in response to the 
overwhelming conventional combat power developed by the West in 
general and the United States in particular.579 
 
 
Thus, the RAF is all too aware that the ability of western powers to deploy 
overwhelming airpower, has led opponents to rely on asymmetric responses, and this 
necessitates a doctrinal framework that commanders can use to counter this 
asymmetry. AP3000 (4th edition) is presented in a manner in order to deliver 
messages to two audiences, as Christopher Finn argues: 
 
Edition 4 has two aims: first, to provide authoritative conceptual 
direction on the employment of air and space power to airmen; and 
second, to explain as clearly as possible its utility to soldiers, sailors 
and all of the other actors who, as part of a Comprehensive Approach 
to ordering crises, are influenced by, or influence air and space 
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power.580  
 
This aim, as described above relevant to AP3000 (4th edition) is an aspect of RAF 
doctrine that Parton has argued is enduring, he states that: 
 
A study of the way that the RAF has used doctrine throughout its 
history reveals two main purposes: first, as a guide to those within the 
Service and, second, as an explanation to those outside the Royal Air 
Force of the way that it intended to operate.581  
 
Doctrinal evolution is further evidenced in the pulication of Joint Doctrine 
Publication 0-30 (JDP 0-30).582  
Through a century or more of counterinsurgency operations the British have learned 
that the best approach to these operating environments is a holistic approach that 
encompasses political, social and military responses. This approach has now been 
formalized in doctrine and is known as the Comprehensive Approach: 
 
the Comprehensive Approach, employing all available levers of power, 
has been adopted by the United Kingdom as the best way to achieve 
favourable and enduring end-states. The military contribution to this 
cross-government and inter-agency approach is captured by the 
campaigning process.583  
 
The RAF expanded on this approach in its publication ‘Airpower in an uncertain 
world’. 584  It is to the operational realities of contemporary small wars that this work 
now turns. 
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Operations  
The RAF highlights several roles for the modern air force, these include; control of 
the air, air command and control, rapid global mobility, persistent ISTAR, precise 
effects, battlefield mobility and force protection. 585 The below graphic from Joint 
Doctrine Publication 0-30 summarises this well:586 
 
Figure 20 - Summary of the roles of airpower, and their associated missions 
 
Source: Joint doctrine publication 0-30 (JDP 0-30): UK air and space Power, 2nd edition (2017), p. 
41 
 
 
These roles differ little from the role envisaged for airpower in its earliest 
incarnations, however the way in which each of these roles are delivered today 
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differs greatly from what has come before. This section will look to outline the RAF 
view of its role and particularly how this relates to the way in which the RAF 
operates in small wars environments today. This will be achieved through an 
analysis of the seven key roles that the RAF has highlighted in their publication ‘Air 
power in an uncertain world’. The RAF views these roles as enduring. For each of 
these roles this work will analyse the following; the RAF principal, its application in 
modern small wars, its evolution throughout the last 100 years, and its potential for 
the future. By analysing these enduring principals this chapter will provide an 
analysis of how and why these roles have evolved, and whether during their 
evolution we can discern a pattern of learning and development, particularly as it 
relates to the employment of airpower in small wars. 
 
Control of the Air – freedom of action  
Control of the air essentially refers to the ability of your air forces to operate 
unmolested within an area of operations. In the past, this has been referred to by 
various names, the most common is that of air superiority. Within the Iraqi, Syrian 
and Afghan engagements the requirement for airpower to win and hold control of the 
air was limited, this control was achieved very early in the conventional phase of 
these operations and was never legitimately challenged. Thus, there was no 
requirement for the air forces to perform a function to maintain this, however in all 
theatres it has been challenged.  
 
The essence of asymmetrical warfare is the ability to find ways to challenge your 
opponent even if you cannot match up in conventional conflict. 
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Insurgents contested the Allied use of air power, not by having an air 
force, but by antiaircraft fire, attacks on airfields, and the use of 
propaganda about casualties.587 
 
In Iraq one way in which insurgents challenged the coalitions, including the RAFs, 
control of the air, was to target aircraft that were in the process of taking off or 
landing. This was achieved by using several types of weapons, including shoulder 
launched anti-aircraft missiles and even crude rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). On 
the 6th of May 2006, the Royal Navy lost a Westland Lynx AH.7 over Basra in 
southern Iraq, a subsequent military inquiry concluded that the helicopter ‘was shot 
down by a surface-to-air missile, using a man-portable air defense system, fired from 
the ground,’.588 The man portable air defence system, or MANPAD, turned out to be 
an SA-14. 
 
Photo 33 - SA-14 launch tube and missile 
 
Source: https://naveodtechdiv.navsea.navy.mil/ (accessed 22 April 2017) 
 
 
In a similar incident in February 2007 an RAF C-130 Hercules was seriously 
damaged upon landing at a temporary landing strip in southern Iraq. Initially the 
                                               
587 Jeremy Black, Air power (Lanham, MD, 2016), p. 275 
588 International Herald Tribune Europe, 27 April 2007 
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RAF reported that the incident had simply been a landing accident, however a 
subsequent report stated that  
 
The C-130J transport aircraft was struck by two bombs planted by 
militants as it landed on a temporary runway in Maysan Province in 
south-eastern Iraq on February 12 last year [2007].589 
 
These two incidents demonstrate that an asymmetric approach by insurgents can 
certainly challenge the concept of ‘control of the air’, thus it is imperative that air 
forces continue to devise strategies to not only maintain control of the air, in the air, 
but also to find ways in which they can negate the ability of ground based insurgent 
forces from threatening their ability to operate unmolested. 
 
The ability to operate unmolested in an area of operations has been the goal of the 
RAF since its earliest days over the western front in World War 1. In Iraq and the 
Northwest Frontier in the interwar period the RAF faced similar challenges, however 
in both of those theatres the challenge came from tribesmen wielding rifles, whereas 
today the ‘tribesmen’ wield MANPADS (man portable air defence systems, like the 
SA-14). The tactics to protect against this type of threat have not really changed 
from Iraq in the 1920s and 30s to the Middle East today. The key is to maintain 
security of your facilities, and if possible, to maintain a security zone around your 
facilities. One of the challenges faced by this in contemporary small wars 
environments is that modern day airports tend to be in and around cities and thus the 
ability to create a security zone around the facility is very difficult. 
                                               
589 Express, May 17 2008, available at http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/44813/MoD-covered-up-
truth-about-Hercules (accessed 21 April 2017) 
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With the development and evolution of weaponry, this ability to challenge air control 
by asymmetric means will continue to increase. Weapons are becoming more 
accurate and smaller, thus the ability to detect and counter the threat will become 
increasingly difficult. Training air force personnel to be aware of these threats and to 
act accordingly will be a key way in which this threat can be negated.  
 
Air Command and Control – efficient and effective use of resources  
Since the emergence of airpower in the early twentieth century one of the key areas 
of debate has centred on the command and control structure that should be in place 
when it comes to utilising airpower. The RAF, since it gained independence, has 
positioned itself as the most appropriate command structure for the utilisation of air 
assets and one of the key drivers for this is the belief that only through this structure 
can air assets be used in an efficient and effective manner. This is regardless of the 
primary role of airpower, whether that be on independent operations, or as a force to 
support land or sea operations.  
 
In modern deployments, unless they are independent air operations, the RAF tend to 
contribute to a larger force structure, and as such tend to be subordinate to the officer 
commanding, typically an army officer. In relation to the ongoing actions against 
ISIS, speaking in January 2016, the Royal Air Force's Deputy Commander of 
Operations, Air Marshal Bagwell, stated that: 
 
My role and that of RAF Air Command is simply to force generate the 
air forces to sustain our contribution […] We have a long way to go 
before the operation concludes, but we should be very proud of our 
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contribution […] Airpower is our major advantage in this conflict and 
the RAF is a very significant part of its successful delivery.590 
 
As can be seen in this quote the RAF views its role as contributing to the larger 
operation, at the same time it is aware of the importance of this contribution to the 
overall success of the mission. What is interesting is that there has been a sea change 
in approach to air dominated deployments. Whereas during the interwar years the 
RAF had command responsibility for British operations in Iraq, Palestine, 
Transjordan and Aden, in modern small wars where air is the dominant arm, this 
approach has not been taken. So why is this? Modern small wars operations are very 
much joint operations, and there are little if any independent operations. This is in 
line with more of an emphasis by the British military on jointery. This can be 
evidenced in the publication of Joint Doctrine Pulication 0-30.591 Thus air 
component commanders typically work in collaboration with a land component 
commander and both report to a joint forces commander. For context a British 
command structure for contemporary operations is outlined below: 
 
The concept of component command is central to the joint command 
and control of the British armed forces on operations. The JFC [Joint 
Forces Commander] will designate a JFACC [Joint Forces Air 
Component Commander] to exploit the full air capabilities available to 
the joint force; his role is to recommend how the Air Component 
should be employed, and he is responsible for planning, coordinating, 
allocating, tasking, executing and assessing air operations to 
accomplish assigned objectives.  
  
 
                                               
590 Air Marshal Bagwell, ‘RAF Deputy Commander of Operations: The fight against Daesh’, Defence 
in the Media Blog, available at https://modmedia.blog.gov.uk/2016/01/14/raf-deputy-commander-of-
operations-the-fight-against-daesh/ (accessed 21 April 2017) 
591 Ministry of Defence, Joint doctrine publication 0-30 (JDP 0-30): UK air and space Power, 2nd 
edition (2017) 
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The key philosophy underpinning modern air force command is the concept of 
‘centralised control, decentralised execution’, this typically takes the operational 
form of tasking orders. 592 
 
Will there be a situation in the future where the RAF has command responsibility of 
a small war? No. However there is every likelyhood that an RAF officer will 
command within Permanent Joint Headquarters, but the signifcant shift towards 
‘jointery’ has meant that no single service will hold command responsibility for a 
contemporary small war . As stated above the clear majority of contemporary 
operations are joint operations, furthermore, the approach to modern small wars is a 
holistic approach that not only includes the armed forces, but also political and 
humanitarian aspects.  
 
Rapid Global Mobility – deployment and sustainment  
One of the enduring abilities of airpower is to be able to project power globally, and 
to sustain deployment in difficult environments. Thus, the RAF sees as one of its key 
goals the ability to deliver Rapid Global Mobility. The US Department of Defence 
defines Rapid Global Mobility as: 
 
The timely movement, positioning, and sustainment of military forces 
and capabilities across the range of military operations.593 
 
 
                                               
592 RAF, British air and space power doctrine, AP 3000 (4th edition), p. 61-6, available at 
https://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/9E435312_5056_A318_A88F14CF6F4FC6CE.pdf 
593 Joint Publication 3-17 (JP3-17), Air mobility operations, available at 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_17.pdf (accessed 01 September 2018) 
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Rapid Global Mobility mission types include airlift, aerial refuelling, and casualty 
evacuation.  
 
In today’s modern small wars, rapid global mobility is one of the key attributes of 
airpower and one of its defining contributions to the conflicts that the RAF are 
involved in today. A great example of this is the operations in Afghanistan. Initially 
Afghanistan posed a challenge to military planners from several perspectives; it was 
landlocked, adjacent basing rights were not in place, and road and rail infrastructure 
were very poor. Thus, the ability of airpower to move, position and sustain the 
leading coalition elements was of paramount importance. Following on from airlift, 
the ability of air forces to sustain operations through aerial refueling, and their ability 
to deliver casualty evacuation across a theatre of operations allows military 
commanders to maintain the tempo of operations, while providing support to those 
on the ground. 
 
As airpower has developed, specifically engine and aircraft technology, mobility has 
developed from a secondary role to a primary role of modern air forces. Although 
there was the use of air mobility in the interwar era, it was quite limited, however 
over the last thirty to forty years the development of air mobility as a key primary 
role of air forces has been marked. In the RAF, this development is marked by a 
continued significant investment in air mobility assets (eg. A400M, Voyager, C130J 
and C17), and the establishment of a separate Air Mobility Force (AMF).594 The 
                                               
594 RAF, Air mobility, available at http://www.raf.mod.uk/role/air-mobility.cfm (accessed 22 April 
2017) 
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versatility of the A400M is an example of the increasing importance of these air 
mobility assets.595 
 
Photo 34- Voyager Refueling a C-130 Hercules 
 
Source – RAF, available at  http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/voyager.cfm (accessed 22 April 2017) 
 
 
Engine and aircraft development in the last seventy years has enabled the rapid 
growth and evolution of air mobility, this will not change. As aircraft engines 
becomes more efficient, thus it will make economic sense to move more and more 
cargo by air. This will certainly not replace the requirement of sea transport to move 
bulk cargo, however the ability of air mobility to carry heavier loads over longer 
distances will only enhance politician’s ability to rapidly deploy military assets 
across the globe. 
 
                                               
595 Royal Aeronautical Society, Atlas shoulders the load, available at 
https://www.aerosociety.com/news/atlas-shoulders-the-load/ (accessed 08 August 2018) 
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Persistent ISTAR – intelligence-led operations  
Whether acting in an independent role, or as part of a joint operation, one of the key 
attributes of modern airpower is the ability to provide the commander with a more 
complete view of the battlespace. This clarity has been enhanced in recent decades 
with the proliferation of technology that enables more accurate intelligence 
gathering. In modern terms, the ability of aircraft to become sensor-shooters, has 
enabled a single aircraft, multi-role reality. 596 Thus, according to the RAF, airpower 
‘provides an essential and very significant element of the Joint intelligence collection 
and surveillance capability’.597  
 
The application of this ability by the RAF is significant in modern small wars. This 
is how the RAF describes the application of intelligence-led operations: 
 
In recent conflicts, hostile forces have sought to exploit this ‘confusion’ 
[confusion between combatants and non-combatants] to avoid air 
attack. However, the constellation of sensors employed by modern air 
forces is uniquely placed to solve the problem and exploit the solution 
– the process is termed Find-Fix-Finish-Exploit-Assess 
 
• Target is identified through intelligence 
• Its location precisely confirmed 
• It is captured or attacked 
• Documentation and other information at the site is examined 
• Collected intelligence is analysed 
 
 
The RAFs ability to Find-Fix-Finish-Exploit-Assess is enabled through its ISTAR 
(Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) fleet, including; 
                                               
596 A sensor-shooter is an aircraft that not only provides the ability to conduct ISTAR activities, but 
can also then act on this information through kinetic effect (i.e. weapons employment) 
597 RAF, Air power in an uncertain world, available at 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/role/airpoweruncertainworld.cfm (accessed 30 January 2017) 
302 
the Sentinel, Sentry and Beechcraft Shadow R1, and the General Atomics MQ-9 
Reaper. These assets are controlled by ISTAR Force Headquarters.598  
 
Photo 35 - Sentinel landing 
 
Source: RAF, available at http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/sentinelr1.cfm (accessed 22 April 2017) 
 
The evolution of intelligence gathering by airpower in the last one hundred years has 
been staggering. Airpowers original mission in World War 1 was reconnaissance, 
and even at that early stage the ability to deploy a sensor-shooter was acknowledged. 
Airpower, and its development, has been hugely influenced by technological 
advancements and this is particularly apparent in intelligence. Concepts like sensor-
shooter and network-centric warfare have been enabled by the immense 
advancements in networking technology in the last thirty years. 
  
Recent operational experience of the RAF has led to the development of the Combat 
ISTAR (C-ISTAR) approach:  
 
                                               
598 RAF, Intelligence, available at http://www.raf.mod.uk/role/intelligence.cfm (accessed 22 April 
2017) 
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whereby the platforms, sensors and their ground and airborne 
exploitation nodes are networked. In addition to providing a fused 
picture, this joined up approach ensures that ISTAR assets, which are 
often described as high demand/low density assets, are employed 
efficiently. It must also be remembered that C-ISTAR reflects not just 
a passive capability, but also confers the opportunity to take immediate 
and decisive action, including the use of weapons.599 
 
This idea is probably best demonstrated in the concept of the sensor-shooter, this is 
an aircraft that not only provides the ability to conduct ISTAR activities, but can also 
then act on this information through kinetic effect. Aircraft that provide this 
capability today include the MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle, and the not yet 
operational F-35. 
 
Precise Effects – timely, kinetic and non-kinetic, across the battlespace  
One of the ongoing debates about modern airpower in small wars, has been the 
discussion as to whether kinetic effects or non-kinetic effects are a more important 
role for airpower in this environment. This is an area that will be revisited in the next 
chapter. However, the ability of modern airpower to deliver precise effects, whether 
kinetic or non-kinetic, is one of its most powerful attributes. The RAF believe that 
this ability to deliver timely and precise effect is one of its most enduring 
capabilities. By kinetic effect we refer to all those roles that involve the application 
of firepower, non-kinetic are those roles that do not involve the application of 
firepower. 
 
                                               
599 RAF, Intelligence, available at http://www.raf.mod.uk/role/intelligence.cfm (accessed 22 April 
2017) 
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One of the key discussions around the use of kinetic airpower in modern small wars 
is the potential damage that collateral damage causes to the overall strategic aim of 
the operations. Colonel Merrick Krause has written about this topic and describes a 
concept called the ‘atrocity threshold’, this refers to the political will to digest 
collateral damage and interestingly, the propaganda value that collateral damage 
gives to asymmetric opponents: 
 
An important mechanism, referred to here as the atrocity threshold, 
affects the conceptualization, planning, and conduct of postmodern 
military operations. The will of both the public and elected leadership 
is influenced by the number and type of casualties, depending upon a 
number of factors, including whether or not the casualties are civilian, 
children or adults, women or men, and documented by the media.600 
 
The use of civilian casualties by insurgents as a propaganda weapon against western 
coalitions has been an increasing factor in recent conflicts. There are many reasons 
for collateral damage; poor intelligence, human error etc, however regardless of how 
targeting technology evolves into the future, collateral damage and civilian casualties 
will always be a part of conflict. As Jeremy Black has analysed: 
 
The advisability of bombing in COIN operations was questioned given 
the frequent difficulty of identifying targets separable from civilians 
and the problems posed by a hostile response to bombing in a context 
within which local support was sought. Thus, in Afghanistan, air strikes 
compromised such support and also had an adverse impact elsewhere, 
notably in neighbouring Pakistan.601 
 
                                               
600 Col Merrick E. Krause, ‘Airpower in modern war’, in Air & Space Power Journal, vol. 29, no. 3 
(May-June 2015), p. 48 
601 Jeremy Black, Air power (Lanham, MD, 2016), pp 300-1 
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The ability of modern air forces to minimise the occurrence of civilian casualties is a 
vital challenge for the future. However, the capability to deliver precise kinetic effect 
is a vital component of airpowers contribution to modern small wars. 
 
Kinetic and non-kinetic effects in small wars have a significant impact on operations. 
As discussed, the challenge in relation to kinetic applications of airpower is 
predominantly around the identification of target sets. Furthermore, as Joel Hayward 
has argued: 
 
Designing target sets to punish insurgent groups successfully for their 
maleficence is almost impossible.602 
 
This is in stark contrast to the policies of air control examined earlier in this work. In 
the 1930s the RAF developed a strategy that described collective responsibility, thus 
if you were supporting or aiding insurgents, you too could become a target of 
retribution through bombing, in the contemporary world this would-be anathema, 
and indeed illegal. Thus, there has been a tendency to focus more on the non-kinetic 
effect of airpower. Roles in this area include; ISTAR, casualty evacuation, 
propaganda, electronic warfare and many more. While kinetic effect is the most 
visible of airpower contributions, arguably, non-kinetic roles are even more 
important. In the present-day operations against ISIS in Iraq, the RAFs intelligence 
                                               
602 Joel S.A. Hayward, ‘Air power and insurgency: some preliminary thoughts’, in Joel S. A. Hayward 
(ed.), Air power, insurgency and the ‘war on terror’ (Cranwell, United Kingdom, 2009), p. 12 
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assets are some of the busiest, with the ISTAR force being responsible for ‘30-40% 
of the Coalition’s total ISTAR output’.603 
 
As discussed earlier there will always be collateral damage whenever military force 
is applied, so the question becomes how this can be addressed. The facts support the 
argument that insurgents are responsible for far more civilian deaths than airpower, 
in Afghanistan for example: 
 
According to the National Counterterrorism Center, terrorist attacks in 
Afghanistan were responsible for 6,796 casualties in 2009. 
Comparatively, ISAF actions accounted for 657 casualties, and only 78 
of those were attributable to airpower […] The reality is that between 
2007 and 2009, nearly 14,500 air-to-ground weapons releases occurred 
in Afghanistan and less than one-tenth of one percent resulted in 
civilian casualties604 
 
However, insurgents are becoming increasingly adept at leveraging social media and 
the internet to paint a picture of the attacking forces that supports their view of 
events. The ability of air forces to counteract this through electronic warfare and 
cyber warfare will be a key to future operations.  
 
We cannot escape the fact that one of the enduring principles of the application of 
modern airpower is its ability to have precise effects.  
 
Kinetic airpower is an important element of combined arms 
employment and its primary role in counterinsurgency operations is to 
                                               
603 ‘ISTAR firmament: the future of the RAF's combat air reconnaissance assets’, in Janes Defence 
Weekly, p. 5, available at 
http://www.janes.com/images/assets/332/72332/ISTAR_firmament_the_future_of_the_RAFs_combat
_air_reconnaissance_assets.pdf (accessed 24 August 2017) 
604 Norton A. Schwartz, ‘Airpower in counterinsurgency and stability operations’, in Prism 2, no. 2, p. 
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provide fire support.605 
 
 
The potential for the future is for the kinetic effect to be more precise and the non-
kinetic effect to be more reactive, responsive and supportive across the entire 
spectrum of operations. 
 
Battlefield Mobility – tempo and protection  
Battlefield mobility, especially in a small wars environment, is seen by the RAF as a 
key enabler of operations. Afghanistan is a great example of this, where land 
communications became so dangerous that the ground forces relied heavily on the 
ability of rotary wing aircraft to move men and materials into and around the area of 
operations. The RAF argue that this capability provides military leaders with the 
ability to significantly affect tempo, while also offering protection. 
 
A significant step forward was made in 1999 with the establishment of Joint 
Helicopter Command, this organisation brings together the battlefield military 
helicopters of the British Army, Royal Air Force and Royal Navy. It’s inventory 
comprises of more than 200 helicopters split by designation of ‘lift, find and 
attack’.606 
 
                                               
605 Colonel Eugene L. McFeeley, Balancing the kinetic effects of airpower with counterinsurgency 
objectives in Afghanistan (US Army War College, PA, 2009), p. 12 
606 ‘UK JHC prepares for Future Force 2025 and global contingencies’, in Jane’s International 
Defence Review (28 March, 2018), available at https://www.janes.com/article/78905/uk-jhc-prepares-
for-future-force-2025-and-global-contingencies (accessed 15 September 2018) 
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The application of battlefield mobility in contemporary small wars has been 
significant. As discussed, the ability of rotary wing aircraft to supply and sustain 
isolated troops has enabled British forces to establish and maintain strongpoints in an 
environment where insurgents have made road communication very problematic. 
This benefit has been seen in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Since the Malayan conflict in 
the post-war period the application of battlefield mobility has been increasing in 
significance. In Malaya, as has been discussed, helicopters were a key enabler of 
counterinsurgent activities. As helicopters have evolved the roles that they can 
perform have widened. Today the RAF fields a wide spectrum of rotary aircraft, 
these include; Chinook, Puma HC2 and Griffin HAR2 aircraft. One of the key 
helicopters in the past thirty years has been the Chinook, the workhorse of the RAFs 
support function, the Chinook offers troop transport, resupply and battlefield 
casualty evacuation. 
 
Photo 36 - Troops boarding a Chinook Helicopter 
 
Source: RAF, available at http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/chinook.cfm (accessed 27 April 2017) 
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Since its introduction in the Malayan Emergency the helicopter has played an 
increasingly important part in all the RAFs subsequent small wars. However, this has 
not been without challenges. Although the helicopter provides a flexible platform on 
which can be delivered numerous functions, the challenge has been its vulnerability 
to asymmetric forces. By its very nature, the helicopter is slow moving and operates 
at lower altitude, this has made it susceptible to ground attack.  
 
Helicopters will continue to be an integral part of future small wars. Like aircraft 
evolution, the helicopter of the future will be stealthy and multi-role. The challenge 
that needs to be addressed is the vulnerability of advanced helicopters to asymmetric 
threats, this is particularly acute given the proliferation of advanced MANPADs 
(man portable air defense systems), like the SA-14 described earlier.   
Force Protection – reach, responsiveness and precision  
Force protection, or the ability to support ground forces, kinetically and non-
kinetically, has been one of the principal roles of airpower in modern small wars. 
Debate as to the efficacy of close air support, and the much-publicised errors that 
have occurred in this arena, has led many to question the suitability of many modern 
fast-jets to this role. As Jeremy Black has argued: 
 
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan also reveal a lack of flexibility on 
the part of "fast jets"607 
 
This is linked to the ongoing debate within the American military as to the future of 
dedicated close air support aircraft, such as the A-10 Warthog. Rotary wing aircraft 
                                               
607Jeremy Black, Air power (Lanham, MD, 2016), p. 274 
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are the best equipped to perform this role, however, in contested environments these 
aircraft are not ideally suited. Thus, we have seen a proliferation of fast jets 
performing close air support, sometimes with negative consequences.  
 
The application of force protection in Afghanistan and Iraq has been highly 
publicized within the media, since the possibility of civilian casualties is higher 
when targeting insurgents. However, the ability of aircraft to support ground forces 
has been a key enabler of operations in these two conflicts. The challenge for air 
forces operating in a small wars environment has been that the aircraft available to 
them, are not always well suited to the role they are trying to perform, as Joel 
Hayward has stated: 
 
Slower-speed, armoured, survivable and precise fixed-wing aircraft 
and gunships with good loiter capacity (such as the A-10 Warthog, the 
AC-130H Spectre and the AC-130U Spooky) may seem the answer [to 
providing close air support], but few air forces have them and, in the 
case of the gunships, few can afford them. UAVs (unmanned aerial 
vehicles) and UCAVs (unmanned combat aerial vehicles) are 
accordingly becoming far more numerous608 
 
The proliferation of UAVs and UCAVs has been marked in the RAF in the last two 
decades. While the primary mission of the MQ9 Reaper is intelligence, 
reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR), the RAF also states that: 
 
Its secondary mission is to provide pilot-commanded kinetic effect to 
Land Force commanders for fleeting targets that “pop up” in the 
battlespace and also to provide Close-Air-Support (CAS) options to the 
Reaper’s supported unit. 
                                               
608 Joel S. A. Hayward, ‘Air power and insurgency: some preliminary thoughts’, in Joel S. A. 
Hayward (ed.), Air power, insurgency and the ‘war on terror’ (Cranwell, United Kingdom, 2009), p. 
14 
311 
 
After its first introduction into service in 2007 as an ISR platform, within 12 months 
the Reaper was employing kinetic effect in Afghanistan. What is interesting about 
the Reaper is the fact that the RAF views its employment no differently than it does 
any other aircraft, manned or unmanned, this is seen in its view that: 
 
The Rules Of Engagement (ROE) used for Reaper weapon release are 
no different to those used for manned combat aircraft; the weapons are 
all precision guided, and every effort is made to ensure the risk of 
collateral damage and civilian casualties is minimised, this may include 
deciding not to release a weapon.609  
 
Regardless of the ROE in place for drones, the public perception of the use of drones 
in strike operations is conspicuosly negative. As Scott Shane summarised in a New 
York Times article: 
 
Some people find the very notion of killer robots deeply disturbing. 
Their lethal operations inside sovereign countries that are not at war 
with the United States raise contentious legal questions. They have 
become a radicalizing force in some Muslim countries. And 
proliferation will inevitably put them in the hands of odious regimes.610 
 
Air forces around the world are investing heavily in unmanned aircraft and 
automation, due to this they will need to address public concerns about the perceived 
inhumanity of strike operations conducted by unmanned or automonous military 
                                               
609 RAF, Reaper MQ9A RPAS, available at http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/reaper.cfm (accessed 
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vehicles. As Sarah Sewall argues, ‘avoiding civilian harm effectively makes ehical 
military behavior an operational imperative’.611 
 
The evolution of force protection has been closely aligned to the evolution of aircraft 
technology and to the perception of the relative importance of air operations in 
counterinsurgency environments. The evolution of technology within aircraft has 
had a decisive impact on the force protection role. The advance in precision guided 
munitions and the platforms from which they can be released has led to the 
utilization of modern fast jets in the force protection role. This has resulted in both 
positive and negative aspects. The positive impact relates to the ability of air forces, 
including the RAF, to retire older platforms while consolidating roles performed by 
newer platforms. Thus, in the RAFs case, we see the move away from the Tornado, 
and more reliance on newer platforms like the Eurofighter Typhoon, this will be 
further seen with the introduction of the F-35 in the coming years. Coupled with this 
has been an expansion of the role of UAV and UCAVs. The ability of these 
unmanned platforms to provide kinetic effect on the battlefield has introduced a 
great amount of flexibility to the employment of airpower in operational 
environments. The negative impact of some of these changes has been the perception 
that modern fast jets and unmanned aerial platforms do not provide the specialist 
capabilities many believe are required to provide close air support to troops in the 
field. This is particularly marked in counterinsurgency operations where the margin 
for error for weapons release has become smaller and smaller.  
 
                                               
611 Sarah Sewall, ‘Ethics’, in Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (eds.), Understanding 
counterinsurgency, doctrine, operations, and challenges (Oxon, UK, 2010), p. 206 
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The future of force protection would appear to be moving more towards the reliance 
on unmanned platforms and modern fast jets to provide this capability, however, in 
recent years there has been an ongoing debate as to the efficacy of using older 
technology aircraft to provide close air support, aircraft like the A-10, and newer 
platforms that are based on prop or turbo-prop engine technology. The extensive use 
of the Embraer Tucano in counterinsurgency operations against the FARC guerrillas 
in Colombia is a great example of this. The Afghan government has also invested in 
this aircraft and as recently as early 2017, the US armed forces trialled the use of an 
OV-10 aircraft in Iraq. The OV-10 was used extensively in the Vietnam conflict. 
 
Photo 37 - OV-10 Bronco 
 
Source – Airman Magazine, November 1984 
 
This potential return to the past offers significant advantages to air forces. On the 
one hand the aircraft are slow moving and have a good loiter capability, this is very 
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advantageous in a close air support role. Also, and potentially more significantly, 
these older aircraft offer the ability to provide close air support and 
counterinsurgency operations, at a price point that is very attractive. 
 
When we look at the roles and capabilities that the RAF purports to have, all of these 
are relevant to the counterinsurgency environment. It must also be remembered that 
capabilities of air forces must be looked at in relation to the impact that non-kinetic 
applications can have, along with the more traditional kinetic roles. These various 
roles encompass: 
 
Non-kinetic applications of airpower include electronic attack, counter 
IED support, combat search and rescue; intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR), command and control, space operations, 
mobility, and information operations. Kinetic applications of airpower 
include precision engagement in the interdiction, dynamic targeting or 
close air support roles612 
 
 
The ability of airpower to influence operations in the small wars environment is 
significant. Colin Gray believes that one of the great fallacies perpetrated in 
discussions about counterinsurgency strategy and tactics is the belief that airpower 
can have little impact in this operational environment: 
 
‘[…] Airpower can never be other than a minor player in the conduct 
of counterinsurgency warfare (COIN). Judgment: COIN is inherently 
land-, indeed, ground centric in nature. But this geostrategic and 
tactical fact does not mean that the varieties of airpower that support 
the ground effort can accurately or helpfully be described as being only 
of minor importance. In COIN today, airpower cannot be the leading 
edge to the military dimension, but it will always be quite literally 
                                               
612 Colonel Eugene L. McFeeley, Balancing the kinetic effects of airpower with counterinsurgency 
objectives in Afghanistan (US Army War College, PA, 2009), p. 18 
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essential.’613 
 
As Gray rightly asserts, although airpower will not be the predominant component of 
counterinsurgency operations, like it was in the air control era, it is undoubtedly 
essential. However, the challenge for the other military services, is the fact that 
airpower has played such a decisive role in modern military conflict, that its ability 
to secure a high proportion of defence expenditure is significant. As Benjamin 
Lambeth argues: 
 
[…] a high-stakes controversy has emerged in major capitals around 
the world centering on how best to apportion operational roles and 
budget shares among the services at a time of uncertain challenges and 
near-unprecedented fiscal constraints. Naturally, given the 
predominant role played by the allied air campaign in Desert Storm and 
the far-reaching claims made on behalf of air power as a result of its 
performance, the roles and resources controversy has gravitated toward 
air power as the principal lightning rod for debate.614 
 
 
As a result of this, political decision-makers have looked for ways in which airpower 
can be utilised in a far greater way that it had been in previous decades. The current 
operations against ISIS are a good example of this. The strategy of the western 
coalition would appear to be based on the utilisation of airpower to provide breathing 
space for the retraining and re-arming of indigenous forces, in this case the Iraqi 
military and the Kurdish forces.615 It remains to be seen whether this strategy will be 
successful. 
                                               
613 Colin S. Gray, Understanding airpower (Alabama, 2009), p. 12 
614 Benjamin S. Lambeth, ‘The role of air power going into the 21st century’, in Natalie W. Crawford 
and Chung-In Moon, Emerging threats, force structures, and the role of air power in Korea (Santa 
Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 2000), available at 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF152.html (accessed 31 October 2016) 
615 Arming Iraq’s Kurds: Fighting IS, inviting conflict, International Crisis Group, report no. 158 (12 
May 2015), available at https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-
peninsula/iraq/arming-iraq-s-kurds-fighting-inviting-conflict (accessed 04 September 2018) 
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As we analyse the contemporary RAF and its approach to doctrine and the 
application of airpower in small wars, can we consider them to be a learning 
organisation? An organisation that: 
 
[…] typically adds to, transforms, or reduces organizational 
knowledge. Theories of organizational learning attempt to understand 
the processes which lead to (or prevent) changes in organizational 
knowledge, as well as the effects of learning and knowledge on 
behaviors and organizational outcomes.616 
 
There is evidence to suggest that the RAF in recent decades has embraced learning 
in a certain way. It has shown an ability to pivot its approach and application of 
airpower, from one focused on conventional conflict, to one that appreciates the 
significance of unconventional operations. This is demonstrated in AP 3000 4th 
edition and Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30: UK air and space power (second 
edition), as well as the more informal communications coming from the RAF. 
Furthermore the establishment of the Directorate of Defence Studies (founded in 
1977) and the RAF Centre for Airpower Studies (founded in 2007) shows a desire by 
the RAF to create organisations that can capture, analyse and disseminate 
information of relevance throughout the organisation. This viewpoint is captured 
well in the RAF’s description of the Centre for Air and Space Power Studies: 
 
The Royal Air Force Centre for Air and Space Power Studies (RAF 
CASPS) is an RAF think tank which focusses on the strategic and 
conceptual study of air and space power.  It seeks to: generate 
evidence-based academic research; provide strategic influence through 
coordinated engagement with think tanks, allies and other professional 
bodies in the defence and policy space; leverage the intellectual 
                                               
616 Martin Schulz, ‘Organizational learning’ in The blackwell companion to organizations (2002), 
available at http://www.unc.edu/~healdric/Classes/Soci245/Schulz.pdf (accessed 17 April 2014), p. 1 
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horsepower of external institutions and RAF personnel; and help 
inculcate a philosophy of learning and critical thinking within the RAF 
(emphasis added).617 
 
One interesting way to analyse RAF thinking is to look at the annual reading list 
recommended by the Chief of the Air Staff. In 2017 this reading list includes books 
on ISIS, as well as the Libyan Civil War, its theme would appear to be about the 
changing international climate and how military power must adapt; a pivot from 
conventional to unconventional thinking.618 
 
  
                                               
617 https://www.raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/centre-for-air-and-space-power-studies/ (accessed 05 
September 2018) 
618 RAF, CAS reading list 2017, available at 
http://www.airpowerstudies.co.uk/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/20170615-cas-reading-list-
2017.pdf (accessed 25 August 2017) 
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Conclusion 
From The First World War to The Second Gulf War the importance of military 
aviation has been growing. While airpower may only have played a supporting role 
in the First World War, by the start of the twenty first century it is a core component 
in the planning for all military operations. In relation to its use in unconventional 
operations, this work has analysed the use of airpower by the RAF in small wars. In 
particular it focused on the relationsip between theory, doctrine and operations, and 
how each of these influenced the other. Furthermore, it has used this analysis to 
answer a key research question; does the evolution of doctrine, theory and practice, 
relevant to the use of airpower in unconventional operations, demonstrate that the 
RAF during this period can be considered a learning organisation? 
 
This work has examined the evolution in the approach to the use of airpower in small 
wars and counterinsurgency operations by the RAF since the end of the First World 
War to the present day. It has done this through a focus on some key small wars 
campaigns, including; British Somaliland, Iraq, Aden, Palestine, Transjordan, North-
West Frontier, Malaya, Kenya and also contemporary operations in the Middle East 
and Afghanistan. In doing this it has attempted to trace the impact of doctrine and 
theory on operations, and the impact of operations on succeeding theory and 
doctrine, through an examination of three core areas; theory, doctrine and practical 
application. Through this analysis it has looked to address a number of core research 
questions, all of which relate to the key research question mentioned above, namely; 
was there an evolution in relation to airpower doctrine and theory during this period 
as it related to small wars, did practical application during this period filter through 
into subsequent theory and doctrine, does the utilization of airpower in small wars in 
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the twentieth century provide lessons for its utility in the twenty first century, and 
finally, does the development of the RAFs approach to the utilization of airpower in 
small wars inform an opinion as to whether or not the RAF can be considered a 
learning organization. Much of this concluding chapter will address each of these 
points in detail.  
 
Was there an evolution in airpower doctrine, relative to small wars, in 
the period 1910-2010?  
When one looks at the evolution of doctrine in the last one hundred years there is an 
obvious dichotomy apparent. Between the end of The First World War and the start 
of The Second World War there is an apparent and traceable evolution in doctrine 
relevant to small wars, this began with the publication of CD-22 in 1922 and ends 
with the publication of AP 1300 in 1940. Within this period, we see a constant and 
consistent evolution in thought as to how airpower should be used in small wars. 
This doctrinal evolution is easily linked to the operational experience during this 
period. The RAF learned from its operations in British Somaliland, Afghanistan, Iraq 
and wider operations in the Middle East. The lessons from these operations were 
captured and ultimately encapsulated in later doctrinal publications. After The 
Second World War RAF doctrine was heavily influenced by two events; firstly, the 
creation of atomic and nuclear weapons, and secondly the establishment of NATO. 
The establishment of NATO has had a significant impact on RAF doctrine, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. NATO was established to create an alliance that 
would conduct operations against Soviet forces on the plains of Central Europe and 
did not consider small wars as an eventuality that needed to be accounted for. What 
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this meant for RAF doctrine was that NATO doctrine superseded RAF doctrine, and 
doctrinal change happened within the framework of NATO doctrine and not native 
RAF doctrine. Thus the first modern RAF doctrinal publication was only released in 
1991. The RAF was to suffer the consequences of this in its small wars of the 2000s.  
 
It is not until AP 3000 (4th Edition) that we see a concerted effort by the British 
military to officially examine the impact of asymmetric and hybrid warfare. There is 
now in the RAF a realisation that they must prepare for, and demonstrate an ability 
to play their part in, the Comprehensive Approach, as codified in AP 3000. Thus, 
when we analyse the period there are two waves of evolution, the first between 1920 
and 1940, and the second beginning in 2004, it is hoped that the second wave will 
continue to show an evolution in doctrine, however the danger is that 2004 
represents a point in time and not a transitory period from which further innovation 
and evolution of doctrine will begin. 
 
This new wave of focus on asymmetric and hybrid warfare is borne of nearly two 
decades of operations within small wars environments. However, this needs to be 
balanced with the evolving threats posed by the re-emergence of Russia and the 
growth of Chinese military capability. Thus we have a scenario where although the 
RAF are operating extensively within small wars environments today, they envitably 
need to also focus on their conventional role and what will be required to carry this 
out in the future. It is this balancing act that poses a risk, too much emphasis on one 
side has a detrimental effect on the other. This is where the advantages of a dynamic 
and evolutionary approach to doctrine creation and dissemination can prove 
invaluable. As Air Commodore Tim Garden has argued: 
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If the thoughts of today are not dated in ten year’s time by the march 
of technology and the countermoves of potential enemies, then we are 
not thinking enough.619 
 
Thus there is a requirement to not only think more, but to construct a doctrinal 
creation and dissemination process that ensures that doctrine is always relevant. 
 
Was airpower theory during the period examined reflected in airpower 
doctrine?  
British theorists had a significant impact on airpower in the interwar years, in 
particular Hugh Trenchard and John Slessor, however we do not see a significant 
British influence in the period after the end of the Second World War. Although 
John Slessor was to write extensively on nuclear theory, this topic was dominated by 
American theorists, writers like Bernard Brodie. In the main nuclear theorists were 
American, and airpower theorists also tended to be from the US, men like John Boyd 
and John Warden. British historians have written extensively about the history of 
airpower, but there is a dearth of British theorists. This is not a purely British 
phenomenon; the development of airpower theory has been limited in the last fifty 
years. Jeremy Black has recently highlighted a simple but impactful fact: 
 
In the early twenty-first century, there have been almost no major 
theoretical innovations or developments in air power. Practitioners 
today are more centered on method than outcomes.620 
 
 
                                               
619 Air Commodore Tim Garden, ‘Air power and the Royal Air Force, lessons from the past’, in 
Group Captain Andrew Vallance, Air power, collected essays on doctrine (London, 1990), p. 48 
620 Jeremy Black, Air power (Lanham, MD, 2016), p. 299 
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Thus, it is not surprising to conclude that there is little evidence of theory influencing 
doctrine in the RAF context after the Second World War. What is sometimes argued 
is that theory abounds and that the topic is well catered for, however when one looks 
at modern airpower writing it tends to focus on the history of airpower and some 
commentary on its future direction, there has been little if any focus on the theory of 
airpower and its employment. What is also interesting to note is that in the interwar 
period the writers of theory, were quite often also significant influencers when it 
came to doctrinal content, for example Trenchard’s influence on the RAF, and 
Mitchells on the output of the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS). 
 
Did practical experiences of airpower in small wars during this period 
filter through into subsequent airpower doctrine and theory?  
As has been shown, there are undoubtedly linkages between the practical application 
of airpower in small wars and doctrinal evolution, this is particularly apparent in the 
case of the interwar period. However, this same influence has not been seen in 
relation to airpower theory related to small wars. It can be argued that there has been 
a dearth of theory written specifically about the employment of airpower in small 
wars, work by John Andreas Olsen and David Jordan is the exception, rather than the 
rule in this regard.621 Although works do exist, the ratio of writing about 
                                               
621 For example see, John Andreas Olsen, Airpower Applied: U.S., NATO, and Israeli Combat 
Experience (2017), Airpower Reborn: The Strategic Concepts of John Warden and John Boyd (2015), 
Air Commanders (2012), The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present (2010), A 
History of Air Warfare (2009), John Warden and the Renaissance of American Air Power (2007), 
Strategic Air Power in Desert Storm (2003), Asymmetric Warfare (2002), A Second Aerospace 
Century (2001); David Jordan, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, Ian Speller, Christopher Tuck, C. 
Dale Walton, Understanding modern warfare (Cambridge, 2016); David Jordan, ‘Air and space 
power in the contemporary era: 1990-2030’, in David Jordan, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, Ian 
Speller, Christopher Tuck, C. Dale Walton, Understanding modern warfare (Cambridge, 2016) 
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conventional as opposed to unconventional airpower is not representative of the 
application of airppower today. From Douhet to Warden, airpower theorists have 
tended to focus on the employment of airpower in a conventional sense. 
Contemporary writers who have written about airpower in small wars, like Corum, 
Wray, Towle and Omissi have provided an historical review of airpower in small 
wars in the last century, but have not analysed that experience with a view to 
theorising on the application of airpower in small wars into the future.  
 
Does the application of airpower in small wars throughout the period 
provide lessons for its utility in the 21st century?  
Airpower, and its utilisation in armed conflict, is now over one hundred years old. 
Despite this, there has been, and continues to be, debate about how airpower is to be 
utilised, As David Jordan states, this debate: 
 
[…] often heated – has ebbed and flowed over the ensuing decades, 
frequently as practitioners, politicians and analysts, use the most recent 
conflict to espouse a particular view of airpower and the ‘right way’ to 
use it.622 
 
While it is dangerous to attempt to seize upon the lessons of the most recent conflict 
to plan for the next, it is equally dangerous to ignore the lessons of the past. With 
that sentiment in mind, we must understand what lessons can be learned from the 
RAF use of airpower in small wars over the last one hundred years. One of the ways 
in which western militaries can better learn from the past is to put in place 
                                               
622 David Jordan, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, Ian Speller, Christopher Tuck, C. Dale Walton, 
Understanding modern warfare (Cambridge, 2016), p. 228 
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mechanisms to allow them to learn more effectively. Matthew Kowalski explains 
this well when he states that in order for western militaries to be more successful in 
the prosecution of modern small wars there are three areas that must be addressed: 
 
First, “Western” militaries need to place greater emphasis on a political 
response to the contemporary confrontation and further develop their 
abilities to wage unconventional warfare, particularly MOOTW. 
Second, “Western” militaries must take more effective measures in 
creating the necessary functions to better learn from their mistakes. 
Third, “Western” governments must recognise the inherent limitations 
in attempting to eradicate and annihilate “terrorists.623  
 
It is Kowalski’s second point that must be an area of focus going forward in order to 
capture and leverage the existant knowledge. The body of knowledge used to 
extrapolate must include emergent trends and threats, but this information must also 
be combined with the experiences of the past. As Dave Sloggett has so presciently 
stated: 
 
One of the enduring aspects of air power in its first century is its ability 
to be flexible, agile and adaptable to changing technology and 
geostrategic viewpoints. In its second century, those enduring 
characteristics are unlikely  to change.624 
 
 
The ability of air forces and airmen to correctly analyse the past for potential lessons 
is a crucial aspect of creating doctrine and theory for the future. As Neville Parton 
has so eloquently stated: 
 
The question, therefore, is not so much whether or not history has 
anything to offer, but how people should be trained to understand what 
                                               
623 Matthew Kowalski, ‘Global insurgency or global confrontation? Counter-insurgency doctrine and 
the “long’ war” on terrorirm’, in Defense & Security Analysis, vol. 24, no. 1 (March 2008), pp 65-71, 
p. 68 
624 Dr. Dave Sloggett, A century of air power (Barnsley, 2013), p. 193 
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can be learned. They need to be given an “analytical toolbox” necessary 
to determine what may be usefully deduced.625  
  
So what are the key lessons that can be learned from the first one hundred years of 
the RAFs use of airpower in small wars? Certainly in the period studied we see a 
significant trend towards the reduction in the kinetic application of airpower in small 
wars and an increase in the use of non-kinetic applications. In a practical sense this 
results in the increased use of airpower in a supporting role. Key applications include 
mobility and reconnaisance, both of which have been increasing in importance 
throughout the last century. Certainly in the last two decades, mobility in particular 
has become a key airpower role. However, this conclusion must not detract from the 
important part that kinectic applications of airpower can bring to a small wars 
environment. Again this is typically in a supporting role, however the ability of 
airpower to provide fire support and ‘precise effect’ is, and will be, enduring. 
 
Does the development of doctrine during this period tell us something 
about the ability, or inability, of the RAF to implement practical 
changes based on the evidence of operational experience? (i.e. can the 
RAF be considered an effective learning organization?). 
When one looks at the period in question it is not straight-forward to determine 
whether the RAF can be considered a learning organisation. If we focus on two key 
aspects this becomes clear. Firstly, did the RAF add to, transform or reduce 
                                               
625 Group Captain Neville Parton, ‘In defence of doctrine…but not dogma’, in Defense & Security 
Analysis, vol. 24, no. 1 (March 2008), pp 81-9, p. 84 
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organisational knowledge during this period? and secondly, did the RAF take a 
systems thinking approach, or rather did they evolve their thinking in silo’s, thus not 
appreciating the impact as experienced throughout the organisation. When one looks 
at the period through the context of these two questions then a clear dichotomy 
emerges between the interwar period and the post Second World War period.  
 
It is apparent within the interwar period that the RAF certainly added to and 
transformed their knowledge base. This is seen in the evolution of interwar doctrine 
and specifically the elements of that doctrine that related to small wars. However, 
even in this period of evolution, this thinking seems to have been done in a silo; the 
thinking of how to conduct air operations in a small wars environment did not seem 
to influence core conventional doctrine. Furthermore, informal doctrine, as 
evidenced through staff college lectures, once again appears to have focussed solely 
on the applicability of that thinking in a small wars environment and not its potential 
impact on wider doctrine. This is evidenced in an analysis of the small wars syllabus 
of the RAF Staff College in the interwar period.626 
 
When we look at the theoretical writings, there is a dearth of theory published in the 
interwar period that talks to the experience of conducting operations in a small wars 
environment, thus there does not appear to be a theoretical outlook to influence 
                                               
626 For a list of lectures given as part of the small wars syllabus, see, Andrew John Charles Walters, 
Inter-war, inter-service friction on the North-West Frontier of India and its impact on the 
development and application of Royal Air Force doctrine (PhD thesis, University of Nirmingham, 
2017), Annex 5, pp 423-9 
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higher level RAF thinking, as was evidenced with the impact that interwar airpower 
theorists (eg. Douhet and Trenchard) had on conventional doctrine. 
 
When one looks at the post Second World War period this lack of theoretical writing 
on airpower in small wars is compounded by a lack of doctrinal focus. Whereas the 
interwar RAF gave considerable attention to the small wars environment, coming out 
of the Second World War this attention faded. It is not really until the late 1980s and 
1990s that we see a resurgence in writing about the small wars environment, and not 
until the 2000s do we see this reflected in official RAF publications. 
 
Thus the conclusion is that the RAF displays some characteristics of a learning 
organisation, at a number of points in its history, however it would be untrue to say 
that the RAF is a learning organisation. It does not appear to have the attributes that 
you would expect to find in a learning organisation. A learning organisation is an 
organisation where: 
 
people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly 
desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, 
where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually 
learning how to learn together.627 
 
The RAF certainly has the experience of operating in a small wars environment, 
probably more so than any other western air force, however their focus until very 
recently has still been on conventional capability and planning for a conventional 
conflict.  
                                               
627 Peter M. Senge, The fifth discipline: the art and practice of the learning organization (Revised 
edition, London, 2006), p. 3 
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A point of focus for modern military forces needs to be on the concept of 
adaptability. As can be seen in the analysis conducted in this work, the doctrinal 
creation process is slow at the best of times, thus in the future a new concept of 
doctrine, or perhaps a new process for its creation and dissemination needs to be 
considered. The lag that has been demonstrated is simply at odds in the digital age in 
which military forces need to operate. Benjamin Jensen in discussing how military 
officers need to escape the ‘iron cage’ of doctrine, argues that: 
 
‘doctrinal change requires incubators, informal subunits established 
outside the hierarchy, and advocacy networks championing new 
concepts that emerge from incubators. Ranging from special study 
groups to war games, test beds and field exercises, incubators provide 
a safe space for experimentation and the construction of new 
operational concepts. Incubators form sites where officers engage in 
what scholar-practitioner Thomas Mahnken calls speculation, a search 
‘to identify novel ways to solve existing operational problems’. These 
concepts […] become the foundation of new doctrine articulating a 
theory of how to fight and win future conflicts’.628  
 
 
Further research related to the areas highlighted above would be very beneficial. 
Examples of areas requiring exploration include; quantitative analysis of small wars 
and counterinsurgency operations, in particular the analysis of aircraft type and 
sortie rates of kinetic and non-kinetic airpower, an analysis of fiscal spending in the 
last number of decades to understand where RAF spending has been focussed and 
whether or not this is justified through its actual application. Finally, and one of the 
key areas for further analysis, would be a review of educational strategy within the 
                                               
628 Benjamin Jensen, ‘Escaping the iron cage: the institutional foundations of FM 3-24. 
counterinsurgency doctrine’, in Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 39, no. 2 (2016), pp 213-230, p. 214 
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contemporary RAF and an understanding of the linkages that exist between learning 
and the doctrinal creation process within the RAF. As Jeremy Black has argued: 
 
Whatever the nature of the distribution of international power in the 
future, it is likely that major states will continue to have to plan for 
symmetrical and asymmetrical conflict, and for high- and low-tech 
military operations, In turn, these categories are malleable, may require 
continual redefinition, and can overlap.629 
 
Thus, one of the greatest challenges for modern air forces, including the RAF, is to 
get the balance right. On the one hand to ensure capability to conduct conventional 
operations, while on the other being cognizant of the current threat landscape and the 
nature of operations that need to be conducted. Air Chief Marshal Sir Andrew 
Pulford recognised this in a speech in 2015 when he stated that: 
 
‘Global strategic trends 2040’, ‘Future operating environment 2035’ 
and a ‘Primer for the new future air and space operating concept’ are 3 
key documents now informing the UK’s ongoing strategic defence and 
security review. The picture they paint is one of complex global 
challenges on the horizon with no simple solutions for their 
resolution.630  
 
 
It is documents like these that will help inform doctrine. Doctrine will be a key 
enabler of helping states plan for the future. A key way in which this can be achieved 
is through the creation and dissemination of appropriate doctrine, as Hoiback has 
argued: 
 
[…] the point is that doctrine ought to be explanatory, culturally 
sensitive, and authoritative in order to have effect.  
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The balancing of the three elements above, i.e. theory, culture and 
authority, can be done in different ways, and by doing so can produce 
three ‘ideal types’ of doctrine: doctrine as a tool of command, doctrine 
as a tool of change, and doctrine as a tool of education. As a tool of 
command, doctrine says authoritatively what to do; as a tool of change, 
it says authoritatively what to be; and, as a tool of education, it says 
what we do, and why, and who we are for the time being.631  
 
 
The only way the RAF can truly display the flexibility required to meet future 
challenges is by becoming, in every sense, a true learning organisation. An 
organisation that captures and diseeminates knowledge, that encourages and drives 
learning amongst its people, and encourages and supports engagement and feedback 
at all levels of the organisation. The good news is that the RAF has begun to do this. 
The role of the RAF Learning Force is: 
 
[…] dedicated to helping members of the Royal Air Force, Royal Air 
Force Reservists their families and MOD employed personnel realise 
their full potential through Lifelong Learning. 
 
The Royal Air Force provides its personnel with a range of Educational 
and Training opportunities.632  
 
 
While the RAF facilitates and encourages learning, it also emphasizes the 
importance of the person’s commitment to learning, thus it defines personal 
development as: 
 
Where an individual takes responsibility for experiential or academic 
learning in achieving their own personal goals and career aspirations, 
which also enhance the effectiveness of the organisation.633 
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Thus the RAF on the one hand provides the apparatus for learning, on the other it 
emphasizes the importance of the individual in achieving development. This is a key 
trait of a learning organisation. The final part of the equation is to ensure that an 
environment is created: 
 
where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where 
collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually 
learning how to learn together.634 
 
 
The RAF has the foundations in place to become a learning organisation and in an 
age where it is becoming increasingly difficult to attract and retain top talent, this 
will become ever more important. Thus the RAF must now utilise these foundations 
to deliver on the vision of the RAF Learning Force. 
 
  
                                               
634 Peter M. Senge, The fifth discipline: the art and practice of the learning organization (Revised 
edition, London, 2006), p. 3 
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